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Hazi hds always sought, to cj.aiploy military threats short
of actual conflict to achieve political objectives. The
initial response of statesrren to the dsvelopracnt of nuclear
weapons v/as to viev/ tliem as ir.ore significant in torin.s of
their political value than previous v/eapo:is had proven. This
perception is relevant today in that decisions of nations
regarding the value of acquiring nuclear weapons are largely
dependent upon political rather than military ccnsideiations.
However, the passage of tin^e has demonstrated that the polit-
ical utility of nuclear weapons is not as significant as was
initially thought. The vastly increased destructivenc ss of
these weapons is considered by some to have ruBde the threat
of their use credible only for defending a state's perceived
vital interests. In the extreme view, the only political
utility of such forces is to nullify &v.Z neutralise the
political value of siiailar forces deployed by potential
opponents. However, even those w};o hold to this belief con-
cede that a nuclear stalemate could result in some advantage
to either one of the superpowers depending on the possession
of other consent! >?naJ. military fences and the mutually per-
ceived will to use them for limited objectives. Nevertheless,
in the abserce of absolute parity in strategic weapons sys-
tems, r.he real or alleged differences in f^-ach systems affect
both the political perceptions of opposing states and third




creat-ion of uncertainties influences.
Political use of railitary capabilities is a highly
subjective exercise , It involves a nation's own assessment
of the iTiilitary balance and its trends and its evaluation of
how its potential opponents viev? the sarae or slightly differ-
ent data and the perceived wiJl of the parties to employ
their forces. Modern intelligence devices have brought
force level estimates closer mo being objective realities.
The greaL remaining uncertainties are found in attempting to
qualitatively assess the relative military capabilities of
each potential opponent ana to determine the probable tacti-
cal employment of his forces. Since almost all strategic
weapons systems have never been tested in combat conditions,
great uncertainties exist about the quality of a nation's
own forces, not to mention -chose of its potential opponents.
It does not follow, however, that these uncertainties are
balanced between potenticiJ adversaries. Uncertainty may be
greater for one side than the other. This is the situation
where military threat is most likely to achieve political
advantage by exploiting or even increasing the opponent's
uncertainties. Several options are open to states which
induce uncertainty with re£-pect to strategic weapons systems:
1. Assertion of the possessiori of military capabilities
or of forces which employ these capabilitiesi
2. Taking political or military actions which presuppose
the possession of military capabilities;
3. Demonstration of partial military capabilities in an
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attempt to induce potential adversaries to conclude
that full capabilities exist;
4. Violent or non-violent actions which imply confidence
m claims of strategic capabilities where acquiescence
or ineffectual resistance by potential opponents v;ould
suggest that thoy share the perception of the claimed
capabilities
,
To the extent that strategic weapons systems support these
options, they are seen to possess political utility. In the
post-Stalin period, particularly during the period of i:ikita
Khrushchev's leadership, the Soviet Union employed these
options either singly or in combinations, notably in the
creation and the manipulation of the "Bomber Gap" and the
"Missile Gap."
A policy of manipulating uncertainties entails major
risks and costs. At one extreme, it may result in a nuclear
exchange. At the other, it may be completely overlooked by
the potential opponent. In between, it may result in an
unanticipated response by the opponent which requires an
abrupt retreat with its attendant political costs, such as
occurred during the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962, or
it may result in significantly greater inferiority such as
followed the "BoKiber Gap" and "Missile Gap." Further, it
m.ay strengthen the arguments of those in the opposing state's
bureaucracy who are arguing for policies at odds with the
threatening state's broader interests, but not directly
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relcited to the threat bfi.'.ng iT.ccdec
Politically, types of strategic weapons systeius may be
employed in a kind of tacit or explicit bargaining proce;-:E
with a potential adversary. Thomas C. Schelling has described
such a procese as a "dialogue of competitive armaments."'
Such a dialogue may involve more talking at, a potential
opponent than talking with him. Elements employed in a dia-
logue of ccrr^p'iti tivci armaments include the release of selec-
tive information about technical characteribtics or opera-
tional capabilities of existing or potential weapons systems;
increased or decrear;ed budgetary support for those systems
j
announcements of adjustrcients in projected or existing force
levels; statements of support for related systems by influ-
entia3 officialt>; and announcerr>entc concerning the intended
missions for those forces. Although these elements hove
importar:t functions in domestic national security policy
deliberations, they el so may be expected to influence the
planning of nc^tential adver sarier. . Since a major input to
military planning involves responses to perceived threats to
a state's security* armanent decisions are to some extent
reactive. Considerations other than the probable reaction
of potential opponents may be more important in individual
m.ilitary planning decisions, but the reactive element must be
anticipated. For this reason, in addition to the primarily
1. Thoaiac C, Schelling, Arms and Inf ^luence, (New Raven and
London J Yale University press, 1?'Go), pp. 260-286.
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domectic elements outlined abe"e, a dialogue cf competitive
anriaroents may include direc-c ci tacit statements or actions
whose primary goal is to influence the perceptions of poten-
tial opponents. Typical exarciplas inclu-'le overt linkage of
a natior. • s own weapons systeras as counters to those of.
potential adversaries, comparisons of opposing force levels
to advocate increases in a nation's ovm forces, rind state-
ments which attempt to induce potential opponent?} to alter
their apparent force posture intentions.
Such a dialogue is more than an exercise in interstate
communications. Where strategic weapons are involved, the
potential survival of the state is at stake. In this case,
the dialogue serves to establish and reinforce the state's
conimitment to defend itself agc:.inst real or perceived mili-
tary threats. Additionally, since modern weapons are so
closely linked with advanced technological competence, impor-
tant prestige considerations are involved. Therefore, the
dialogue may be expanded to include statements or actions
intended to influence third parties. Finally, the costs of
modern weapons systems, particularly those involving strate-
gic offensive and defensive forces, insures that vital state
interests are involved in such a dialogue. The fact that a
dialogue exists represents an attempt to keep those costs
vjithin absolute limits.
Following the development and deployment of the inter-
continental ballistic missile and the submarine-launched
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ballistic missile, both Soviet and United States spokes.T.en
acknowledged that the next military development and procure-
ment plateau to be surnounted involved antimissile defenses
to counter these v^eapons. To a limited extent, the decisions
to deploy such defenses have been tentatively made. Limited
defenses are being built tind extensive research and develop-
ment prograias conducted while each side probes and exam.ines
the other's future intentions. In the latter half of the
decade of the 1960 's, increasing prospects for arrris limita-
tion agreements involving these systems further complicated
the issue as did the developme:nt of improved offensive tech-
nology, notably in the form of penetration aids and multiple
warheads.
The purpose of this paper is to outline the questions
incident to the development of antimissile defense systems,
to examine the United States-Soviet antimissile defense
dialogue as a case study of tlie use of weapons systems to
manipulate military technological developments for political
purposes, and to evaluate the role of antimissile defense
systems in larger questions of national strategies.
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The^ Antiijil ssile Defense Debat.e
Before analyzing the dieloguc on entiraisrile defense
betvyecn the United states and the Soviet Union, it is im-
portant to eet do^-rn some bacJcground infonration. The polit-
ical dialogue to bo diccuseed takes place figainst a back-
ground of technological factorr. , system missions, and widoly
varying opinions on the wisdom of system deployinent.
Ballistic roisciles in flight pass through three general
phasofit the boost ph?ise vrhere they are launched in povrered
flight upwfJird through the atmosphere and downrange to thrust
termination and reentry body release above the ati'fiOspht:*.re
j
the ballistic phase where the reentry body moves downrange
in a free-fall trajectory above the atmosphere j and the re-
entry phftDO back through the earth's atmosphere to the tar-
get. Froia the standpoint of the defense, ballistic missiles
can be attacked during each of these phases. Each poses
special problems Biid has sone advantages over the other two.
Attack during the boost phase requires rapid reaction tiiTie
and high interceptor acceleration for the defensive system.
It require? placing the defensive system aboard satellites,
shlpc, or aircraft along predicted flight paths as close to
1. For a particularly detailed overvisv; of ballistic missile
fiighr pr.ths and advanced guidance technology, see D. G.
Koo-g, "Ballistic-missile Guidance," in B. T. Feld, T.
Grecnvocd, G, v;. Rathjens, and S. Weinberg, eds.. Impact
of New T^chnolccTJes on the Arms Race
, (Cambridge and
TJondons The m"!" I. T, Press,"" 1971 ) , pp. 19-108.'
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potential cneniy launch points ae possible. The primary ad-
vantage of boost phase intercept is that it allov;s for
interception of the offensive missile before penetration
aids and multiple warheads are deployed. Vulnerability of
the defensive platform to enemy counterattack prior to bal-
listic missile launch and system cost are the primary dis-
advantages.
Exoatm.ospheric (above the atmosphere of tlie earth)
attack during the free-fall phase allows for detection,
evaluation of the threat, end interceptor launch over a
matter of a few minutes rather than seconds. During this
phase, the opportunities for offensive deception are great-
est, a factor which is countered by the fact that nuclear
effects allow for the defense to employ large warheads with
increased tolerances for miss distances. Area defense cys-
teras enploy exoatmospheric intercept.
Point defense systems intercept incoming warheads
during the reentry phase. The same characteristics of rapid
reaction time and high interceptor acceleration common to
boost phase interceptors are required for point defense.
The main advantage of this type of intercept is that it
allows the increasing density of the atmosphere to remove
the majority of offensive penetration aids or to separate
there from the actual warhead. The primary disadvantage is
that low yield defensive warheads are required to avoid self-
destruction which in turn requires high accuracy. Larger
yield warheads could be used in point defense of non-populated
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areas, such as offensive missile bases. However, point de-
fense of cities would require comprehensive shelter and
civil defens* programs \f other than low yield v?arheadj? were
to be empioyea. The relative complexity of the individual
defensive miasiies rnaker point defense generally more ex-
pensive than area defense,
Tc be effective* antimissile defense must fulfill a
number of functions* First, the defensive system must detect
incoming warheads as th«y approach the area to be defended.
Although this function may theoretically be accomplished in
a variety of ways, the most likely solution involves the use
of radar. Modern, low frequency, high power radars can ac-
quire most incoming objects as they enter the line of sight
of the radar. Due to the earth's curvature, the range of
this acquisition will be dependent upon the trajectory of
Incoming objects. For the normal, minimum energy trajectory
where the maximum altitude is about 800 miles, initial detec-
tion could take place at about 2000 miles, approximately 10
minutes prior to the time of impact at the intended target.
For lofted trajectories, the initial detection range may be
greater. For depressed or fractional orbital trajectories
where the objects remain below an altitude of 100 miles,
initial detection could be made at a range of less than 800
miles, about 3 minutes prior to impact. Further developjii»nt
of "over the horizon** radars will increase initial detection
ranges. At Initial detection ranges, the defenoe may not be
able to d2»teimine what is coming, only that scraething is
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approaching* At t'ais point, the attacker has lost most of
the eleir-snt of surprise. Since the tracking radars are
linked to high-speed computers, the projected flight track
and impact point can be determined quiOcly, 'if tho defensive
system iy of the area defense type which relies on OKoatmos-
pheric interception, the antimiscile missile would be laun-
ched as aoon after initial detection as track determination
2is completed.
The second problem for the defense is to discriminate
between real incoming warheads and false onet:* The sophti-
cated attacker must be expected to attempt to saturate the
defense with penetration aids and multiple warheadn to con-
front it with more incoming objects thr'n it has defensive
missiles. Among the types of penetration aids diecuFsed in
open sources are cheff, balloonc* bropter rocket fragments,
heavy and light decoys, electronic countermeasures, and
blackout effects.
Chaff is fine metal wire cut to one-half the wavelength
of the defensive rads^r. The wavelength can be obtained by
intercepting and analyzing signals fram the defensive radar.
2, If the defensive missile has a •*loJter*' ce.pability - the
ability to slow or coast to conserve fuel above the
atmosphere and to alter its course during this period to
take advantage of further radar tracking - early launch
has the dual advantages of early attack while reentry
bodies are closer T:ogether and allows more time for re-
attack if the initial intercept is unsuccessful*
3. Richard L, G^rv/in &nd rians A. Bothe, "Anti-Ballistic
Missile Systems," scientific Arrerican, Karch 1963, p, 27,
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The pcft/er and mission of these radars insure that their sig-
nals will be radiated outside the borders of the defended
nation. Dispersed over a large volume of space and travel-
ling at the same velocity as the reentry body, chaff dras-
tically increases background noise seen by the radar. The
key to effective chaff employment is even distribution in
space. In this case, it would not be possible for the. de-
fense to know where the warhead is located within tlie chaff
cloud and it would be forced to expend several defensive
warheads to cover the entire cloud. Chaff would not be as
effective within the atmosphere since it is far less dense
and would become rapidly separated from the warheads.
At the present time, balloons appear to be the best
4
exoatmospheric penetration aids. They are only effective
in the area above the atmosphere and can be made of thin
plastic covered with raetal foil to make their radar cross-
section approximate that of a warhead. Inflated and ejected
as soon as the offensive missile clears the earth's atmos-
phere, the primary difficulty with balloons is to put them
on trajectories which terminate at credible objectives.
Properly programmed, the defensive system's computers could
reject those incoming objects which lack such impact points.
4. Aviation Week and Space Technology , 20 July 1970, p. 20.
5. The radar cross-section of an object is defined as the
electronic characteristics of the radar returns from
that object e Radar cross-sections of reentry bodies may
be obtained through instrumented testing over a range of





However, if the defense I3 an area defense eyst^^m which seeks
to protect the entire nation , even objects without ''creditle
objectives*' must be taken under att*ick« Due to their low
density, b^illoons will be drastically slowed on reentering
the atmosphere and will separate from the warhead and burn.
Booster rocket fragments can be deliberately created by
blowing up the last stage of the booster rocket after buru-
out# In theory, these fragments could be deliberately sized
to approximate the radar cross-section of the warhead or
allcn-red to disintegrate into randomly sized fragments. In
practice, booster fragments have proven somewhat counterpro-
ductive. The heavy debris has tended to cluster around the
warhead "attracting r^^dar attention" while the light frag-
ments are easily sorted out by computer programming based
on their radar cross-section. Like chaff and balloons,
booster fragments are less dense than warheads and become
separated on rtientry, A defensive system based on point
defence could take advantage of the phenomenon known as
"atmospheric borti»;g" to reduce nixmbers of objects it is
confronted with. Although th€;y are carried at a signifi-
cant price in payload weight, hez^vy decoys whose radar cross-
section and aerodynaimic characteristics approximate those of
the vrarhe'id could bo carried tc confuse and attempt to sat-
urate point defenses. Electronics ccunternrcasures could be
included at o lesser penalty in payload weight to Jain or




Blackout effects are clightly similar to those of chaff
except that objects behind blackont effects cannot be detect-
ed by the defensive rad'sir, whil-ij objects outside a cloud of
chsff can be detected^ Self-blackout can result from the
detonations of the warheads of defensive missil&s. Other
blackout n;ay be the result of so-called "precursor" attacks
in which the attacker deliberately u.3tonate£> large yield
warheads above tlie atmosphere to confuse the defence and
allow the bulk of the remainder of the attack to penetrate
7the defense. Rr.dar blackout is caused by the large amount
of free electrons released by a nuclear detonation. These
free electrons are the result of the ionization of atoms and
molecules in the thin upper atniosphere, Ioni2aticn is caused
by the intense heat of the fireball and the release of beta
radiation by the radJ.©active debris of the detonation. Ion-
ization effects are more pronounced at the lower frequencies
vhich provide the best long range radar performance. Atten-
uation varies inversely with the square of the radar fre-
quency. Scientific testimony in 1970 indicated that the
Soviet "Hen House" radar had an operating frequency of about
150 megahertz and that the proposed United States Perimeter
S
Acquisition Radar (PAR) would operate at 450 megahertz.
Using the above outlined relationship, the "Hen House" is
1* George Ac W, Baehro^ "Courtdown for Nike-X," Fortune
,
Koveniber 1965, p. 133.
e* Aviation W^ek and Space le'^hnolocry , 20 July 1970, p* 20,
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nine times as vulnerable to blackout effects as is PAR. For:
the reasons? outlined above, discrimination is perhaps the
most difficult aspect of defense against ballistic missiles,
particularly for area defense systems. The major techno-
logical uncertainties are computer programs capable of deal-
ing with saturation attacks and discriminating between the
radar "signatures" of actual warheads and those of penetra-
tion aids.
The third function is launching the interceptor missile.
For an exoatmospharic intercept, the launch may precede
final discrimination, particularly if the interceptor mis-
sile has a "loiter" capability. An early initial launch may
allow the defense to employ "shoot-look-shoot" tactics to
conserve interceptors by withholding cubEoqucnt launches
until the results of previous interceptions are known,''
Since point defense delays launch to take advantage of atmos-
pheric sorting where the heavier warheads fall faster than
the decoys, discrimination is not as crucial. An additional
factor Is that the higher frequency radars associated with
point defense systems are less vulnerable to blackout effects.
Delayed launch requires missiles with rapid response time,
high thrust, and a capability to climb rapidly to the high-
est poeeible intercept altitudes. "Shoot-look-shoot" tac-
tics may also be employed by point defenses.




Firjaliy, the defense must destroy the incoming warheads.
In theory, defensive inissiles could enipioy either nuclear or
conventional vrarhcads. The capability of even a lov yield
nuclear detonation to destroy an incoming warhead is virtucil-
ly certain If the detonation tekes place in cIopo proximity
to the incoming warhead. Kcr«vever, if such a perfect inter-
cept could be reliably achieved^ a conventional cintimissiie
warhead would b€t just &s lethal without producing detrimen-
tal electromagnetic effects which degrade radar performance.
In practice, such intercepts are not anticipated and nuclear
v/arheads must be used to compensate for reasonable miss dis-
tances in actual intercepts. The detonation of the defen-
sive nuclear warhead will produce blast, heat, and radiation.
Blast and neutron or x-rey bombardment are primary kill m^ch-
anisms.
Point defense tystens which employ intercept within the
earth's atmosphere depend upon neutron bombard-xent and blast
tc destroy Incoming v^arheads. Since point defense detona-
tions occur fairly close to the defended targets, it is ne-
ceoeary tc keep the yield of the defensive warhead &e sir.a.11
as possible which In turn makes close miss distance inter-
cepts mandatory. Neutrons can penetrate matter of any kind,
but their intensity is rapidly attenuated within the atmos-
phere. At close range, they will penetrate the inconiing
10, Garwin and Bethe, "Anti-Ballistic Missile Systenis,
Scientific American, March 1968, p. 26.

warhead's heat shield and outer jacket end entf.r the nuclear
material. The resulting fissions in thlt; material may cause
sufficient heat to deforn the precisely designed shape of th&
nuclear material and to cause the v/arhead to fall as a dud.
If the neutron flux is high enough, it may cause premature
12
detonation of th^ incoraing warhead. To reduce the effect-
iveness of this kill mechanism, the attacker may increase the
shielding of his warheads which reduces their yield for a
given weight. Blast effect is most pronounced at lower alti-
tudes. Shock loading of warhetd components is the primary
kill mechanism. It can be countered by designing the v/arhead
to have extraordinary structural strength at a penalty of in-
creased weight. Additionally, blast may deflect the warhead
from its intended flight path causing it to miii.c its target.
Above the atmosphere, the area defense syiiitcm depends
on x-radiation for its kill mechanism. Kegaton-range deton-
13
ations emit most of their energy release as x-re.ys. The
Intervening atmosphere provides adequate protection for the
population below. Low fission output of radioactivity to
reduce radar blackout is also a desirable feature for this
11. Time , 26 May 1967, p, 46.
12. The Key; York Time s > news article by Wallace Turner,
25 July 1971, p, 41.
13. Time , 26 May 1967, p, 46, Hig>i energy x-rays consti-
tute &3 m'ich ac 80 per cent of the energy cutout of a
meqaton-'ianqe detonation. X-ray output may be increased
by decve.^-^.lng the aracunt ci" Uranid\-23C in the warhead ^s
outer shell and using more tritium.
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warhead, Vvhen x-rays strike an incoming reentry vehicle, c
portion of the heat shield is turned into a pl^isma and a
shock wave is created within the warhead which may destroy
th© heat shield, causing the warhead to burn up on reentry.
If the internal shock wave is strong enough, it may destroy
internal components or set off the high e>:plosive booster*
X-rays will not alter the radar characteristics of the in-
coraing warhead, so the defender v;ill not know whether he
has succeeded in destroying it until the warhead reenters
14
the atmoBphere, As was true for other nuclear effects,
warhead shielding and hardening can reduce the effective-
ness of x-rays as a kill m^^chanism. Again, reduced warhead
yield is the key trade-off.
Although both the Soviet Union and the United States
conducted high altitude experiments in their last atmos-
pheric nuclear testing scries, these tests were far from
exhaustive and major extrapolations are required to predict
nuclear effects in and above the atmosphere, underground
tests and laboratory simulations have been carried out, but
1 s
uncertainties still abound.
Contemporary deterrence theory assigns two chief func-
tions to strategic weapons i "assured destruction" and "damage
14, Garwin and Icthe, •Anti-Ballistic iMissile Systems,"
Scientific American , March 1968, p. 27.
15, For a highly detailed technical discussion of nuclear
effects, see R, pay, "U.S. ABM Would Imperil Test Ban
Treaty, •• Technolo<jy Week , 20 March 1967, p, 14.
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limitation." Former Secretary of Defense Robert C. McNarrara
dAfined assured destruction as the ability "to inflict at all
times and under all foreseeable conditions an unacceptable
degree of damage upon any single aggressor, or con\bination of
aggressors - even after absorbing a surprise attack. •• Dam-
age limitation is the ability "to reduce the potential damage
of a nuclear attack upon the United States through the use of
17
both offensive and defensive weapons." Depending upon
their assigned mission and pattern of di-ployment, antimissile
defense systems may contribute to the fulfillment of either
tVie "ajisured destruction" or the "dcimage limitation" function
or a combination of the two. Missions for antimissile defen-
ses vrhich have been discussed fa] 1 into the follov^ing cate-
gories i damage lim.itation for the entire nation if deterrence
fails, protection against accidental or anonyiuous attack,
protection of offensive missile bases to degrade the advan-
tages of a surprise attack on retaliatory forces, cojTipllca-
tion of the strategic calculations of potential enemies by
creating or exacerbating uncertainties about the probabili-
ties of the success of an attack, and defense of the nation
to destroy attacking missiles which survive a disarming first
strike by one's offensive forces.
16, Robert S, McNam.ara, Fiscal Year 1969-73 Defense Program
and Fiscal Year 1969 Deren se Budget, Department of De-
fense monograph, 1 February 1963, p. 47.
17. Clark Clifford, Fiscal Yaar 1970-74 pefgnse Program and
Fiscal Year 1970 Defense Budget ^ Department of Defense
monograph, 15 January 1969, p.~47.

Dojn&qe limitcition if deterrence fails i » the **gut** mis-
sion for an antimissile defense system, Vy'Viilr this mission
is damage limitation for superpower confrontations, it rray be
a mission of "damage denial" for small power att-acks. The
anti-China cirea defense concept of the sentinel system an-
nounc*?.d in Septftraber 1961 had such a mission. To fulfill
this nission, an area defense, possibly augmented with point
defense of key cities, ie the most likely deployment pattern.
The **thickness" of the system may vary r.ccording to the
amount of dsimage limitation sought, the strength of the anti-
cipated attack, and the estimated sophietication of the ex-
pected attack. The deployir.ent p<?.ttern will also be dependent
on what elements of the populat.5.on and resources of the
nation are considered moot necessary for the continued func-
18tioning of that nation.
Protection against accidantal or anonymous t^ttack could
probably be accorr»plishcd by a relatively thin area defense
system. Although the probability of an accidental attack is
low, it iL posEiible, The k<«y question in the evaluation of
the validity of this mission is politiccJ % does the remote
possibility of such a launcli warrant the expenditure of sev-
eral billion dollcaB by itself? For this reason, this mission
is usually treated as a bonus by antimissile defense advocates
18. For a positive analysis of thia mission, see Donald G,
Erennan, "The Case for Population Defense," in Johan J.
Hoist and Willit.m Schneider, Jr., eds, , Wny ASM?, (New
Yorkt PergcjT.on Press, 1969), pp^ 91--117.
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v;ho support other rfiissions. The anonymous attack scenario
normally involveE an attack by a third pov.er in a period of
tension with the aim of exacerbating superpower conflict,
possibly acting as a catalyst for a large nuclear exch.ange
between the superpowers. While the possibility of such an
attack cannot be rejected out of hand, its likelihood is re-
mote end this mission falls into the "bonun** category.
Protection of offensive missile bases is generally pic-
tured as fulfilling an "assured destruction" function since
the rnission is to insure the survival of a credible propor-
tion of strategic retaliatory forces against a massive coun-
terforce attack. It does not require the low leakage rate
of the first two missions outlined above since it only at-
tempts to protect a portion of the targets taken under attack.
The Safeguard eystem announced in Karch 1969 employs a com-
bination of area and point defense to ccrry out this mission,
although a recent trend seems to point to;;^rd more reliance
on point defense. Area defenses for thit> mission have ad-
ditional functions to protect against accidental and anony-
mous attacks and to provide some damage limitation for cities
located near offensive missile bases.
19. Leakage rate is a proportional probability expression
for those incoming warheads which will succeed in pene-
trating a given antimissile defense system,
20, U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Arms Control,
International Law and Organizations of the Committee on
Foreign Relations, ABM, KTRV, SALT, and the Nuclear Arms




By complice ting the calculations of adversary Gtrategic
planners » antimissile defense systems force potential advcir-
saries to expend additional rcBCurces on penetration tech-
niques and devices instead of on destructive power. More
lmportc.n'.-.Ty, thny incre'SE'S tb€ nargins of uncertainty for
these planners concerning the range of probable outcomes of
a given nuclear attack, particularly if that attack is ^.o be
made on the opponent's strategic retaliatory forces. Deter-
rence is enhanced by these uncertainties since prudent plan-
ners are assumed to be less likely to advocate counterforce
strikes when the probcibility of success is more uncertfiin.
The final mission, defense of the nation egainst an
adversary's residual retaliatory forces after he has under-
gone a disarming first strike, is the cornerstone of "worst
case" planning by the superpowers. Such a mission v;ould re-
quire at least an area defense system, probably augmented by
point defense of the nation's highest value targets. The
function of such a defense is pure "damage limiting." Design
and deployment of a defensive system to fulfill this ndssion
would reflect an assessment of which of the adversary's
strategic systems were most likely to survive the planned
first strike and would maximize its capabilities against
those systems.
Given the technical considerations and missions for
antimissile defense systems outlined above, a vigorous debate
on the wisdom of system deplcyiTicnt has been going on in the
United States for over a decade. The debate was prifRariiy
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conducted within governmental agencies prior to the decision
to deploy the Sentinel system in September 1967. Since then,
a similarly intensive debate has been conducted in public
sources. While some facets of this debate are highly techni-
cal and involve classified ijecurity information, the inten-
sity of the dtbate is thought to have brought most of these
questions into the public dorx-ain, it only through inference.
Although only content anrilyris of the Soviet press is avail-
able in open sources, it is extremely likely that a t.imilar
debate has been going on internally within the Soviet bureau-
cracy. The cost and technological uncertainty inherent in
antiir.iftglle defense virtuaJly guarantee that it will be a
controversial issue in any government. While it is highly
unlikely that the Soviet debate is a mirror iwage of that
which has been conducted in the United States, the basic
points of argument probably reflect similar pocitionr.. An
appreciation of these points is essentiiil for an analysis of
how the antimissile defense dialogue between the United States
and the Soviet Union has been conducted since its inception.
The arguments for the deployment of antimissile defense
systems generally stem from the basic philosophical convic-
tion that governments are responsible for defending their
citizens against threats to their security if the means for
defense are available. This argument holds that even though
an antimissile defense system cannot reduce casualties in a
nuclear exchang** to zero, it is imprudent or ov«n immoral
not to deploy a system that may reduce fatalities by millions
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or even tens- of millions. One end of the spectrum of this
argument Is represented by Senator Richard Russell's October
1968 statement that "If we have to start all over again with
another Adam and Eve, then J want them to bo Americans and
not Russians - and I want them on this continent and not in
21
Europe. ** On a more intellectual plane, it is argued that
antimissile defenses that proportionally reduce fatalities
and dauiuxge. to the nation's productive capacity may greatly
influence the ability of a society to recover from a nuclear
exchange. Another facet of this argument is a reluctance to
accept th<2 dictum that nuclear wars arc unwinnable. While
spokesmen in both the United States and the soviet Union have
endorsed this concept, Marxist-Leninist ideology makes this
22
admission particularly uncomfortable for the Soviets.
Antimissile defense advocates attempt to counter the
argument that technological complexity will produce extra-
ordinary system unreliability by pointing out that offensive
2i« The Kev; York Times , 22 November 1968, p. 9. For the Sov-
iet re.r.ponse to this statement, see "Adam and Eve and the
Senator," Izvestia , 26 November 1968, p. 2,
22. Although this doctrinal debate is not as significant
as it xras during the Khrushchev-Malcnkov-Molotov per-
iod in 1953-55 before the ouster of the Anti-Party Group
in July 1957, it is argued at an esoteric level within
the military press. In general, these articles do not
argue that present forces are adequate to insure a
Soviet victory in a future nuclear war but stress that
future technological developm.ents may provide military
superiority, vrhile such arguments are a useful bu-
reaucratic tool to press for greater resource alloca-
tions tor military spending and programs, they also
have doctrinal roots.

systiSWK are also basiC'i^Llly untested in the enticipated vjcir-'
time eriVironment'. Although this stateixieiit is trae vihen taken
at face value, the relative uncertainties of sysccrr^ perforn-
ance csn be r«*duce.d through somewhat realictic (end highly
expensive) prcxjf testing of offensive missile componentfs with
the exception of the warhviad, v;hich can be proof t<^!:ted sop-
23
arately underground. Similar proof tecta of i^ntiiuiesilfi
defenue system radars and missiles in a non-nuclear environ-
ment can be made by the United States at Kwajelein and the
Soviet Union at Sari Shagan. Since the major technologj cal
uncertainties of system perforn^ance are dependent upon nuc-
lear effects, these tests are leyr valid.
Cost-exchange ratios of near unity are put forth by sup-
porters of antimissile defense for nystems which have mis-
Bions which do not require high assurance of impenetrability.
In the antimissile defense context, the cor-t-exchange reitio
Is nom\ally spoken of as an expression of the cost to reduce
the number of fatalities by a given amount versus the cost to
produce the same nuTl^er cf fatalities. Systems whose mission
requires near zero leakage rates have higher cost-exchi:rge
ratios since this defente must be "thicl:er" to attempt to
23, For example, through May 1970, a total of 60 Titan II,
MinutCiiian I, and Minuteman Zl intercontinental ballis-
tic missiles had been fired by the United States for
the specific purpose of gathering data on ny^tem per-
formance and accuracies, U.S., Congress, Senrite, Sub-
committee on Arms Control, intcrnatior.al Law and Organ^
illations of the Corranittfte on Foreign Relations, ABM, MJHV
,
^i^i£LfI:£»Hlf-il!-^5i-J^_fit{!'£.Ji ^Ist Congrees, Second
Session, (Washington, IsTo), p. 621,

offset an offensive strategy which concentrates on a few tar-
getG. The expense cf ;3,ophisti:::at«a decoys and countermear-
urer and multiple warhead systems required to penetrate other
than primitive antiminsilc defense i»ysteiris is cited as the
priirary cau.<;e of the improvement in cost-cxchange ratios v'hen
Been from the perspective of the defeiise, *'"'^ Xn support of
this contention, some antimitsile defence advocates argue
that the soviet "Galosh" syetcin around Moscow, which has a
maximum estimated cost of two billion dollar r, forced the
United States to spend over five billion dollars to develop
and deploy sufficient Poseidon and Kinuteman XII multiple
varhead offensive missiles to insure penetration of those
defensec.^^
Inherent in basic **flexlble responoe** and •assured des-
truction" strategies is the implicit notion that the "spasm"
nuclear exchange is highly undesirable. Reliable second
strike forces; secure, redundant ccmmand «ind control facili-
ties; and stable decision-making organieatione have been estab-
lished to support this apparent conviction by the United
States, Proponents of antimissile defense argue that active
defenses contribute to such strategies, particularly when
employed to defend strategic retaliatory forces. Faced with
24. Donald G, Brennan, "The Case for Missile Defense," For-
eign Affairs. April 19G9, p, 435.
25. Center for the Study of :v;r.ocratlc Institutions, Anti-




opposing offftn3iv« micsile forces which are considered to
have some capability against hard targets, such as missile
silos, the temptation or imperative to adopt a "launch on
warning" strategy is increased. Defense of these silos
provides some assurance that sufficient missiles to maintain
an assured destruction capability can be expected to survive
a surprise counterforce attack, thus contributing to overall
strategic stability.
Additionally, it is argued that antimissile defenses
raise the psychological threshold of nuclear warfare by en-
larging the range of uncertainty about the probable outcomes
of a nuclear exchange. Given this increzised range of uncer-
tainty, strategic planners would be less certain of their
calculations which in turn v?ould reduce the chances for rea-
soned advocacy of initiating a disarming attack. Unquestion-
ably, the existence of antimissile defenses near intended
target areas greatly complicates an attacker's operational
planning. An early 1968 statement by General Earle G. Wheel-
er, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, illustrates
this point I
If the enemy merely knot^/s that we have an
ABM system, whether or not he knows how
good it is, how effective it is, what the
26. Even a system of antimissile defense-type radars linked
to high-npeed computers which could accurately predict
impact points of incoming objrcts and provide an indica-
tion of the intensity of an attack would reduce the
pressures to "launch on warning,"

probo.bllity of kill is^ he has got to take
it into account in his trtrgeting. He can-
not jgnorci it, because otherwise.'! his c'ttack
could fail. And if he operates like the
ci>»erage military planner, ^nd I am sure he
will, he wiii thjcov in a eafety factor to
make sure he has enough of his resources
devoted to any given tsirget. It is a com-
plicating, factor in an already vtry complex
equation, ^^
From their initjn.1 conception as icl?^as on paper, tfechno-
logicr»l developments pass through a gestation p-eriod normally
characterized by paper feasibility studies, prototype con-
struction, tcjst and evaluation, and system deployment. For
complex weapons systems, thic period normally requires seven
to ten years. VTliile iAdoitional study at each stage u-^ually
produces improved system performance or rellAbillty, the mar-
ginal gains tena to decreabc beyond certain points* Advocates
of antimissile defense deployment argue that the technology
involved in the Nike-vysentinc]/Safeguard system hais daveloped
to a point where deplo^inent is required to rillow the techno-
logical momentum of the established scientific and managerial
cadre to refine and improve the system. Failure to deploy
would result in a reduction of the marginal utility of this
group and, ultimately, to its dispersal In their viev/. Proto-
type research and development v/iil not always reveal signifi-
cant improvements or problem areas that would result from
27, U.S., Congress, Sen^^te, Pre):>aredness Investigating Sub-
co.TjTiittce of th'i^ CojiTvitte^* c^n Arrned Services, "trttis of
U .S. Strategic I--ow>*r, Part I, 90th Cor.grotiS, Second
Session, (Washington, 1968)7 p. 20.
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experience in system deployment and subsequent operation.
The opponeiil-.s of the deployment of ©ntimlssile defense
eystems have fcaced their fergument on tlirec; general considera-
tions! a cost-exc'nanoe ratio v7hich favors the offense over
the defen&c, the technological complexity and probable effec-
tiveness of the Nike->;/Scntinel/Safeguard system, and the
probability th'at deplo'^'ment will exacerbate pressures for a
superpov/er arms race which will not add to the security of
either power.
The cost-exchange ratio argument is based upon the deter-
rence theory assumption that "assured destruction" must be
expected to incur an arbitrary nuiobor of fatalities on an op-
posing nation to be credible. While this number is based on
assumptions, it is held that it is the fear of incurring a
finite number of deaths that deters a potential enemy from
attacking. The necessary coniplexity of antimiseile defense
systems and the requirement to expend at least one defensive
missile to destroy each incoming reentry vehicle are consid-
ered to favor the offensive fcrces permanently, barring a
major technologic?il breakthrough. Implicit in this argument
28. Much of the antimi sella defense deployment debate in
the United States h*\8 reflected the general public die-
satisfaction with the war in Vietnam and large expenc^i-
tUi.cc for miiicary hardware. The absolute cost argu-
n^ent is typical of this sentiment. While the sincerity
of those who oppose antimissile defense deploym.^nt as a
logical consequence of a conviction that defense funds
should b.i triTLf^rred to tht: soJution of domestic prob-
leras sn not questioned, th:: arguir.ent^ diccucsfcd here are
those which deal directly with strategic considerations.
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is the conviction that a potential adversary will respond to
any antimissile defense deployraent by quantitatively or qual-
itatively improving his offensive forces or both.
The combinuition of tactical and technological uncertain-
ties concerning the employment and performance of both offen-
sive and defensive weapons in a nuclear exchange causes oppo-
nents of antirnicEile defense to doubt its relative effective-
ness. They argue that short of an actual nuclear exchange,
the system is untestable and therefore unreliable. The Par-
tial Test Ban Treaty further complicates this problem since
key nuclear effects are held to be unverifiable. Although
the same argument has been made against offensive systems,
the range of uncertainties is not as great and the techno-
logical sophistication is not as advanced.
Finally, it is asserted that dcmestic political pressure
and bureaucratic inertia will caur;e any antimissile defense
system to become more extensive and thus more provocative to
potential adversaries, thereby promoting arms race pressures.
A spectrum of opinion on the content of such an arms race,
from defensive systeinb to counter defensive sya terns to offen-
sive systems to overwhelm defensive systems, has come forth
in support of this assertion.
29, A. R, Hibbs, "ABM and the Algebra of Uncertainty," Bulle-
tin of th<? Atomic scientists , Karch 1968, pp, 31-33. Dr.
Hibbs examines hov/ uncertainties about strategic v/eapons
can alter the results of cost-exchange ratio calcula-
tions and posits that assumptions chosen concerning the
uncertainties regarding antimiesile defense can result
in a range of outcoraes between 1/3 »1 and 3il,
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Despite the quesitionable prospects for creation of effec-
tive defense against ballistic missiles, both the United
States and the Soviet Union conduct expensive and eimbitious
research and development programs in this area. The underly-
ing basis for these vast expenditures is the profound under-
standing that despite past frustrations and the gloomy pros-
pects for complete success, they cannot entrust their national
security to the chance that such a defense is in-(pc3ciblc.
History is littered with now obsolete "ultimate weapons."
Research and development programs which have been carried out
by the Urjited States have ijicluded several boost phase inter-
ceptors employing sea, air, and space sur^'cillrince and inter-
ceptor launch. The degradation of the antimissile defense
environment by nuclear detonations has resulted in careful
study of kill mechanisms which do not employ nuclear weapons.
In addition to conventional explosives, high velocity steel
30pellets to destroy warhead coatings and asphalt cloud tech-
niques to coat warheads and cause them to burn up on reentry
31have been studied.
30, William Schneider, Jr., "Missile Defense Systems* past.
Present, and Future," in Johan J. Hoist and VJilliam
Sclineider, Jr., eds. , Why ABii? , (New Yorki Pergamon Press,
1969), p. 13.
31, Aviation Week and Space Technology , 8 June 1970, p. 19,

Chapt >-.r 2
The United state s-Sovj.et DJ.g1oq uffi > 1960-66
Although the problems involved in antiniiG£:ile defense
wtrc discussed in the Soviet presF during the Jattei: huif of
the 1950' E, this survey of the United Stsites-Soviet dialogue
on antimiBsile defenses takes IJikita Khrushchev *c defense
policy speech to the Suprenie Soviet on 15 January 19v0 r.o its
point of departure. In this authoritative discussion. Pre-
mier Khrushchev asserted that Soviet military planners should
act on the assurr.ption that any future g<^neral war would in-
volve the mass use of nucJ tar weapons. Ke. postulated that
approximcitely 100 nuclear weapons would te s-afficicnt to
obliterate the main centers of an industrlaliz.ed nation the
Pirse of Great Britain or France. In a radical departure from
previoun Soviet pronouncements, he stressed the point thr-t co-
nation's defence capacity should be meatvired in terms of its
firepower rather than Its number of men und-br arms. To su.p-
port this conr.entionp he stated that although Soviet armed
manpov.'ftr had declined since 1955, further reductions over the
year 1960 would reduce the Soviet Armed Forces to a total man-
power figure of 2,500,000, a cut of 1,200,000 men. This cut
could be made vithcut sacrificing overall Soviet defense pos-
ture since the Soviet Union already had a "sufficient supply
1. For example, its theoretical potential had been discussed
by Major F. Kriksanov in his article "The Problem of the
Irteic: ption or inx:erco'.itinear-al f)allistic Missiles,"





of nuclear we&ponc to dt^al with Rny eventuality* •*
During the latter y&ars cf -che Elsenhower Actninlstra-
tioHf United States stri'tegic policy was still essentially
bastid on john Foster Dulles:* concept of "Massive Retaliation,**
although gtneral criticism of its inplj critionj; hcd gron-zn in
the yeary after 1957, In ttarly 1960, Major General John B.
Medaris, U.S. Army (Retired) r formerly the director of the
Amty*s Jupiter intotrmediate range ballistic laissilc program,
criticijied procurement policies as having produced "overkill.*'
He urged the Administration to oeplcy »:he Nike-Zfuc antimis-
sile defense system, terming it the "only conceivable end
positive defence" r.galrnt r.ttock tliit \/ould be available in
3
the decade of the 19C0'b. v;hile this advice v.og not imple-
mented as policy, **realiBtic feasibility tests" for the Nike-
Zeus system were announced in late June.^ No date was given
for these t©stSt which were to be conducted against Atlsks
reentry vehicles, but it was anticipated that the Nike-Zeus
might net be reedy for such testt: until early 1961. Given the
then-existing technology, the detection, tracking, and des-
truction of »n inccTting warhead was viewed as a great techno-
logic?! cr.allengc, Defenre c:g<»iiij3t a cluster of warheads was
seen as an unsolvable problem without a major teclinologiccl
breakthrough. The 1958-61 luorfttorium on nuclear testing
*^* EJ^J{^» ^^ January 1960, p. 1.
^' The New York Times, 21 April 1960, p, 7.
^* The New York Times , 30 June 1960, p. 9.
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further coiuplicated the problem by denying critical nuclear
effects data.
In an important article which appeared in October 1960,
Major General Uikolai Talensky, a military theoretician on
the Soviet General staff, seconded Khrushchev's earlier asser-
tions i
War as an inntrun>ent of policy is becoming
outdated. The process of development of
technique in the destruction of people makes
it impossible now to use weapons for the
solution of political tasks, as has been the
case in the course of thousands of years .^
In the same article, he scoffed at the notion thant anti-
missile defenses could prevent the loss of half the population
of the world in the event of nuclear wart "So far, there is no
practical way of repulsing a nuclear rocket attack."^ In view
of subsequent Soviet testing of antimissile weapons one year
later, it seems reasonable to assunie that General Talensky's
pessimism was at least partially intended to lull the United
States regarding Soviet progress in this area.
This view was quickly disputed both in the United States
and the Soviet Union, on 15 October, **Pentagon sources"
Etated that the Soviets were working on an antimissile mis-
78ile. Previously, these sources had considered such a




7. The New York Times . 15 October 1960, p. 3.
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development as a possibility rather than a fact. This conten-
tion was obliquely supported when, a montVi later. Marshal of
Artillery Vacily L. Kasakov f.innoar.c€d th.at Soviet forces hD.d
rockets which could destroy "offensive pilotless devices at
pgreat altitud»*s, " Although it is posfsible thtit he was refer-
ring to jet-powered, air-breathing cruire missiles then being
q
carried by Strategic Air Cowiuend borriberc> he may have been
aiiGaiguously implying an antimissile defense capability.
United States reaction throughout late 1960 and the
first half of 1961 ranged from statements of the technologi-
cal difficulties involved in antimissile defence to crediting
the Soviets v/ith having made a major breaJcthrough. Brigadier
General Paul Betts, cungoing Director of the Defence Depart-
ment's Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), stated that
"a reasonsonably effective terminal defense system can be
built.*" This statement provided a basis for increased Army
pressor*^ for antliQiSolle defence during the Fiscal Year 1962
Congressional appropriations htiarings. Dr. Jack P. Ruina,
the new Director of AHPA, led off this campaign in February
^» l2vostia» 18 November 1960, p. 3,
9. Cruise missiles are essentially pilotless aircraft which
follow flight profiles within the ^'.arth's atmosphere. Al-
though they are smaller than manned aircraft, thc;y share
the same general operating characteristics. In the stra-
tegic role, cruise missiles are norraally launch':id from
boinber aircraft at a distance from the target, thus pro-
viding some degree of protection to the launch aircraft.
The missile delivers the weapon over varied atmospheric
flight paths.
10. Tho Kevr York Tlm^s, 6 December 1960, p. 11.
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1961 vhea he 'stated th^c ever one-half of /^pa'e- $170 rrdilion
research a^id dcvcicprnent. budoet was devotea to t-intJ-TnlFslle
defense research, Mc predict^a that iUke-Zeus might be devel-
oped into a defense for selected areas. Richard MorpCj Army
Research and Development: Director, rained t)ie specter of Sov-
iet suprernacyi "It is my opinion, based on ray inforruation,
that the Rvicsians have a large, a very l^^.rgc antimissile
effort, and have had for some time," The Array advocated
gradual production and deployment of l^ik^-Zeus, admitting
that it could bo defeated by large-scale saturation attacks,
but doubting that the Soviet Union had enough missiles for
euch an attack. This optindsni seemed bovine out by the suc-
cessful tracking of an Atlas reentry vehicle by a Zeus radar
on Ascension Island in the South Atlantic: on 27 May 1961.
The "Missile Gap" which had figured importr^ntiy in the
1960 United States Presidential Election gradurlly collapsed
during the latter half of 1961 coincident with the conduct of
an unanticipated Soviet series of atmospheric tests of nuc-
lear weapons. Although Kennedy Administration leaders were
probably aware of the growing discrepancies between force
level projections based on soviet production capabilities and
actual deployments at an earlier date, the timing of tlie re-
lease of such Information to the public indicated that it vris
primarily intended to quiet domestic concern over tlie test
series
. A secondary motivation for this extended silence may
^^* T>^<^ Washington Post
, 13 febru?ry 1961, p. A4.
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have been to avoid comproiaising tht sources of United States
strategic intelligence during that period which predated
present reconnaissance satellites. Accordingly, previous
United states projectionc of 200 Soviet intercontinental bal-
12listic missiles were reduced to "less than 50,"
The motivation behind the Soviet test series probably
lay in a desire to proof teat newly developed technology,
including that related to antimissile defenses and to stage
demonstration tests of extremely high yield (in excess of 50
megatons) devices to sustain the impression created by Sput-
nik and the "Missile Gap" that the Soviet Union led the Uni-
ted States in advanced weapons technology. The latter factor
is supported by the timing of the test resumption to coincide
with the Conference of Non-Aligned Nations in Belgrade, Both
Premier Khrushchev and Defense Minister Rodion Ya. Malinovsky
made subsequent statements which asserted that the large
yield devices tested provided the Soviet Union with important
operational capabilities which should alter any relative
force calculations made by western analysts, Khrushchev saw
these weapons as "a sword of Damocles" which would "hang over
the heads of the impcrialicts when they decide the question
13
whether or not they should unleash war." Marshal Malinov-
eky*s statement emphasized that these weapons were capable of
12. The Washington Post , news article by Joseph Alsop, 25
SeptemLer 19G1, p. A20.
13, Pravda, 9 December 1961.
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being delivered by mieaiici
• , .ws have nuclear chsrges equivalent to
several tens of thoucands up to 100 million
tons of TNT, and cur ballistic rockets have
proved to be so splendid that no one can
doubt their ability to 3,ift and del <.ver
such charges to ciny point on earth.-
^
The unanttcpated resumption of atmospheric nuclear test-
ing by the Soviet Union on 29 August 1961 resulted in wide-
spread alarm in the United states. Much of it centered en
the possibility of a brcr.kthrough in antimissile dc^fense
technology. Some officials caw testing of an antiir.issile
system £:s the priiru^.ry rcasou for th* atmospheric testing.
They assumed that the Soviet Union had engaged in a crash
aritimi sslle defense prograAi and x^as probably ahead of the
United States in this field i "For the Soviets to have reached
the technological point where such tests are possible, it vras
said, would indicate vast progress in antimissile research
15
and developjTtent. " General Kedaris warned that the United
States must not allow the Soviets to be first to de^'elop an
antimissile defense, since possession of such weapons in ad-
vance of the United States could Induce the Soviets to pre-
emptively attack before antimissile parity could be reached.
14. L££vda, 24 October 1961.
^^^ Th^ New York Times , 6 September 1961, p. 3. Subsequent
information concerning these tests revealed that they
included several tests of antimissile defense kill mech-
anisms, including an actual destruction of tv.c inccsaing




He repeated his advocacy of iminc-.diate deplo^m»<»nt of Nlkc~Zeus,
a-tating that it could destroy 80 per cent of incoming warheads
as long ao their nurnber did not exceed the number of inter-
ceptor Kis^iles* In a reversal of his earlier position
that antimissile defense V7as impossible. Dr. Edward Teller
added that the Soviet testing program may have led to "real
progress in developing an antimissile missile. ••
In what now appears to have been a clever campaign of
deliberately ajribiguous statements, each somewhat more direct
than the previous one allov/ing for the exeunination of United
Stateo reaction » the Soviets exploited these fears. Appro-
priately, this campaign was initiated by Khrushchev himself
ivi an interview with C.L. Sulzberger on G September, After
prefacing his remarks with a discussion of the requirements
of military secrecy, he lauded soviet scientists! "We remain
very satisfied vith the work of those who produced fne means
of combatting rockets." This was the first public state-
ment by lOirushchev on antiu^issile defense. The interview was
follc/zed by sn article by Marshal Kiril S. Moskalenko, Com-
mander of the Strafgic Kocket J.'orces, crediting Soviet ICBMs
1^
as being "invulnerable to modern means of counteraction."
It was uncertain whether he referred to hardened launch sites
1^» The New Yor }; ^ Timer , .^l September 1961, p. 15.
^^
•
The Waahington Post, 31 October 1961, p. Al4.
^^* ll'iL^trl5lJ^rJlJ?ii!L=£» 8 September 1961, p. 1.
^^* ^^rasnaya yvegda (Red Star), 13 Septemiier 1961.
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or the ability of these missiles to penetrate any known anti-
missilt' defense. The canipaign was capped by Defense Minister
Marshal Rodion Ya. Malinovsky's review of the state of Soviet
Armed Forces before the 22nd Party Congress on 24 October
which included the following statement i "I must report to you
especially that the prcblerii of destroying missiles in flight
20has been successfully solved. " Marshal Malinovsky did not
say whether such a weapon had been developed and deployed.
Further such statements followed in early 1962, On the 44th
Anniversary of the Soviet Armed Forces, Marshal Malinovsky
asserted that Soviet forces "can destroy the enemy's air and
21
space means of attack at enormous distances and altitudes."
In a Kay article. Colonel I. Sidenikov repeated Khrushchev's
1960 contention that a United States-Soviet war would be a
missile war. He also echoed Marshal Malinovsky 's October
statement that "We have successfully solved the problem of
22destroying enemy missiles in flight,"
Official United States reaction to tliese claims was high-
lighted by President Kennedy's speech announcing the resump-
tion of nuclear testing in the atmosphere. He stated that
despite statements by non-government analysts such as Dr, Tel-
ler to the contrary, the recent Soviet test series "did not.
20« Pravda , 25 October 1961, p. 1,
^^* Pravda
, 23 February 19C2, p, 4,
22, Colonel I. Sidelnikov, "Concerning Military Doctrine,"
Kraenaya Zve^-.da (Red Star), 11 May 196 2, p. 2,
'.«:•: >-. y-'?!
j«. * < ->.-. j# *4 . - .^1
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23
in our judgment, rcf3.ect a developed a.ntiirii&nile system,"
President Kennedy added thft tVit; forthcorrdng United States
tests would include high altitude detonations and other tfcsts
in areas related to antimissile dafciiGc, The stated goal vras
better nucletr effecty date relevant to defensive systems.
These declarations vere supported at President Kennedy's 14
March press conference whf^re he sr.ated the-.t there v;&a no sign
that the Soviets **have sufficient dat<t to develop an antimis-
sile weapon based on their recent teste, "^ He added that the
United States v/as continuing development of the Nike-Zeus.
This system successfully intercepted a Nikc-Herculcs missile
at ^'Thitc Sands Proving Ground on 22 December 1961, On 26
January 1962, the Nike-Zeuo intercepted an electronically-
simulated reentry vehicle. The Kennedy iisscrtion of contin-
ued Nike-Zeus develop.-ncnt was supported by developments in
the summer of 1962, The Army purchased 10 Atlas JCBh-s for
future intercept tests at Kwa.jelein Atoll in the Central Pac-
ific, The first such test was successfully conducted on 19
July v;hen a Nike-Zeus intercepted an inccTiing Atlas reentry
vehicle at an altitude between 100,000 and 200,000 feet.
Despite this achieveinent. Administration officials remained
guarded over the system's effectiveness, citing the control-
led conditions of the test, A second successful test was
conducted on 13 December, Again, devclojxnent V2is stressed in
official press releakjes. Throughout this period, the United
^^' '^^^^ Washington Pest, i March 1962, p. A2.
24, The \^cw York Times , 15 March 1962, p. 18,
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States attempted to deliberately avoid giving any ambiguous
signals regarding deploy^nent of an aiitimicsilc system,
Soviet antimissile d<?tfense claims in 1962 bracketi^d the
Cuban missile advcntur<£ of Septeraber and October, Khrushchev
himself carried out the prc-Cuba assertions. in a IT: Karch
speech in Moscow, he announced that the Soviet Ji.ion hcid de-
velopttd a "global** rocket invulnerable to antimiisile wea-
pons. This statement was repeated before the Viorld Congress
on General Dit;armaur.ent in Moscow on 10 July» "In order to
insure its security, the Soviet Union was forced to develop
...the global rocket which is practically impervious to de-
25fense, and antimissile rockets." This statement slightly
weakens the March stand on vulnerability of the global rocket
by substituting "practically Impervious •* for "invulnerable.**
Later in this conference, Khrushchev cancelled trie planned
showing of a film demonstrating the Soviet ?.ntimis3lle missile
in operation, citing concern that its mer^sage might be "mis-
26
understood." His July bc>astiagLa were capped by Khrushchev's
17 July interview with United states newspaper editors. In
th5.s interviev;, he repeated his 13 July statement concerning
the film of Soviet antimissile missiles in action. He had
decided against showing it, fearing "it might be misunderstood'
^^' Pravda, 11 July 1962, p. 3, These "global rockets'* are
not to be confused with the Fractional Orbitfti Boinbard-
ment System (FOBS) which was a later development. Sub-
sequent evidence seems to indicate that Khrushchev was
referring to the ICBM at this time.
^^' Pravda
, 13 July 1962, p. 1.

- 36 -
cs a warlike gestiarej
Had people been shown this film they would
have Been what kind of a machine it is. You
can say our rocket hits a fly in outer space
• ••• 1 asu not boasting, but we actually have
a global rocket that cannot be destroyed by
any antirocket means and I know, if anybody
knows, what antirocket means are because we
do have them. ^
United States reaction to this statement tended to minimize
its credibility and interpreted it as an attempt to play on
world opinion and possibly still Soviet critics of Khrush-
chev's defense policies.
From July until the outset of the Cuban Missile Crisis
in the latter half of October, Soviet statements on antimissile
defense were absent. The dialogue was resumed by Marshal Mal-
inovsky at the height of the crisis. Speaking before the All-
Army Conference on Ideological Questions on 25 October, he
repeated his year-old formulation that "v;e have successfully
solved the problem of destroying enemy missiles in flight."
However, for the first time, he appeared to attempt to estab-
lish antimissile defenses as an actual operational capabilityi
"Our scientists have developed and our engineers, technicians
and workers have built and prepared complexes of numerous
means for the defense of our country against enemy missile
attacks. "^^
Following Marshal Malinovsky's speech, the overt Soviet
27. The New York Times , 17 July 1962, p. 1.
28
» Kragnaya Zvezda (Red Star), 25 October 1962.
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strategic discussions subsided in the wake of the October mis-
sile crisis. In early December, Soviet ci<».ims of superiority
were again advanced, l^larshal Sergei S« Birioizov, v^ho had suc-
ceeded Marshal Koskalenko as Connmandcr of the strategic Rocket
Forces in November* asserted that the Soviet Union led the
United States in the development of "powerful rockets" and
antimissile defenses. He stated that "the Soviet Union has
proved her superiority over the united states in the field of
29
antimissile defenses," On 10 December, Chief Artillery Mar-
shal Sergei S. Verentsov, Coaimander of Tactical kockets and
Artillery, asserted that the Red Army was more combat ready
than its United states counterpart. To support t>iis conten-
tion, he cited a failure-free launch record lor his force's
minsiJe exercises. It ic significant to note that thetje
statexnents did not repeat the pre-Cuba claim that the Soviet
Union had the advantage in overall nuclear striking power,
stress was shifted to assertions of Soviet superiority 3.n de-
sign and development of large rockets and warhead yield. To
cap this period, Khrushchev addressed the Supreme Soviet on
12 December. He stated that the past seven mont>i6 had proved
the validity of the doctrine of peaceful coexistence. With
respect to Cuba, he praised both sides for their "sober ap-
proach** and outlined concessions made by both the Soviet Union
and th<3 United st?ttes« **Thlp i=i exactly the policy of peaceful
25. Krasaay g Zvezdc. (Kta Star), 4 Decerober 1962.





coexistence in action," he conciu-ded.
On 15 December, President Kennedy responded to Soviet
antimissile claims, particularly Khrushchev's "fly in the sky*'
statement, at a press conference
«
He might hit a fly but whether he could hit
a thousand flies with decoys - you see,
every missils that comes, might have four or
five warheads in it - that i2 a terribly
difficult t£n)c which v;e have not mastered
yet, and I don't tb5l,n)c he has. The offense
has the advantage. '^^•
In response to a question of whether tlie Soviets had solved
the problem of hittira a missile in flight he answered, "Yes,
33
and so have we."
Soviet antimissile defense claims for 1963 were notable
for tlieir lo^^ );ey approach, particularly durir.g t}ie firct ten
months. The only specific claims made during tr.is period
were Strategic Rocket Force Conunander Marshal Sergei S. Bir-
yuzov's 22 February repetition of Marshal Mallnovsky's pre-
vious statement that "the problem of destroying enemy rockets
34in fligVit has been successfully solved." However, the pub-
lication of Marshal Vasily D. Sokolovsky's book, Soviet tMili-
tary Strategy, provided a somewhat deeper insight into Soviet
31. Igvestia , 12 December 1962.
^2. The New York Times , 17 December 1962.
33, Ibid.
34, Krasnaya Zvc^da {Re6. Star), 22 February 1963.
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military doctrine and strategic analysis. Its Western intro-
duction described this v^ork as the first comprehensive book
on Btratecry published in the soviet Union since 1926. It is
noteworthy tViat the author had served as Chief of the soviet
General Staff from 1953 to 1960. In its discussion of anti-
missile defense, the Sokolovsky work was notable for its re-
straint, stating that "in principle, a technical solution to
35
this problem has now been found." Nevertheless, the author
made no attempt to assert that the Soviet Union possessed such
a defense system, but predicted its future possibilities more
specifically while cautioning that for the present the offen-
sive forces still maintained the advantage!
Ballistic missiles, employed en masse, are
still practically invulnerable to e>Listing
means of air defense, and t>jeir einpioyn^ent
is almost independent of weather conditions.
Only as special instrurr^ents of ontimiGoile
defense are developiid will it be possible
to comba^ the massive use of missiles in
the air.-^^
In the united States, Congressional hearings on the Fis-
cal Year 1964 Defense Budget created an active debate on anti-
missile defenses. The debate was opened by senator Strom
Thurmond in a 25 March letter to his constituents whicli stated
that the soviet Union had "a lead of at least several years in
35. Marshal v. D. Sokolovsky, soviet Military Strategy, re-
vised edition, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jerseyi prentice-





cievelopment of an active defense against ballistic raissiles."
He added that "a very re€i.l and dangerous gap exists." The
well-informed military analyst, Hanson Baldv?in, pointed out
that the 1961-2 Soviet nuclear test series had included a
high yield blast above the atmosphere which had destroyed two
ballistic missiles. He added:
Some experts belictvo the Soviets are about
to deploy some Kind of antiballistic mipeile
system, however others believe that the uni-
ted States is ahead of Russia technically
and that both powers are very far from pro-
ducing a system capable of deaj.inq with
decoys and saturation attacks. -^^
On 10 April, acting against rxipe*rtment of Defense advice, the
Senate Armed Services Committee appropriated <196 million to
begin procurement of long leadtime items for Nike-zeus. The
Kennedy Admini strati or. quickly responded that the funds would
not be spent. Two days later. Senator Thurmond called the
Senate into cioaed session for the first time since World War
II* In this session he outlined the discovery of a suspected
antimissile c:>mplex near Leningrad. Pentagon sources evalu-
ated the site as a development installation like that on Kwa-
jelein. The Senate voted against recommending the deployment
39
of Nike-Zeus, 58-16. In subsequent hearings before the Sen-
ate Appropriations Subcommittee, secretary McNamara outlined
37. The Ncvr York Timer., 25 March 1963, p. 8.
^®» The New York Times , 5 April 1963, p. 7.
39. n->e VJcshinqton Post , 12 April 1963, p. Al.
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the Admlntstre'tion'r. rationi^le for postponing antimisaile de-
fense deployifient t
Al chough we are Investing large sums on re-
search a.nd c?e.v<»lcpment in ABM r?ye terns?, we
do not h3ive any Eignifacant capabilxty to
intercept those missiles once they have
been Iciurched, and, contrary to no/spaper
reports, and I want to cxiphasize this point,
neither does the Soviet Union- Thsre are
technical reasons why v;e should not proceed
with actual deployment; (a) we cannot dis-
criminate between real and decoy warheads,
and (b) we need to know more about the ef-
fects of a nuclear detonation on elcnients
of the defensive system, "^^
This debate then subsided until it was essentially re-
peated during Senate hearings prior to ratification of the
Partial Test Ban Treaty in Augut;t 19G3. Both the critics and
supporters of the Treaty treated ballistic missile defense as
the most significant weapons development which would be inhib-
ited by the absence of knowledge further atmospheric nuclear
testing would provide. The Administration argued that nuc-
lear testing did not seem to be decisive either to t>ie eval-
uation or development of antimissile systciTis. Secretary McNam-
ara stated tliat: "In designing an A3M system, the m^ijcr factors
are reaction speed, missile performance, traffic-handling cap-
acity, decoy discrimination, resistance to blackout effects,
and warVicad technology," Only tlie last two factors depended
^^ Hearing s before the 85th Congres s» Sena te Appropriations
Subco;p!T\i ctee
, (Washington i U.S. Govertiment Printing Of-
fice, 1963), p^ 6.
^^* lit^* 23 August 1963, p. 14.
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on atr.ocpheric testing. The implication was that the test ban
was not an indirect ban on ba3.1i8tic missile defenses. In a
press conference on 2 August, President Kennedy cuiwned up the
then-existiiig uncertainties t
The problem of development of a defense
against a missile is beyond us and beyond
the Soviets technically, and I think nany
who work en it feel that perhaps it never
can be successfully accomplished, ... If
there is an advantage, it seems to me, to
be with the offense,42
This faith in offensive superiority has been a persistent
theme in United States antimissile defense discussions which
have stressed saturation attacks to overwhelm a defense and
the use of penetration aids to confuse it.
The Soviet low key approach of early and mid-1953 was
abruptly terminated when an antimissile rocket was displayed
in the 8 November military parade commemorating the 46th
Anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, This display was
accompanied by wide coverage in the news media. In a radio
broadcast, Karshal Biryu^ov cited this rocket as being cap-
43
able of destroying "the enemy's rockets in the air," Other
radio commentators described the weapon as the one Khrushchev
referred to in his "fly in the sky" statement. The news agency
Tass added t>>at the rocket had performed brilliantly in recent
maneuvers. However, Western military attaches on the scene
^^* The Key; York Times, 2 August 1963, p. 10,
43. The Wci nhington Post , 8 November 1963, p. Al.
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were so'nawhat skeptical of its real perfoKmance and noted that
neither Tas s nor Izves tirj. had used the term "antimissile mis-
sile" to «1'if?cribe the weapon. The maneuvers mentioned by Trss
were given more detailed descriptions in later articles by
Soviet military leaders* On 16 November, Major General p,
K?.dchenko, an Air Defense Forces spokesman, described the
44
maneuverrs p.s a "complex aerial situation." The following
day. Marshal N. I. Krylov, the recently appointed Commander of
th'5 StrcT:egic Rocket Forces, moved to counter any speculation
that Soviet strategic rockets were vulnerable i "The existing
fcV'St*iir;s of 3nLiaircrc.f t and antimissile defense cannot v/ith-
etand nuclear rocket strikes. And no matter strong this de-
fense may be, our strategic rockets will in^jvitably reach
45
their selected targets." It is perhaps significant tViot
neither article discussed penetration aids as being a part of
the "complex aerial situation" of these maneuvers. The temp-
tation to do so must have been great since most United Statec
responses to the antimissile display stressed satura-cicn tac-
tics and penetration aids. Perhaps "complex aerial situation"
vjas thought to be sufficiently ambiguous to play on Western
uncertainties.
Two early 1964 article s by Marshal V. Sudets, Commander
of the Air Defense Forces (PVC), followed up the November 1963
^^* Krasn?tya zvezda {Rod Star), 16 Novemk-er 196 3, p. 4.
^^" lyvestia, 17 2^ovamber 1953, p, 4.
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cainpalgn. On 5 j£inuc<ryf he stated that "the coniiat capabili-
ties of these [?V0] forceb permit the destruction of prac-
tically all iriodern means of air-space attack, " '"^ This v;as
followed by an article gene^rally more militant in tone but
which returned to Marshal Mallnovsky 'b earlier formulation in
describing defensive capabilities: ".-^e havs successfully sol-
ved t?ie problejo of creating a reliable dof-nse, not only
against aircraft, but also against missiles," However,
although the form of this statement seems much like those of
Marshal Malinovsky, there seem to be importanr. diflerences.
The problem Marshal Kalinovcky discussed v;as that of "des-
troying enemy missiles in fljght," while Marshal Sudetc*
problem involved "creating a reliable defense." It now seems
likely thc\t Marshal Sudets was lobbying for deplcynnent of
such a syotem rather than the possession of a mere military
capability.
For the firrt half of 1964, United states Ltatementc on
antimissile defense were particularly subdued. 'IX was not tn
issue in the Johnson- Goldwatei: -iJoction campaign. Four suc-
cessful tsikc-Zeuo intercepts of Atlas reentry vehiclec over
Kwajelcin were ttsrs^ly ecrmounced c^nd th<* Fieca3 Year 19G5
Budget Hearings were generally fies. from real debate en the
dcploiinent issue. In a comindncement addics?' ^t the Coast
46. Marshal v. Sudets, "A Reliable Shield," Izvestia, 7 J^in-
uary 1954, p. 5.
47, Marshal v. Sudets, 'The National pvo at the Present
Stage. • Krasnaye> Zve^do (Red Star), 28 March 1964.
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Guard Academy in New London on 4 June, President Johnf;on
underscored the united States program of steady development
progress while postponing the deployment decision! "Nike-X,
when developed, V7ill give this nation the option to deploy,
if national security requires it, the best antimissile missile
48
available to any nation." This decision to postpone deploy-
ment was based on real doubt whether the cost of the Nike-X
system was worth the protection it might provide. The cost
consideration was primary. The Jolinson Adininistration seemed
initially determined to minimize military spending, h second
consideration was a desire to conduct further research to
assure that system components would operate as designed. Third
was a desire to avoid any destabilizing activity that could
prompt an accelerated arms race with the Soviet Union.
In an article which appeared on 24 July, Hanson Baldwin
discussed the identification of a possible second Soviet anti-
missile defense site near Moscow, He concluded the article by
outlining recent United states defensive progress, stating
that the improved Nlke-X radar could be hardened and that it
had proven capable of discriminating between real and decoy
warheads above the atmosphere where they could be destroyed
by the newly-designed Spartan missile. The initial cost of
^^* The New York Times, 4 June 1964, p. 1. The Nike-X system
succeeded the Nike-zcus system in eiirly 1965, /unong its
advances were a larger, longer range exoatmospheric in-
terceptor, the Spartan? a second high-acceleration point
defense missile neuaed Sprintj and phased array radars to




such a sysf^ff. around twenty cities v;as placed at 1^15-17 bil-
AC*
lion, with annutil operating costs estimated at $2,0 billion. ^^
Ttvo particularly important articles appeared in October
1964, just prior to Khrushchev's ouster. On the Soviet side,
>lajor General Nikolai. Talensky authored •Anti-Missile Systems
and Disarmament," which appeared in Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn*
(International Affairs). To date. General Talsncky is unique
in that he is the only Soviet military t>ieoretician who hac
identified himself with arms control and disarmament issues
in a positive manner. This articlt was preceded in August by
a statement from Karshal Sokoiovsky which intimated that anti-
missile defenses were a future capability and that the United
States was not the only nation which could base its strategy
on saturating the defenses of an opponent
i
The constantly growing possibilities of anti-
missile defense must be taken into account.
McNam.ara. . .declared that the United States
intercontinental ballistic missiles should be
launched in a salvo to overcome the enemy's
antimissile defense, that the launching of a
large nuniber of missiles should be carried
out simultaneously. The Soviet Union is cap-
able of launching no less mighty a salvo of
its own str^itegic missiles^ . .and, moreover,
more than one such salvo. ^^ [italics mine]
This article made no mention of Soviet antimiseilc capabili-
ties, but Etressed antiaircraft forces and defense against
^^* The b?e\y York Times, news article by Hanson Baldwin, 24
July 1964, p. 7.
^^* Kra pn:.ya ZV'^tgda (Red Star), 25 August 1964, p. 2.
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bc-jnber-.launclieci air~brea.thing cruise missiles.
Genere.l TeleRcky began his article vith a general dis-
cussion of the historical int.erplay betwscn offensive and
defensive weapoiiS. Reaching the present period, hs described
war as a disaster for all mankind v/ith the obvious corollary
being to abolish war. He realistically saw this as improb-
able;, if not impossible, given the present international sit-
uation. He then outlined a case for the deploiTnent of anti-
missile defenses I
It is theoretically ^nd technically quite
possible to counterbalance the absolute
weapons of attack with equally absolute
weapons of defence, thereby eliminating
war regardless of the d«;\:ires of resisting
govern^Ticnts. . . . VJh.^it is important is thcit
antimissile rockets are designed exclusively
for the destruction of anemy rockets and not
for hlttiiivT any other objecti'/es on the en-
emy' G territory. • • • Thuc, cinti-Tiissilc sys-
tems are defensive weapons in the tull sense
of the_ v/ord » by their technical nature they
go into octicn o'lly when the rockets of the
attcjcklng side take to their flight paths,
that is when the act of aggression has been
started. The advantage of antimissile sys-
tems is that their use is caused by an act
of agqresslon, and they will simply not work
unless an aggressor's rocket makes its ap-
pearance in flight over a given area,...
While nuclear rockets offer only one solu-
tion to the problem of attack ana defense,
namely a nuclear strike, antimissile systems
are a nev; form of nuclear rockets, namely
their specifically defensive form,^^
51, Major General Nikolai Talensky, "Anti-Kissile Systems
and Disarmament," Mezhdunarodnaia Zhizn* (International
Affairs), October 1964, p. 16.
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Having established tliis rationale for the development of anti-
missile defenses. General Talensky moved to criticize Western
contentions that such deployments would upset the nuclear bal-
ance, which he referred to as the system of "deterrence
through fear i *•
It is said that the international strategic
situation cannot be stable when both sides
simultaneously strive towards deterrence
through nuclear rocket power and the crea-
tion of defensive enti-missile systems.
.T cannot agree with this vi«w either. From
the stiindpoint of strategy, powerful deter-
rent forces and an effective anti-missile
defense when taken together, substantially
increooe the stability of mutual deterrence,
for any partial shifts in the qualitative
and quantitative balance of tlier.e two com-
ponent elements of mutual deterrence tend
to be correspondingly compensated and equal-
ized.
In that case, the danger lurks in politics.
An aggressive policy and a course set for
nuclear attack with 'acceptable* losses for
oneself as a result of a counterstrike cre-
ate the danger of an out.break of thermonuc-
lear war, whether or not anti-missile systems
are at hand. fiut these systems considerably
enhance the security of peace-loving states.
The creation of an effective anti-missile
system enables the state to make its defense
dependent chiefly on its own possibilities,
and not only on mutual deterrence, that is,
on the goodwill of the other side.^^
Although General Talensky failed to carry this argument for
heavy antimissile defenses any farther, its logical outcome
52. Talensky, "Anti-Kissile Systems," Mezhdunarodnaia 2hi :;n^_
(International Affairs), October 1964, pp. 17-18.
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vould h».ve iecuit«td in the neutrdixation of the political
utility of. strategic forces short of deterring zYiC Soviet
Union end thr. Unif^d i5tat^s from resorting to nuclear warfare
against each other. V7ith the perceived threshold of resorting
to nucle&r war thus eievatedj soviet advantages in General
Purpos<5 or Theattr Forces and geographical proximity to areas
of potential conflict could have been expected to offer iii-
creaped opportunities for extracting concsssionn through
classical modes of power politics in those areas ^/ithout the
Soviet Union having to deal with the fear of a nuclear re-
sponse from tho United States.-*"^
To presp home hie point that deploiiv.ent of antin.issilo
defenses was a rational response to the existing international
situation for the Soviet Union, General Talenbky concluded
that I **Thftre is only one reasonctble alternative to a race In
antirrdssile gy^temg, and i t Ib the early Implerpentation of
genera l and ccrnple t o disarmament ."" Withoxat such an agree-
ment, he argued thc^t the Soviet union would have no recourse
but to deploy antiniissile defense systems, despite their high
cocts.
53. uri Ra'anan. "Soviet Global i-^olitics and the Middle East,**
Naval Vjnr Col lege Revi ew, September 1971, p, 21, S-^e also
the fcrthconiinq pamphlet The Deteriorr.tion of tr? U.S.,-*
Soy JL c L^ V-: 1
1
a t cc^ 1
^ _ .v
'^ l V {• 9,$'.L Sojie Political Iimp l ica tl on o
,
by the rc.me author to to prcj^nted to the Senate Coirjuittec
on Governmental Operations, Subcommittee on National Sec-
urity, in February 1972,
54, TalenaKy, •'A.iti-Micrsj le Systems,* Meghdunarodnaia zhi^n*
(International Affciirs)^ October 1964, p. 19,
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The appearance of General Talensky's article was paral-
leled by the publication of an lnflue:ntial article by United
States BCientists Jerome Wlcsner and Herbert York, fioth men
had served in high level ccientific advieory positions shortly
before writing this article? Di • Wiesner as Special Assistant
for science and Technology to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson
from 1961 \:o 1964 and Dr. York ul> Director of Defense Research
and Engineering from 1953 to 1961. Altnough specifically in-
tended to quiet doiPe»tic concern ov«»r tv.e implications of the
Partial Test Ban Treaty, it also addr#:ssed itself to antimis-
sile defenses. Deployment of such syctems was sann to be
highly destabilizing, leading to a resunr.ption of the arms race
which the authors saw as slowed by the Treaty. Prospects for
the military success of antimissile defense systems vcre min-
imized. Offensive systems were seen to be clearly superior.
having the advantages of surprise, lower abnolute and unit
costs, saturation, multiple warh^iads from a single .tiissilt,
penetration aids, and targeting flexibility. The situation
was regarded as being permanent
i
The hopelessness of the task of defense is
apparent even now in the stalemate of the
arms race. A considerable inertia drags
against the movement of modern, large-scale,
unitary v^eapons systems from the stage of
reiearch and develoorr.ent to operational de-
ployment. The duration and m«ynitude of
these enterprises, whether defenLive or of-
fensive, practically assure that no system
can reach full deployment under the mantle
of secrecy. The designer of the defensive
system, however, cannot oegin until he has
learned something about the properties and
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capabilities of the offensive system. In-
evitably the defense must start the race o.
lap behind. in recent years, it seems, the
offense has even gained somewhat in the
speed with which it can put into operation
strategems and devices vjhich nullify the
most extraordinary achievements in the
technology of defense c^^
In the period immediately following Khrushchev's ouster,
Bpokesmen from the Soviet military attempted to discredit
United States efforts in antimissile detensf: and strategic
offensive missile systems. This campaign was initiated by
Marshal Krylov, Commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces, on
19 November
t
It should be added that in our country thi*
problcTi of combatting enemy rockrts in fljcht
has been successfully solved, and effective
methods have been found for destroying any
weapons of air and space attack by an agores-
Eor. It is no accident that a certain Ameri-
can Senator was compelled to admit that *Kus-
sia's defense systems have attained a level
of where the Russians can destroy our Polaris
missiles, and possibly even our Minuterr.an
missiles in the air. And, after all, these
are the weapons wo consider the least vulner-
able. '^6
In early February, three. Soviet articles appeared con-
cerning United States antimissile defense progress. This per-
iod from November 1964 to February 1965 is unique in that it
encompassed the first real discussion of United States efforts
55. Jerome B, Wiesner and Herbert F. York, "National Security








to appear In the Soviet press. Therefore, it seejus appropri-
ate to quote liberally from those articlcB. Colonel p, F, Ply-
achenko c^ted scientific pessimist) in the United States
«
U. S. GCientists and planners believe the-.t
it is impossible to set up an anti-rr.iscile
system v;hich would be oioable of destroying
any incoming missile force. Instf=:ad it Is
hoped that such a system \;ould be effective
enough to discourage the enemy. The progress
made in the Uj^ S. ABM program is discussed in
those terms. ^'
Another article by Colonel-Engineer V. Romanov described the
extensive efforts of the United states in antin-issile defense
re*3earch. He degraded the Ballistic Missile Early warning
System, a netv;or)c of itirge radars facing over the Korth Pole,
as being vulnerable to soviet "global rockets" which could be
58fired against American targets from the opposite direction.
He evaluated United states defensive efforts as follove? "Des-
pite all efrorts of Americans, up to now they liave not suc-
ceeded in creating a reliable systcirc of anti-rocket defcnss
and still need a lot of time to solve this problem."'^ He
concluded with a statement that Soviet rockets would reach
57, Colonel P. F. Plyachenko, "Developir.cr.t of an Anti-Mi :;s J le
System in the United States," Ve stnj k Protlvovov^dushnoy
Oborony (Air Defense Journa] ) , February 1965, p. 18.
58, Subsequent evidence suggested that this "glob<:.l rocket, •"'
referrr-d to in the West as the Fractiona) Orbital tcr?-
bardment System (FOBS), was in pre-flight testing at this
tine. Engineer-Ccioncl Romanov was inferring a false
operational capabilltyt
59, Engineer-Colonel V. Romanov, news article in Sovetskiy
Patriot (Soviet Patriot), 7 February 19G5.

their Aracriccin uci.rg«i.ts, which for the first time v.'ere vulner-
able ddspite th^^.lr geographical isolatio;^ should the United
States start a general wcir. No ir.ention v;as made of Soviet
antimissile defense capabilities in thiB article or another
authored by Major General V. Zerr.skov V7hich followed it. Gen-
eral zeniskov's article presented a knowledgeable analysis of
United States force levels and defense trends. ^0
Other soviet articlts during this period repeated pre-
vious claiir.G of Soviet antimissile defense capabilities. Mar-
shal Kalinovsky's message on the 48th Anniversary of the Sov-
iet Armed Forces was typical
i
The air defense forces have mastered the new
methods of destroying flying targets while
they arc still far short of objectives bsing
defended. The Soviet Union has solved the
complex and extremely important problem of
destroying any enemy rocket in flight. *^^
On 30 March 1965, the United States announced the first
successful test of the Sprint missile, the point defense in-
terceptor fcr the Nike-X system. in previous years, such an-
nouncements had served to ignite public debate on antimissile
defense deploi-TOent. In 1965, such a debate did not take place
The only overt statement by the Johnson Ad^ninietration was the
60, Major General V. zemskov, "Policy Is Still an Arms Race,"
Krasnaya Zve zda (p-^d Stcjr), 17 February 1965.
61. Pravda, 23 February 1965, p. 2. Sec also Engineer-Lieu-
tenant Colonel V^ Ko^yrev, "W-sapons of Great Destructive
l>o\Ner," Vcyennyy* Zna niya (Military Knowledge), November
195
-i, pp. 34-3; and iuaishal V.D. Sokolovsky, The New York
Times, 18 February 1965, p. 6,
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14 May release of previously classified testimony given by
Secretary KcNaraara to the House Appropriations Committee on
5 March. There seems little doubt that the release of this
testimony, which coincided V7ith China's second nuclear test,
was intended as a warning to the Chinese. Specific care was
taken to avoid ambiguity with regard to the Soviets. Secre-
tary McNamara's statement cited development of an antimissile
defense system which would protect the United States from
attack by other than great powers for a "decade or two" as
"well worth considering.** He estimated the cost of such a
system, at eight to ten billion dollars, about half what he
estimated to be the minimum cost for a system to afford "some
measure of protection" against a massive Soviet attack.^ In
this and other related public Ktatements, Secretary McNamara
was careful to avoid picturing an "anti-China ABM" as being a
threat to the United states-Soviet nuclear balance.
Overt Soviet "antimissile rattling" during their Kay Day
parade may also have influenced the McNaonara release. While
the weapons paraded in Red Square included the same antimis-
sile missile previously displayed, Tass described it as an
"antimissile rocket" specifically for the first time and
repeated the co/itention that Soviet rockets were "practically
62. The New York Times , 15 May 1965, p, 3. For the complete
text, see U.S., Congress, House of Representatives, Hear*
ings Before the Committe*^ on Defense Appropriations
,
Fiscal Year 19C5, part 3, (Washington! U.S. Governmeht
Printing Office, 1965), p. 357.
63. The washing ton Post, 10 May 1965, p. Al.
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invincible to antiiaicsile defense." In a more significaiit
davelopment, Moscow television broadcast a thirty sninute
film entlt3.ed ''Rockets in r.he Defense of peace" on 10 May,
Included in th*?. film was footage of Soviet antirnitisile defense j
includino testing Btations and computer centers supplying data
for interceptions and launching of defensive misBileB, One
sequence showed tVre :: j ring of c.n antimissile missile and its
interception of an incoming reentry vehicle at an uusp£cifie:d
aJ titi.do.^'^' This pCirticular incident marked the first time
the present Soviet leadership had reported to the typically
Khrushchevian technique of military threat, by demonstration
in their manipulation of the antimissile defense dialogue.
The fall of 1965 produced indications frorr« the Soylftts
that tht;y wer*: moving toward additional deployment of anti-
missile defense and upgrading tVie numerjcal strength of th.eir
strategic offensive forces. In an important article whic>)
appeared in September, Lieutenant Colonel E. I. Rybkin at-
tacked General Talensky'c fatalitm with regard to nucl«iar vrir
,
V^hile he failed to refer specifically to Khrusyichev. his ar-
guments Ltrongly challenged the implicat-lons of the former
leader's overall strategic policy. He emphasized that steps
must be taken to minimise or eliminate domage to the Soviet
Union in t^ie event of nuclear war. To accomplish this goal,
he advocated two avenues, either quick defeat of the enemy
through massive offensive operations or the development of
^^* T'n^' N'g-w York Time s, 11 May 1965, p. 3.
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•'nsw means of defense. *'^^ He further emphasized that these
avenues were not incompatible. Defensive progress was in-
timated by Marshal Kalinovsky in a quotation which appeared
in October iSGSt
With the solution of the problem of destruc-
tion of ballistic mierJ.ics in flight, troops
of the PVO have stsrted to have at their
disposal all necessary means for reflecting
and breaking do-.^n striJcei: of the enemy from
the air in distant approaches to defended
objects. They have bficome a reliable shield
against nuclear attack. ^'^ [italics mine]
Three ot?»er articles discussing dtvelopnient of offensive
weapons appeared in November. None of these articles men-
tioned antimisr.ilo defense capabilities. On 14 IJovember,
Colonel General Vladimir Tolubko, First Deputy Commander of
the Strategic Rocket Forces, stated that the Soviet Union was
developing long-range intercontinental missiles which could
be maneuvered in flight i "Even more powerful rockets, which
can deliver nuclear warheads over ballistic as well as or-
bital trcjI-TiCtories a'-jd tsrc- capable of maneuvering on trajec-
tory ere undt-r cievelopment. •* It w<iG unclear from this
65. Lieutenant Colonel E, I, Rybkin, "On the Essence of
World-wide Misslle-tJuclear War," Kommunist Vooru7.hen -
nykh Si l (Communist of the Armed Forces), September
196b, p. 58.
6G. Sovt^tBkiy Patriot (Soviet Patriot), 27 October 1965.
Quoted from Y Yr-.djnoia staryu (In One Formation),
(r^ioscows 196*5),




statement whether these rockets v/ere in the design or test
phase. General Tolubko admitted that the United States v/as
also moving in this direction. To bolster these claims.
General Tolubko' s immediate superior. Marshal Krylov, pointed
out the continuous improvement in offensive rocket technology
SLB evidenced by the display of ncv? solid-fuel intercontinent-
alJ missiles in the parade honoring the 48th Anniversary of
68
the Bolshevik Revolution.
Despite these signs from the Soviet military which ap-
peared to indicate progress to a higher strategic offensive
and defensive posture, powerful forces in the United States
persisted in their efforts to avoid an increasing arn^s race.
In November, the White Hourc Conference on International Co-
operation urged adoption of a three year moratorium on pro-
duction and deploymeat of antimissile defenses. It described
United States ditployment of any anciniissile defense as po-
tentJ.ally destabilizing in that it would cause both the
United States and the Soviet Union to increase their offen-
sive missile forces. This finding was in direct conflict
with the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who had unan-
imously recommended deployment. "' The Conference's position
and findings were supported enthusiastically by The New York
68. Address by Marshal N, I, Krylov on Artillery and Rocket
Troops Day, rrgvda , 19 November 196b, p. 2. See also
an unrigned article "Defense Capacity of the Soviet
Union," Voyennyyc znaniya (Military Knowledge), November
196i3.
69. The iW^w York Times , 24 November 1965, p. 1.
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Time s in editorials puolXished oi; 24 anci 26 Kov<srTvt.sr. "^
De^EpJt** thes? r<»cc!nm*r;c'ations, domestic prossure en the
Johnson A(3minlr;tratic>ri to move towarcj antimissilft defense
cleployrricnt grev; in the firsjt half of 196S, In late January
>
Secretary McNamara appeared before the Senate Arraed Services
ComiTxittee. He teatj.lied that tho Chinees would not be ciblc
to threaten the Continental united Ctatec significantly
before 1975* After stating that antimissile defense deploy-
ment still did not appear to be prvtdent on co&t-effectivencss
grounds, he advocated further postponement of the deployment
dccioi oni
On the basis of our present knov^iedge of
Chinese CotPinunist nuclec^r progress, no
antirnisfile deploynent decision need be
made nc-w. However, the developm-^nt of
the essential ccnioonentG should be pressed
"'7
1forward vigorously* -^
Should deployment become necessary, he indicated that he fav-
ored a "light" system designed to cope with the relatively
smaller missile attacKc of \:he sort the Chinesr* might be cap-
able of launching in the 1975-30 period. Clearly, he made
every effort to f«void challenging the Soviet Union directly.
In the April bugetary hearings before the Congress, the
debate which had previously occurred in 1963 was repeated.
'^'^' The IvLV York Times, 24 November 1965, p. 38 and 26 Kov-
erober 19^.^5, p, 36.
71. The: iTew York rAmet>, ?fc Janu-:iry 19C6, p. 1.
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On 22 April, the Senate proposed ths addition cf $167.9 mil-
lion to the Johnson AdminiEtration'B budget request for
antimissile defense deployment. The sum was earmarked for
procurement of long leadtime items needed for antimissj le
miBsile production. The Johnson Adniinistraticn had requested
$446.0 lAillion for antirnirsiie defense research and develop-
72
ment. On 25 April, Senator Henry M. Jackson appeared on
the television prograni 'Meet the press," Ke outlined tVie
limited soviet deployment of antimissile defenses and esti-
mated that it would take the United States three years to
73
catch up in this vital area. Further debate in the Senate
on 27 April reco.-nrpended an injTUuediatc st,aLt: in production
procurvSjnent. Oii 29 April, the Senate approved the addition
to the budget. Spurred by an uncopf irrr.cd 29 Apr j 1 press
report of additional soviet defensive deployments around
Leningrad and Volgograd which subsequently proved to be in
74
error, the House of Representatives approved t^»e addition
to the budget on 4 May, The Johnson Administration made no
coi(ui\ent on whether this appropriation would be spent. Pre-
vious such additions had not been utilized. Only funds for
research and development had been actually allocated.
Soviet statements regarding antimissile defense in early
1966 seemed to move toward a more realistic aooraisal of its
^^* The Washington Post, 22 April 1966, p. AI.
'^^' The Kew York Times
, 25 April 1966, p. 3.
^^* Zll^-Ji^_J2£iSJIjl£l^» 29 April 19C6, o. 4.
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capabilitifts than hod previous claims;. On 18 February, in
an article prftpared for the Yugoslav military newspaper
Narodna Armya (Peopls't; Army), Marshal Malinovsky stated,
"We have everything necessary for successfully combatting
enemy missiles at distant approaches to protected ob jectivos. "^^
7 fi
This cxeiCt v;ording was repeated in a Moscow statement by
General F. F. faatiti;ky. First Deputy Chief of the Soviet Gen-
eral Staff, indicating that the precise wording had been pre~
viously established. On first reading, the ebovc statements
seem innocuous enough, but when analyzed carefully the typi-
cally ambiguous formulation offers some possible insights.
The key phrases are "everything necessary," which upgrades
Marshal Kalinovsky's October 1965 assertion that the Air
Defense Forces "have started to have at their disposal all
necessary means" to a more comprehensive capabilltyi "distant
approaches," which rilsc appears in the October assertion and
implies a system using interception above the atmosphere;
and "protected objectives," which paraphrases the October
phrase "defended objectives" and represents a tacit admin-sion
that Soviet antimissile defense coverage was in fact select-
ive, not truly comprehensive. The February assertion, when
ccwnpared to that m.ade by Marshal Malinovsky four months ear-
lier, supports the October statement's movement toward some
75. Yugoslav Press Service Tanyi.\g , 18 February 1966.
76. Tass
, 18 February 1966,
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slight increase in rftalism* The major difference wac one of
improved systera readine?!S, from an early <3eployiaent sta-^e to
a more comprehensive capability. Later, at the 23ra congress
of the CoTTjnunist Party of the Soviet Union in April, MarshGl
Malinovsky'e defense ad<-lress continued this trend toward laore
realistic eotiraat«s of Soviet Air Defense Force readiness
v;hen he claimed Ib/at "Soviet air defrsnse faeana reliably en-
sure the destruction of any aircraft and many rockets of the
enemy." The key phrase in this statement was the use of
"many missiles" instead of the previous blanket assertion of
impenetrable protection of defended areas. The above state-
ment implied that that the soviet Union had become confident
of their ability to extract an entry price from ony attacker
and has proven to be. the most consistently used formul<"xtion
76
on Soviet 'air defense capabilities in the period 1969-71.
The trend tov/ard realism was carried further in a 19
April fiddress by Air Defense Forces Commander Marshal Sudets.
He began by describing United states strategy as one which
&trest<es the "devalopment of nuclear weapons and means of air
and space attack» which liave been assigned the m.ain role in
cttacklng tr.rgets during the* Initial period of v;ar." He
then proceeded to describe United States strategic forces in
77. tK^XStl^ 3 April 1966, p. 3.
78# For a complete listing of Soviet antim.isslle defense
formolc'.tlCi)s froia 1960-6S, see Appendix A.
79. Soyetskaya Roosiya (soviet Russia), 19 April 1966.
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a particularly grim f?s\\ion, culminating the "threat assess-
ment cection" ot hi? article with an eqvially peflsinlstic
prognosiFi "The. Pttn^.agon*E plan3 envisag* a further increase
in nuclear rocket means, as v;£ll as the reequipraent of the
Air Force with modern high-altitude Bupersonic! aircraft. "°^
Given the thresit faced by the Soviet Union, Marshal Sudrts
concluded that Air Dorfcr.ce ForC2 rcjponsibi.Mties were "en-
hanced" and crucial to the successful prosecution of ^ gen-
eral war I
Their t^f.k consists of pr^riventing the break-
through of enemy means of air and spac^ at-
tack...c>nd thus of insuring the vJ.ability
of the ctate and the capability of other
branches of the armrid forces to deal a
destructive blow to the enemy. ^^
Turning specifically to antimissile defense, his statement
reflected hiartihal Malinovsky's October and February phracing
somewhat t
Models of our rockets were put on display
at the 1964 and 19G5 military p'lirades.
They are capal/le of dcstroyivig t-neiay
means of air c'.nd &[> \ce attack at any al-
titude and at great distances Zroro. the
protected areas and objectives. ^'^-
Significantly, Marsha} Succts pointed oot that ''models*' of
antimissile rockets had thsi defensive capability rather than
®^» Sov
e





a deplcyeci systciu, thus intii.iating that full operational cap-
ability had not then been achieved. Viewed in the context of
his article, which seemed to be attempting to make a case for
increased responsibilities for the Air Defense Forces, and
considering that Marshal Sudets was subsequently removed froin
his seat on the Central Committee in April, failed to appear
at May military gatherings, and finally was relieved of his
position as Commander of the Air Defense Forces (PVO) by Gen-
eral Batitsky in July when he retired from active duty,°-^ it
seemed that these statements may have overstepped the guide-
lines for "antimissile realirm" or policy advocacy for forces
under his responsibility. Marshal Sudets had been a particu-
larly ardent supporter of antimissile defenses. V7hile such
advocacy would necessarily follow from his personal and bur-
eaucratic interests, he may have objected too strenuously to
decisions allocating resources to other branches, probably
the Strategic Rocket Forces from subsequent force posture
developments. The performance of Soviet-supplied air defense
equipment during the early phases of the air war in North
Vietnam may also have been a contributing factor.
A notable hr.rdening in the international situation was
legitimized at the 23rd Congre^js of the Communist Party of
the Soviftc Union. The general line adopted was indicated by
the Resolution of the Congress regarding the Report of the
83. Fritz i:nnarth, "The ABM Race," Radio Free Europe Re-




Under conditions in vhich the aggressive
forces of iir.psrialism arc exacerbating in-
ternational tension, and foci of conflict
are appearing, the CPSU will hencf^forth
raise the level of vigilance of the Soviet
people in order that the aimed forces of
the USSR may be always ready to conduct a
reliable defense of th'^ achievements of
socialism and to deliver a decisive rebuff
to any imperialist aggressor ^^"^
In the same report, General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev
stated J
..•the party v/ill henceforth reinforce the
deftns'i capability of the Soviet Union,
multiply the mioht of the armed forces of
the USSR, and maintain a level of military
preparedness such as will reliably guaran- _
tee the peaceful labor of the Soviet people.
Premier Alexei N. Kosygin's address on economic matters pre-
sented the question in more practical terms when he stoted
that the material well-being of the Soviet people v;ould be
greater if fne "international situation was not seriously
complicated by the U, S., which unlt:ashed and keeps intensi-
fying the aggressive war in Vietnam. '"^^ He asserted that
84. General V. Ivanov, *'The 23rd Congress on trie Military
Threat and Strengthening Defense Capability, " Koa-Jtiunist
Voorur.hennykh Sil (CoiruTiunist of the Anned Forces), May
1966, p. 0. General Ivanov has served as the Commandant
of thfi Higher Military Academy of the General Staff, In
prior aG«ignjnnents> he was Commander of PVO forces, Baku
Military District froio. 1956-59 and First Deputy Director
of the soviet General Staff from 1959-65
»
^^» F-£^y5l^.» 7 April 1966.
86. Pravda , 6 April 1966.
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"these thrftcts to universal p<?ac:e" had corrpelled the Soviet
Governjnent to increase defense expenditures, with the roeult
that funds for the development of consumer good? industries
would have to be reduced.
A statement: by Marshal Malinovsky in his report on the
state of the soviet cirmed forces aroused great Western inter-
est and speculation. During the rocket section of his speech
he made the following observation, "We stand calmly and con-
fidently on guard, especially now that t>ie blue belt in the
defense of our state has been completed. "^^ At the time, it
was debated in the Went whether this "blue belt" referred to
a recently completed around the world cruise cf a group of
Soviet nuclear-powered subiuarines or antimissile defenses
reportedly being deploved in the northv^i^tern area of the
Soviet Union. Subsequent 'nvestigation has faildd to reveal
the exact meaning of Marshal Malinovsky* s statement c.nd it
has not been repeated.
In an article which appeared concurrently v.'it.h the 23rd
Party Congress, Marshal Sokolovsky made an interesting appeal
for an integrated approacyj to military preparedness
i
Of particular importance nowadays is to
87. Pravda , 2 April 1966, p. 2.
88. In support of the antinisdile defense theory, see Fritz
Erwarth, ''Ciariiication of i'lalinovs/cy • s 'Blue Beit*,"
Radio Free Eurooe Re search Report, 21 July 1966. The
basis for hrmarth's analysis lies in the position of
the statement in the missile portion of ^.he socech.
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ensure that the nuclear forces, the Air and
Missile Defense Forces, and the entire sys-
tem of reconnaissance, observation, and
warning, are at high combat readiness • Vic-
tory in modi^rn war may be attained by active,
decisive operations and full use of all for-
ces and means, and precise cooperation
between thejne89
With regard to antimissile defense systems, the post-
23rd Party Congress statements continued the more realistic
approach. The article by General Ivanov cited above repeated
Marshal Malinovsky's phrase
t
Our antiaircraft troops are developed to
the point where they can guarantee the des-
tri.f.ction of any type of aircraft, and many
missiles, of an enemy. This department of
the armed forces is equipped with the latest
high-efficiency AA missile systems and avia-
tion complexes for the interception and
destruction of enemy units. °^
By late April, even Marshal Sudets had picked up the new
formulation when he stated, *«At the present time the air de-
fense weapons insure the reliable destruction of any aircraft
91
and many missiles of the enemy,** in the same article. Mar-
shal Sudets also repeated the post-23rd Party Congress theme
89, Marshal V, Sokolovsky, "Soviet Views on Modern Military
Strategvj " Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil (Communist of the
Armed Forces), April 1966, p. 64.
90, General Ivanov, "The 23rd Congress," Kommunist
, p, 65,
91, Marshal V. Sudets, "How the party Leads," Vestnik Pro-
tivovQzdushnoy Oborony (Air Defense Journal), May 1966,
p» 3. See also the address by Marshal Rodion Ya. Maiin-
ovsky to the Budapest garrison reported in the Hungarian




The irnpfirialists exaraine the air space as
one of the r:OEt opportune and accessible
]t.athc for ^n attack on th'-3 USSR, for un-
leaching agqres<3ion» Kawely for this pur-
pose new things are being developed in the
USi^. and the weaoons they h?-ve for air or
sp:ice attack are being perfected, t.,all
this obliges the PVO troops to show the
greatest alertnesG, to constantly raaintain
such a level of combat readiness which
would frustrate an inperialist attack. ^^
The 1966 May Day parade contained no nev; military x*ea-
pons for the first tine in three years. The order of appear-
ance was the same as that followed in the 7 November 1965
parade."' At that time, this "reluctance" was thought to be
explained by a desire of the regime to withhold new develop-
ments for ct sennational display on the 50th Anniversary of
the Bolshevik Revolution in November 1967. This contention
seemed borne out by the similar lack of innovations in the
94
Kovejtiber 1966 parade." However, Western observers did not
assume that Soviet antimissile defense efforts were frozen.
In late June, "Pentagon sources" divulged that a defensive
arc was being constructed in the northwestern pert cf the
Soviet Union. This arc was reported to be over 300 miles in
92. Harrhal V. Sudets, "Hov/ the Party Leads," Vestnik Pro-
tlvovozdutohnoy Oborony (Air Defense Journal), Hay 1966,
p. 3,
^^* The New York Times, 2 May 1966, p. 1,
94. The Novefiiber 1967 par&de did contain new weapons, such
as the s?-9 ICBM and SS-N-S submarine-launched ballistic




length and became known as the *^Tallinn Line" for the Eston-
ian city whic'h .Is located at its eouthern end- The sources
did not clearly state that this system was antiaircrcift or
antimisf?ile in character, or whether it was a combination of
bothe it was emphasized that the Bystem had not reached
95
opercitlonal status at that time«
Soviet emphasis en the need for increased military vig"
ilance continued in the sumnver of 1956* On 19 May, General
Secretary Brezhnev asserted that "a high level of defense
preparedness and nonflagging military vigilance are most es-
96
sential in the present international situation," Less than
one month later, Brezhnev expanded this theme in his election
address t
In the struggle against the threat of war
and plots of imperialism, our first duty is
to strengthen our cour.try. . . . In today's
conditions O'jx country is obliged to devote
even more effort and attention to strengthen
its defensive might. We shall keep the armed
forces of the land of the Soviets at thv^ high-
est level of contemporary milita/cy technology
and continue to maintain our army*3 superior-
ity so that at any moment it will be ready to
deliver a crushing rebuff to the aggressor.
The Party fr^^nkly tells the people that ex-
penditures on armaments are a great burden
for our budget, for our national economy.
We would like to accelerate the movement
tov,'ard communism, . • . But the situation does
not yet permit us to do so,«.,^^
95. The llew York Times, 20 June 1966, p, 1«
^^* j^.^yestia, 19 May 1966.
97. Pravda, 11 June 1966,
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In his "Order of the Day" for Soviet Navy Day, Marshal
Malinovsky repeated the theme that "American imperialism"
had aggravated internati'onal tens-«on and credited the CPSU
and the Soviet Government with taking steps to strengthen
the soviet military in response to a serious threat to world
peace. ° On 3 August, Pr€iraier Kosygin addref^ssed the Supreme
Soviet on international problems. He discussed the deter-
iorating relations with the United states as "worthy of
special mention," Although soviet military capabilities
were not discussed, he acknowledged that "military spending
weighs heavily on the working people. "^^ The regime appar-
ently felt a need to legitimize its military expenditures
to the soviet people.
In an article which appeared in an Ecist German journal.
General Pavel Kurotshkin, Director of the Frunze Military
Academy, outlined the necessary response of the Soviet mili-
tary to the increased threat. He postulated that "the char-
acter of any nuclear war will be determined by the way it
begins.""*-^ During this early phase of a nuclear war, he
emphasized that strategic forces and air defense units would
be crucial. However, his emphasis was on the credibility of
98. Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), 31 July 1966.
99. Alexei N. Kosygin, "Soviet Foreign Policy Reviewed,"
Survival , October 1966, p. 325,
100. General Pavel Kurotshkin, "The Soviet Army - A Reliable
Guarantee of peace and Security," Deutsche Aussenpolitik
(German Foreign Policy), October 1966, p. 1181.
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Soviet offensive systems rather than defenstst
The strategic missile units nov? represent
the foundation of the soviet Army, Th.ey
have been equipped v;ith ICBM's which can
deliver nuclear v;arheadB with the destruc-
• tive power of megatone of TNT to any point
on the earth* Ko rocket defense system
could save the aggressor froin these fear-
ful weapons 6^^-^
In reBponec to the increased threat, he adhered to the post-
23rd party Congress^ formulation of increased readiness by
stating, "We are strengthening our homeland's defense in every
way and are continually increasing the firepower of our armed
forces. "^^^
On 27 October 1966, the Chinese tested a ballistic mis-
sile with a nuclear warhead. The official reactions of the
United States and Soviet GovernmentG v;ere notably different.
The Soviet press reported the event in one sentence? "The
Hsinhua Nevrs Agency reported that on October 27 China succes~
Bfully conducted a nuclear micEiie test in its territory. "^^'^
Ko soviet article has credited the developing Chinese nuc-
lear capability ar being a threat to the Soviet Union. The
response of the United States was far more overt and within
two weeks the debate hfd moved from Chinese nuclear tests to
101. Kurotshkln, ''The Soviet Azray," Deutsche Aussenpolitik,
October 1966, p. i.iB3«
102. Ibid.
103. Izvestia, 29 October J?6C, p. 5« The same sentence




Soviet antiraii^siies* in a nev^s conference on 10 November,
Secretary McNaraare. stated that there was "considercible evi-
dence** that the Soviet union was ieploying such a system, -'-^'^
He added that altliough its effectiveness was not known, tho
United states was proceeding on the assumption that the sys-
tem was effective and emphasised that there was "no question
about our capability of penetrating the Soviet defenses with
both our missiles and aircraft, •* To counter this develop-
ment i Secretary McNaniara advocated increases in United States
offensive forca? and thci development of the so-called "third
generation" offensive niisslles, the subrnarine-launcVied Posei-
don and the land-based ICM (Improved Capacity Missile), both
of which were being designed to penetrate sophisticated de-
fenses. This counterproposal was viewed as an attempt to
"pre-empt" pressure from Congress for immediate deployment of
Nike-X, secretary McNamara persisted in his recommendation
to delay the deployment decisioni
We considered the possible deployment of
such systems, both against the Chinese Com-
munist nuclear threat and against the soviet
offensive system.s as v/ell. We concluded
that it is much too early to make a decision
for deployntent against the Chinese threat
and we have not arrived at a decision on any
other deployment. We will continue our dis-
cussions on this subject in the weeks to
1 05




Clearly the United, states debate remained to be resolved.
The end of 1966 marked a significant change in the anti-
missile defense dialogue, particularly on the part of the
united states which took the initiative in trying to trans-
form the dialogue into an arms control agreement on strategic
forces. The period from 1960 to 1966 set the stage for those
efforts. The soviet deployment of antimissile defenses had
begun and the successors to Khrushchev had avoided threats
based on its real or potential existence. They seemed reluc-
tant to inflame united States opinion which could have forced
the Johnson Administration to reignite an accelerated arms
race, bringing the superior resources of the united states
economy to bear. Within the United States, the pressures
for a decision on antimissile defense deployment had increas-
ed substantially. The consensus of opinion held that should
arms control attempts fail to provide an agreement, the de-







Initia). Fsargainj.ng , December 196S-"Septefaber .1967
During the period from December 1966 to November 1969
p
the United States-Soviet antimisGi3.s dialogue underwent a
qualitative shift. The United Stat£-s took the initiative in
moving the dialogue from solely one of "corapeti'cive armaments'
and began to move toward arms control of these systems « This
period was further marked by rapid expansion of Soviet offen-
sive missile forces, relative inactivity with regard to fur-
ther expansion of existing Soviet antimissile defense instal-
lations around Moscow, the united states decision to deploy
antimissile defenses, and attempts by both sides tc Jink aims
control possibilities to the resolution of other key inter-
national disputes s Whether such "linkages" were employed to
avoid or defer movement on strategic arms control or that
manipulation of arms control possibilities seemed to promise
improveirients or solution of these disputes remains unclear.
What Is cleor is that Soviet linkage to the Vietnam situation
end subsequent United States linkage to the Invasion of Chech-
oslovakia and the Middle East struggle retarded the movement
toward formal arms control negotiations.
In a news article which appeared in The Mew York Timef.
at the outset of the period,^ Williajn Beecher outlined the
^' The L^ew York Times, news article by William Beecher, 8




eitiiation, an an2i3.ysi£ generally representative*, of. Washington
opinion » The Soviet defense system was; seen to be located
around Moscow v;ith other minor sites around Leningrad and in
northwestern Soviet territory. In terms of capability and
readiness, the Soviet systen:! was believed to be of the area
defense type ueing exoatmospheric iriterception of incoming
warheads and was thought to be ready for operations by the
end of 1967, In contrast, while Beecher reported Secretary
McNeimara's confidence that United states research and devel-
opment efforts had kept the nation technologically competi-
tive, a fully operational antimissile defense was seen to
require six years of development and construction before it
could be ready. The overall tone of this article was meas-
ured and generally free from emotion or policy advocacy.
However, by this time the public response to Secretary McNam-
ara's November admission of soviet defensive deploymeiits had
begun to build. On 9 December ^ the respected columnist james
Reston reflected the concurrent American distaste for another
round in the arms race in an editorial entitled *'Let *em Eat
Missiles*** Ke pointed out that the costs of an antimissile
defense system Interfered with both Moscow's and v^ashington*s
promises to raise the living standards of their poorest citi-
zens. The Soviet deploi.anent was credited to an increased
influence of the soviet military and a determination to prove
Soviet invulnerability to attack during the forthcoming 50th
Anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution celebration. Reston *6

personal frustration over future prospects was evident:
Never mind that one more upward spiral of
the arms race would probably leave both
sides with no more real security than they
have nowe Never mind that after both sides
have an antimissile system the race v.^ill
start over to produce ntv; more expenr-ive
and more sophisticated missiles that can
penetrate: the antimissile system. Never
mind that the costs will cut deeper into
the poverty programs. The Administration
must not be vulnerable to political attack*
It must have an effective antipolitical
missile system even if it cannot get an
effective antiballistic missile system*
And let the poor eat missiles and live in
shelters!
2
On 18 Deceitiber, William Beecher atteinpted to explain the
rationale of those in the Ad;iiinistration who favored a United
States antimissile defense deployment. In assessing the Sov-
iet deployment decision, these analysts reportedly saw the
Soviet retreat in the Cuban Missile Crisis as a humiliating
incident that the Soviets v;ere determined not to repeat.
They saw a secure second strike force as the logical response
for the Soviets to take and noted that this appeared to be
what the Soviet Union had done. VJhile this analysis stres-
sed the role of the real or perceived strategic balance on
the national leaderships in crisis periods, it omitted ref-
erence to other kev factors which had influenced the outcome
2, The I^ew York Times, editorial by James Reston, "Let 'em
Eat Missiles,** 9 December 1956, p. 46,
^* The Mew York Times
, news article by William Beecher, 16
Decerriber 1966, p. E-3,
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of the Cuban Missile Crisis* In addition to the roughly six
to one strategic missile delivery system advantage enjoyed
by the United States in October 1S62, numerical superiority
of about four to one in strategic bomber aircraft, less vul-
nerable strategic forces, conventional superiority in the
area surrounding Cuba, short lines of communication for those
conventional forces, and the mutually perceived will of the
United States to resort to the use of military force if nec-
essary also had a major impact in the behavior of the adver-
saries. In addition to its strategic force buildup, the
Soviet union's force posture developments in the post-1962
period had included qualitative and quantitative improvements
in naval and mibile land forces in an apparent attempt to
provide increased flexibility to respond to future crises in
a conventional manner. The conclusion that the proper Soviet
strategic force posture response would be to seek secure
second strike forces was, in effect, im.puting the United
States analysis of the Crisis to that of the Soviet leader-
ship. As subsequent Soviet deployments have indicated, it is
likely that the Soviets saw strategic superiority from their
perspective as a highly effective instrument v/hen coupled
with a demonstrated or perceived will to use it.
4. Uri Ra'anan, "Soviet Global politics and the Middle East,'*
Naval War College Review, September 1971, p. 21. See also
the forthcoming pamphlet. The Deterioration of the us-
Soviet Strategic Balance i some political Implications, by
the same author to be presented to the Senate Committee on
Governmental Operations, Subcom.mittee on National secur-
ity in February 1972.
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A sraalier group of Administration officials saw the pos~
sibility of such a dtvelopn-fert at that tims. They w«ra con-
cerned that in some future critjis, with the Soviet Union
possessing parity cr some degree of numerical superiority in
strategic offens'ive forces and limited antimissile defenses,
the Soviet leadership might conciude- that the strategic bal-
ance had sufficiently shifted and that the United St^ites
must back down since it night not survive a nuclear exchange
while the Soviet Union might. Those advocating Unit&d States
deployment of antimissile defenses stressed the function of
reducing the chance of a Soviet or Chinese miscalculation
about the probable outcome of such an exchange in the absence
of United States defenses*
Against this background of increased Soviet capabilities
and gro\/ing public emotion over the antimissile defense de-
ployment issue, the Johnson Administration began to move to-
ward arms control overtures in mid-December. On 16 December,
"officials reported" that the Adj^iini strati on v/as considering
making an appeal for an antimissile defense deplo^went mora-
5torium. On 20 December, John Finney in Th e_^.I^ew \ ork_ _Time
s
reported that the Geneva disarmament negotiations would be
the site of United States-Soviet discussions on a moratorium.
The initial impetus for United States arms control efforts
^' ?1'^ Watching ton Post, 16 December 1966, p, Al,
^* Tbe New York Times, news article by John Finney, 20 Dec-
ember 1966, p. 3,
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was a desire to cvojd antimissile defencD dsployn;&nt and itis
incident expenaecse ^ilthough the broad econoirdc effc^cts of
President Johnson's "guns and butter" policy haa not yet be-
come apparent at that time, there was considerable reluctance
to add additional expsnces to a Defense Budget already sv^ollan
by Vietnam war costs. Given the nunierical superiority of
United States strategic offensive forced at that time (1054
land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles to about 450
»
656 submarine-launched ballistic missiles to about 130, and
7520 long-range heavy bombers to about 150), an antimissile
moratoriuiti without limits on offensive forces would have
allowed the United Stages to avoid large expjinditures for
strategic forces for several years even if the Soviet Union
sought to catch up in nuinerical strength of offensive forces.
The subsequent rr.ove to widen the arms control appeal to in-
clude all strategic weapons systems cjuld hc<ve reflective of
a desire to codify this situation or, more realistically » a
recognition that the Soviet Union would h^vre little incentive
to limit itself in tne one area vrhere it held a numerical
advantage without reciprocal concessions by the United States
in areas where it enjoyed numerical superiority.
The first official reference to possible arms limitation
discussions was made by Secretary of State Dean Husk in a 21
"^
'
The Military Balance 1967-68, (London: The Institute for
Strategic studies, 1967), po 45, Figures cited above are
extrapolated from those of July 1967 to reflect the esti-
mated situation in December 1966,
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December news conference t
The United States would like to see some
means developed to limit the arms race and
thus avoid the wholly new major levels of
expenditures which V70uid have no percepti-
ble result on the strategic balance.^
Although an antimissile defense deployment moratorium was not
specifically mentioned, the phrases "some means developed"
and "wholly new major levels" point to arms control measures
and antimissile defense or increased offensive inventories
to overwhelm such defenses respectively.
On 21 December, a United States announcement of an under-
ground nuclear test stimulated an analysis of trends in such
testing. In the period since the signing of the Partial Test
Ban Treaty in mid-1963, the pace of such testing had increas-
ed i for the United States, there were 21 underground tests in
1964, 25 in 1965, and 34 in 1966; for the Soviet Union, 2
9tests were detected in 1964, 3 in 1965, and 6 in 1966. In
the case of the Soviets, probably more tests were conducted
but not detected. Significantly, during this period the
trend was toward larger yields as well as increased frequency.
On 27 October 1966, the Soviet Union had conducted a test
with an estimated yield of one megaton on Novaya zemlya Island
in the Barents Sea. The 20 December United States test was
8, The Washington Pogfe , 22 December 1966, p. Al.
5» yhe fTew York Times
, 21 December 1966, p. 26.
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described as "nearly as large.,** officially "one of the larg-
est" conducted by the United States undsrcjrour^cl and "design-
10
^6. to aid in the developraent of a vmrhesid for an A3M. "
On 15 December, Minister of Finance V, F« Garbuzov pre-
sented the 1967 budget to the Suprerae Soviet. The section
on military expenditures was preceded by a t^n^lcal pof>t--23rd
Party Congress assessment of the international cituationj
It is the fault of aggressive monopolist
circles of the United states that recently
the international situiit5.on has sharpenftd,
that the danger of a new world war has grown*
Bearing in mind the existing international
situation, the CPSU Central Cortiniittee and
the USSR Council of iMinisters v-ere forced
to take the necessary measures to further
strengthen the defensive might of our father-
land and to increase allotments lor the
country's defense 1«1 billion rubles com-
pared v;ith the present year. The total ex-
penditures for military maintenance in the
USSR state budget is the sjnount of 14.5 bil-
lion rubles, 13,2 per cent of all budgetary
expenditures.^-^
Disregarding the duplicity inherent in Soviet budgetary fig-
ures for defense expenditures, in a dialogue of competitive
armeimentf! a budget increase is a firm indication of resolve,
James Reston's earlier concern that antimissile defense
might bfsccme a parti srtn domestic political issue was borne
out by a .«5tatcment by House Minority Leader Gerald Ford on
^^' The Hew York Tiraes, 21 December 1966, p. 26.
^^' VJ^i^B.* ^^ December 1966, p. 4,
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25 DBceiubers, Noting intelligence reports of Soviet deploy-
ments he warned, •*It seems to me that we are behind the Sov-
iet Union in this particular project. This could bacorae a
serious military crisis if v.-e. delay too much longer* "^'^ He
then predicted that Republican Congressmen would support
spending for deployment of antimissile defenses despite their
general desire to cut Fi&cal Year 196B budgetary collocations.
To counter such pressure, on 27 December "Adirdnistration
officials" reported that President Johnson was considering a
budget option which, should a moratorium on deployment of
antimissile defenses not be achieved, would purchase neces-
13
sary long leadtima items to speed United States deployment.
In addition to its domestic implications as a counter to pos-
sible charges of "doing nothing in the face of the Soviet
threat," such a move was viewed as a signal to the Soviets
of both united States restraint an resolve.
On 29 December, China carried out its fifth nuclear
test* The Soviet response was similar to that which had fol--
lowed previous tests. Pravda carried a one seotence announ-
cement! "fisinhua has reported that today 'CVjina successfully
carried out n new nuclear e>cplo£:ion in the Vi'estern part of
14the country**" United States response was also tempered.
The detonation was reported to be that of a bomb, not missile
^2' Jil£J:?^l}iJ;i2Jr£2L^£;t» 26 December 1966, p. A7.
^^* T}}2.J^yLy^]l.JEll^}J^f 27 December 1966, p. 1.
^'^' gf^vda , 29 December 1966, p. 3,
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delivered as the^ previous teist had hc^en, of several hundred
kilotons in yield. No advances from previous tests were
noted.
Despite this display of American restraint concerning
the Chinese threat, more alarming statements followed. On
1 January, physicist Ralph E, I/app stated that the United
States analysts had overestimated tVje time required for the
Chinese to develop their nuclear capability by assuming that
they v?ould fol]ov; traditional United states methods which
16Stressed perfection through orderly scientific progress.
He argued that a "high risk" technical program would signif-
icantly alter the analysts* estimates. Citing Central Intel-
ligence Agency reports » Senator Henry M, Jackson supported
this contention. He predicted that the CViinese would have
17intercontinental ballistic missiles by the early 1970 *s.
This timetable was somewhat faster than Administration esti-
mates. He credited this upgrading to Chinese adoption of
the recently-developed United States technique of "concur-
rency,** attempting to develop the major components of a com-
plex weapons system simultaneously rather than in sequence.
Such a technique was first employed in the development of
Polaris missiles and launching submarines.
15. The New York Times, 29 December 1966, p, 1.
^^* The Washington post , 2 January 1967, p. A6,
^^' The New York Times. 12 January 1967, p, 10.
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The overt f^doption of the policy of seeking an arms
control agreenient on antimissile defenses v;as begun by Pres-
ident Jolmson in his 10 January State of the Union message.
The proposal did not directly refer to antimissile defense
and implied a willingness to expand the negotiations tc cover
a larger scope of weapons* He stressed the social costs of
the arms race
;
The Soviet Union has in the past year in-
creased its long-range missile capabilities.
It has begun to place near Mcscov/ a limited
antimissile defense. My first responsibil-
ity to cur people is to assure thr-.t no nation
can ever find it rational to launch a nuclear
attack or to use its nuclear power tXQ a cred-
ible threat against us or against our allies.
And I would emphasize that this is wliy an
iiaportant link l!<;tv7een Russia and the United
States is in our corimton interest in arms
control and in dicarin:^ment. Vie have the
solemn duty to slow dovm the arms race be-
tween us, if T,hat is posnibje, in both con-
ventional and nuclear weapons and defenses.
And I thought we were making some progress
in that direction in the first fev; months 1
was in office. And 1 realized that any ad-
ditional r^ce would Impose on our peoples,
and on all mankind, for that matter, an ad-
ditional waste of resources with no gain in
security to eitlier side. And I expect in
the days ahead to closely consult and seek
the advice of the Congress about the possi-
bilities of international agreements bearing
directly on this problem, ^9
There was little that was truly nev/ in these, proposals. The
antimissile defense deployment moratorium had been given tacit
Presidential support in late 1965 when it was reccm'nended by






a V^ite House Conference on Tnternstional Cooperatio'i . • How-
ever, previous efforts directed toward limitations and freo^e
proposals on strategic offensive forces had been countered by
Sov'iet statements that arms control v?as a Western notion and
20
that they were only interested in disarmament.
The Soviet response to President Johnson's address v;as
measured* The arms control section was ignored « Instead,
the Soviet press em.phasized the budgetary announcements:, "New
21budget expenditures are of a downright militarist nature." '
This statement supported the post~-23rd Party Congress line of
increased V7estern threat. President Johnson's professed de--
sire to stop the Cold V7ar were pictured as being contradicted
by his actions, particularly in vietnamx
According to him the aim of the United States
is to stop the cold war and not to continue
it. As such» the President's words co>ild be
greeted with great satisfaction. The USSR
has firmly and consistently advocated liquid-
ation of the cold v;ar and the affirmation of
the principles of peaceful coexistence regard-
ing relations between countries with different
social cystems. The statement made by the
U. S. President on putting a stop to the cold
war, however, flagrantly contradicts washing-
ton's actions. One cannot with one hand give
false statements on the desire to put a stop
to the cold v.'ar and v;ith the other aive orders
19. The New York Times, 1 December 1S65, p. 1.
20, Lincoln P. Bloorr.f icld, Walter C. Clemens, c^.nd Franklyn
Gri f f 1 th s
, jlj}^!£3^:^- t.^.Y„. ^r ^»$J22^^2iS-Ji^l2£ » ^ CaTibridge j The
M. I. T. Press, 196C), p. 141.




for the extension of armed aggression in
Vietncun and the escalation of the bombings
of the DRV, a fraternal socialist country. 22
Releases in the Eastern European press were more specific.
The Czech response stressed the absence of specific disarma-
ment proposal s
i
,, .Johnson expressed concern about the arms
race and the hope that it would be possible
to find common interests with regard to the
problem of disarmaiT\ent. He did not, however,
submit concrete proposals concerning this
serious problem, ^^
The Hungarian press specifically referred to antimissile de-^
fenses and repeated the concern over the absence of specifics!
Johnson carefully dismissed the demand of
military circles that the U. S. should es-
tablish an antimissile system at great ex-
pense, although he admitted that the Soviet
Union had such a system. He pointed out
that instead of continuing with the arms
race, disarmament was needed. However, he
did not expand his views on this point. ^^^
The Yugoslav release, made several days later which allowed
for additional analysis, treated President Johnson's proposal
as nothing new and degraded its possibilities for promoting
a reduction in international tensions. It cited statements
22. Moscovf in Rumanian to Rumania, 1600 GMT, 12 January 1967.
23. Prague Domestic Service in Czech, 1000 GMT, 11 January
1967.




by Secretary McNamara that the prospects for reliable anti-
Kiissile defenses wsre remote«v Given these circuu^rj'tances.
President Johnson *j> statement was seen as an attempt to sti-
fle domestic debate which ajriounted to an endorsement by Pres-
ident Johnson of Secretary McMamara*« stand on increasing
offensive forces as the best response to the deplo^Tnent of
25
antimissile defenses by a potential adversary.
On 22 January! a particularly interesting corrjtientary by
Lubos Dobrovsky vras carried by P.adio Prague, Dobrovsky began
by stating that the Soviet antimissile defense deployment had
caused great anxiety in tlie united States. He then repeated
the 1964 Talensky argument » ^'Wnat kind of danger might threat-
en whom front an installation v;hose sole purpose is to prevent
enemy rockets with nuclear warheads from hitting their target
and destroying it?" However, he avoided the simple Talen-
sky argument that such a system threatened no one c'.nd pro-
ceeded with a fairly sophisticated discussion of strategic
stability I
The answer is not so easy as it might appear
at first glance* First of all, such a system,
if really effective - if it genuinely reduces
the risk of drastic consequences of a nuclear
strike and insofar as it is owned by only one
side - fundamentally alters the balance of
power. The equilibriuixi of risk is disturbed
when one side enjoys an advantage which the
25, Belgrade Tanyug l!iternational service in English, 2111
GMT, 16 January 1967
»




other side will not permit. Hence the other
side is compelled to do the Bame thing as its
adversary: to make its own defensive system
at least equally effective, or to improve the
quality and quantity of its aggressive weapons
to such a level as to enable those weapons to
break through the opponent's defensee27
He then outlined a scenario where a nation with superior of-
fensive strength could adopt a controlled use of offensive
weapons to "damage and intimidate" an opponent. Given such
a situation (and the inference that this described the United
States-Soviet confrontation was obvious), the building of an
antimissile defense system would be "actually nothing but a
mere equalization of the balance of forces." However, he
felt that the united States would not accept nuclear parity
with the Soviet Union and was even more unwilling to resume
the arms race since building antimissile defenses would only
result In another race in offensive systems. The ultimate
result would be mutual destruction economically. Given this
situation, he returned to the Talensky formulations
The way out does not consist of an answer
to the question of whether missile systems
should or should not be adopted. It is ra-
ther the question of whether to have nuclear
weapons* A balance of power at whatever
leveJ is a far too unstable a guarantee to
be regarded as an assurance. An equilibrium
of forces is nothing but makeshift. Assur-
ance is in doing av;ay with the causes of
danger - in nuclear disarmament.-^^
27. Prague




Having made this point, he assessed the possibilities ot" such
an agreement and concluded that without a cessation of hos-
tilities by the United States in Vietnam an agreement was im-
possible.
Contrasted with the fairly articulate reporting of the
East Europeans, the Soviet press in January and early Febru-
ary was barren of xesponse to President Johnson's tacit pro-
posal with one exception. In the 19 January issue of Za
Rubc^hom, its editor, Daniel F. Kraminsky, rejected President
Johnson's claim tliat the United States and the Soviet Union
had a common interest in avoiding a new round in the arms
racet
On this issue there has been and always will
be a great difference between the two coun-
tries. Arms control ±3 strictly an An^erican
position, a position that the Soviet Union
has criticized, opposed, and still opposes.
The Soviet Union has been striving for dis-
anviament, not for control over armaments* -^^
An extensive assessment of President Johnson's address was
carried by Tass on 24 January. No mention was made of the
projected negotiations on strategic weapons.
On 17 January, Marshal Malinovsky delivered an address
itbich repeated bhe post-2 3rd Party Congress formulations on
29, Daniel F. Kraminsky, editorial in 5a Rubezhom (Life
Abroad), 19 January 1967. Also printed in Izvestia,
19 January 1967, p. 4.
^^* I^lB^JJ^^n^tlSIll'k.lSJ^JLlS® in English, 2030 GMT, 24
January 1967.

the possibilities of vjar end increased united States aggres-
siveness » Faced with this increased threat, the Marshal
repeated the Soviets' solution for improving the strength of
their defenses* . He stressed the familiar line of "Vs^rdware
sulutionsf" priority to strategic missiles and ballistic
missile-launching submarines, development of the ground for-
ces, and improved air defense. However, it is interesting
to note that Marshal Malinovsky's statement did not repeat
the "reliable destruction of all the enei{iy*s aircraft and
many of hir? missiles" phrase which had been rigidly adliered
to since the 23rd party Congress. Instead, he reverted to
an earlier formulation: "The air defense forces are capable
of reliably protecting the country's territory against an
31
aerial attack ot the enemy," a more ambiguous statement.
This virtual silence , broken only by statements which
resetted to broad, ambiguous generalities seemed to indicate
that during the period from 10 janyary to 10 February, the
Soviet leadership was attempting to determine a suitable re-
sponse to President Johnson's tacit proposal. The somev/hat
bizarre events of the period between 10 and 22 February
(which vjill be traced below) indicated that a major split,
with roots in the earlier period, developed over this issue.
Following President Johnson's State of the Union remarks.
United States diplomatic efforts develop^sd rapidly. The




newly appointed Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Llevveiiyn E,
Thompson, arrived in Moscow the clay following the ciddiess and
stated that he had a ''special message" from the President to
the Soviet leaders. ^'^ On 20 January, he delivered a letter
from President Johnson to the soviet Foreign Ministry. On
the same day;> the State Depc»rt!nent repoited that Secretary
Rusk had been meeting v/ith Soviet Anibassador Anatoiy F. Dob-
rynin to dlscuso a possible antimissile defense deployment
rooratoriuin. Summing up these conversations, the State De-
partnient release stated, "The Deparanent brs no reason to
believe that the Soviets are not seriously considering the
President's expressed interest in halting an ABM arms race.*'**"^
It was reported that the Rusk-Dobrynin meetings had been
going on since 31 December 1966, when Ambassador Dobrynin
had returned to Washington from consultations in Moscox^-. This
timing suggested that President Johnson's State of the Union
remarks may have been privately encouraged by Ambassador Dob-
rynin before their delivery, but no hard evidence is available
to support such a hypothesis. On 23 January^ Arabassador Thom-
pson presented his credentials to soviet President Nikolai V*
podgorny. Following the ceremony they met in private for one
hour. Details of their discussions were not made public.
Against this diplomatic background, an upsurge of discus-
sion of offensive forces appeared in the United states. The
^^' Tbe New York Times, 15 January 1967, p. 5,
^^' T^^e New York Times , 21 January 1967, p. 1.
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number of minor revelations made during this period constitu-
ted an atten\pt to quiet domestic debate and apply some pres-
sure to the Soviets. Taken individually, these revelations
were not pc^rticularly significant and several had been infer-
red at earlier dates, but not officially confirmed. On 19
January, for example, the pentagon announced that the submar-
ine-launched Posedon missile then being developed would carry
multiple warheads. Although fairly widely discussed pre-
viously by civilian analysts, multiple warhead developments
had formerly been highly classified and not officially dis--
cussed. The same release also referred to skewed terminal
entry as a means of penetrating antimissile defenses for
the first time in an official statement. The 1966 Atomic
Energy Commission Annual Report also referred to multiple
warheads for the first time. However, the most important
revelation contained in this report was that 1966 underground
tests had verified hardening modifications made to existing
United States offensive missile warheads. No specific men-
tion was made of the Soviet defensive system, but the message
•^^' The VJashinqton Post, 20 January 1967, p. Al. No attempt
was made to differentiate between multiple reentry vehi-
cles (MRV) and multiple independently-targeted reentry
vehicles (MIRV) at this time.
35. Skewed terminal entry employs devices which cause reentry
bodies to deviate from their normal ballistic trajecto-
ries as they reenter the earth's atmosphere. Assuming
that these bodies have been tracked above the atmosphere
by radar and their trajectories and impact points pre-





The continuing development objective of in?.-
oroving the penetration capability of stra-
tegic missile warheads - by further decreas-
ing warhead vuln€^rability to nuclear envi-
ronments generated by antiballistic missile
coijintermeasures - has resulted in jpoditica-
tion prcgraj^is for some warheads in the
stockpile,.., Nuclear tests in 1966 verified
laboratory computations and designs for
achieving irriprovcirents in hardness. 36
This statement was intended to degrade the credibility of an
exoatraospheric defense system which utilizes gamma and z-rays
to destroy incoming warheads, united states intelligence
analysts had then concluded that the Soviet systeir. was en
37
exoatmospheric system. The Atomic Energy Commission budget
request for Fiscal Year 1958 showed an increase from $8S1,0
million to $914.0 million for "military applications'* of
atomic energy. " This increase was justified as necessary
to construct a new underground test site in the Aleutians
for the expressed purpose of testing large yield v/eapons*
A late January proposal by the informed and influential
Senator Henry M. Jackson seemed to indicate the probable
Administration response to a Soviet failure to negotiate
36, u. S., Atomic Energy Commission, f^a jor Actjvities in the
Atomic Energy Prcgrams^^ January-Decerriber 1966
,
( Washing~
torn U. S, Government Printing Office, 195? ); p. 105.
37, The New York Times, news article by iicinson Baldwin, 5
February 1957, p. Ic





an antimissile defense T.orat.orium. lit that cosritingariCyp Sen--
ator Jadvson proposed a point defense around the Titan II and
Minuteman intercontinsntal ballistic xaissile bases and a thin
40
area defense of the remainder of the nation. Such a pro-
posal, which subsequently bccamie the key rationale for Pres-
ident Nixon's safeguard antimissile defense system, was de~
picted as one which implied restraint and the desire to main-
tain the then-existing situation of mutual deterrence through
the maintenance of secure second strike forces e The thin
area defense was pictured as an anti-China defense.
Secretary McNamara's annual Defense Posture Statement,
released on 25 January, underscored Senator Jackson ''s remarks.
Antimisiiile defense deployment was pictured as having three
general purposes i protection of American cities against a
Soviet attack, protection against a future Chinese attack, or
the protection of strategic retaliatory forces against a
Soviet attack. Secretary McNaxnara cited the third purpose
as being the most compelling should the Soviets refuse to
cooperate in a moratorium. However, he insisted that forces
programmed to 1972 would be able to absorb a well-coordinated
Soviet surprise attack and Dtill inflict 86 million deaths on
the. Soviet Union in retaliation.^ It was obvious that he
^^* The Washington Post, 21 January 1967, p« Al.
41. Robert S. iMcNc\T.ara, Fiscal Year 1968-72 Defense Program
and Fi sca l Year 1968 Defense Budget
, Departaient of De-





considered such a figure adequate to maintain deterrence.
While arguing that an anti-Chinese deployment could be post-
poned, he cautioned that Chinese defense capabilities were
improving rapidly ^^hen he stated, ''On the basis of recent
evidence it appears possible that they may conduct either a
space or long-range ballistic missile test before the end of
1967**' Nevertheless, he persisted in his opinion that it
was "unlikely" that the Chinese could deploy a significant
niomber of operational intercontinental ballistic missiles
before the mid-1970' s. On 5 February, this view was disputed
by William Beecher in an article which cited "American ana-
lysts" who expected that China would have its first opera-
tional intercontinental missiles by about 1970 and a force
44
of 50 or more missiles by 197 5c On 10 February, Albert
V/ohlstetter supported this estimate and urged the deplo^'ment
of an anti-Chinese antimissile defense system to enhance the
credibility of proposed united states guarantees to Japan and
India to relieve the pressures on these nations to build
their own nuclear forces.^
Restrained pressure on the Soviets was evident in Pres-
ident Johnson *s Fiscal Year 1968 budget proposals submitted
to the Congress on 24 January
i
43, McNamara, Fiscal 1968-72 Defense Program
, p. 75.
^^' The New York Times, news article by William Beecher, 5
February 1967, p. 11,
^^* The New York Times. 11 February 1967, p. 11.
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In 1968, we v.'iils continue intensiva devel-
opment of Nike-X but take no action now to
6f^p} oy ^r* antlir'lFSJ.ler defense? initiate
discussions with the Soviet Union on the
limitation of ABM deployments j in the event
those discussions prove unsuccessful, we
will reconsider our deployment decision.
To provide for actions that rr.ay be required
at that tirr*e, approximately $375 million
has been included in the 19&B budget for
such purposes as defense of our offensive
weapon s sya terns,^^
This statement attempted to serve notice to the Soviets of
the sincerity of the moratorium proposal while establishing
tentative limits to a united states response should an agree-
ment not be reached. The policy of maintenance of an '-assur-
ed destruction" capability based on invulnerable retaliatory
forces was maintainede In addition to t>ie standby funds for
antimissile defense deployment, the budget proposal included
$421.0 million for continued development of the Fikc-X sys-
tem, more than $1 billion for production and deployment of
Poseidon, funds for improvement of penetration and payload
capability of iMinuteman II missiles and procurement of Minute-
man III missiles, and ''vigorous research and development of
more advanced strategic missiles, reentry vehicles, and pene-
47tration aids. '*
Additional speculation in the United States press on the
nature of the Soviet antimissile defense deploi'ment became
available in late January and early February. On 29 January,
^^- TV.e Washin<^ton Post. 25 January 1967, p. ;^7.
^"^' The New York Timos, 25 January 1967, p. 17.
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It was reported that "AmeriCv^n officials" estimated totnl
Soviet expenditures on antimissile defense &t four or five
A p.
billion dollars. "^ This figure inclucxed the coots of the
earlier 1962-3 syBtem around Leningrad which had been aban-
doned. In contrast, United States expenditures to 1967 to-
talled a"bout tv^o billion dollars. Given thsse substantial
allocations by the Soviets, it v/as considered unlikely that
the Soviet leadership would consent to dismantle then-exist--
ing defensive installations* A freeze on further deployment
v;as seen ec the best possible Soviet response to United
States moratoriurri efforts » In an extensive article which
appeared on 5 February, Hanson Baldwin supported this contan-
49tion« However, he cited a growing concern that the Soviet
Union would drag out sny negotiations which might take place
while vigorously pressing ehead with its strategic weapons
programs v/hile the United States delayed further deployments.
Baldwin also outlined a division within the United States
"intelligence cotTiraunity" over the nature of soviet defensive
deployments* He reported that intelligence experts agreed
that cintirri £sile defeni^e deployment had begun, but were div-
ided oa its extent and capabilities. A general consensus
^^» 21?^_!i£E^X2iJl-Tim£s, news article by Hedrick Smith, 29
January 1967, p. 1.
^^* The New York Times,, nei7c article by Hanson Baldwin, 5
February 1967, p, 1« This article also contained an
excellent analysis of the uncertainties involving nuc-
lear effects discussed earlier in this paper. See
above f pp. 9-11,
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existed that an antimissile defense of one type wae being
completed in the Moscow area. A somewhat different system
was reportt3d to be in a lesser stage of completion in other
parts of the Soviet Union. These sites were reportedly lo-
cated in an arc across the northwestern corner of the Soviet
Union (the "Tallinn Line"), v?ith additional more scattered
sites east of the Urals and in the Ukraine. Available evi~
dence, which stressed the relatively unsophisticated radars
associated with these sites, suggested to some an antiair-
craft or anti-cruise m.issilc mission. However, its location
in greatest strength across the intercontinental ballistic
missile flight paths from the United States to the western
part of the Soviet Union pointed to an antimissile mission
for other analysts.
On 9 February, the Defense Department reported that the
Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended "heavy protection"
against missiles for fifty of the largest cities in the Uni-
ted States. ^^ The cities were not named. The Joint Chiefs
had recommended a "building block" approach to antimissile
defense deployment, beginning with point defense of inter-
continental ballistic missile bases and a thin area defense
composed of exoatmospheric Spartan missiles sufficient to
defend against a Chinese attack or a modest Soviet strike.
Later, Sprint point defense missiles could be added to the
city defenses in a phased program. The rationale for this
^^* The Washi ngton Post, 10 February 1967, p, A2
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recommendation Vv'asj based upon two principal argumeritc; t]i?it
some missile defense would reduce the chances of a Soviet or
Chinese miscalculation and, that if deterrence failed, such
a system would limit death and destruction to the United
States.
Official Soviet statements in early February continued
to be restrained with regard to Soviet antimissile defense
capability. Marshal Zakharov, Chief of the Soviet General
Staff, in a discussion of the 1967 Soviet defense budget,
failed to directly refer to air defense capabilities. The
normal formulations regarding the Strategic Rocket Forces,
Ground Forces, and nuclear-powered submarines vrere delivered^
but in place of the normal reference to air defense the fol-
lowing statement was madei "We are working on questions con-
cerning military preparedness of weapons and the mastering
of new equipment and armaments. '"^^
The first extensive Soviet discussion of United States
antimissile defense progress and its rationale since Presi-
dent vTohnscn's January remarks appeared on 6 February. The
Increased tempo of the United States domestic debate was
viewed as an attempt to crecite support for increased mili-
tary spending and to convince Americans and West Europeans
that a preventative war was necetisaryj




The Defense Secretary said outright that the
United Statec- had forciseen the pocsibility
of a rocket attack and had taken proper
measures. He declared that the United States
was Bpending money not on a system of defense
but on offense. In other words, Robert jMcNa-
m£,re. made it clear that the United states
would not wait for energy missiles to attack.
.,, Since the United States and other Western
countries have insufficient missile defenses,
it is Ergued, why wait for an attack and
waste money on defense? Would it not be
simpler to strike firat?52
The commentator, Geliy Shakhov, then turned to the morator-
ium proposal
t
Lately a view has been expressed more and
more frequently by some U. S. officjals that
all countries s^hould abandon antimissile
defense??. v/hat is noteworthy is that they
advocate me rejection of defensive weapons
on3y, not of rocket weapons in general. The
United States, which has stockpiled strate-
gic weapons, suggests that other countries
reject all meanr. of defense, a cunning con-
ception indeed. ^3
Cutting through the top veneer of propaganda in this state-
ment, clearly timed to reach the United Kingdom the evening
before Premier Kosygin's state visit to London, several sig-
nificant observations can be made. First, no claims of
Soviet antimissile defense capability were made, although
it was inferred that £ome nation had such a defense and that
nation was not "Western.** Second, no description of United
'-''^* Kadio Koscov^ in English to the United Kingdom, 20C0




states technical difficuJ.ties, the normal theme of Soviet
discussions of United States progress, was made. Third, the
use of "sorne U. S. officials" seemed to indicate an unwilling-
ness to associate President Johnson with the moratorium pro-
posal. Although the Soviet motivation is unclear, perViaps
thiB was en attempt to degrade the sincerity of such a pro-
posaj or to attack it without attacking President Johnson
personally. However, the Soviets had previously not felt
constrained to question President Johnson's sincerity on the
Vietnam issue. Fourth, limitation of any defenses was pre-
dictably tied to limitation of offensive forces.
The latter point was reinforced by Premier Kosygin's
presB conference remarks made in London on 9 February. In
the first official response to the moratorium appeal, he re-
peated the familiar Talensky and general and complete dis-
armament argiomentst
It seems to me that the system that wards
off an attack is not a factor in the anas
race. On the contrary, it is a factor that
reduces the possibility of the destruction
of people. That is why I think it is a mis-
take to look at this question the v/ay sonie
people do. According to some theories that
are gaining ground in the world, the ques-
tion is posed in the other wayi Which is
cheaper, to destroy man, that is, to have
an offensive weapon that destroys people,
cities, entire states, or to have a v;eapon
that prevents such destruction? According
to these theories, the cheaper system should
be adopted.,.. The antimissile system prob-
ably costs more than an offensive weapon.
But these questions are unrelated. You see,
there are other ways of solving this prob-
lem, more serious ways that would really
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help msnkind. . , ,. It would be much better to
proceed to a discussion and to real pressure
that would result ±n a ban on nuclear v^eapons
and the destruction of nuclear weapons, ^-'^
Beyond the fcuniliar fortoulations, the overall impression of
this statement vjas one of a v/illingness to talk, but no in-
dication of a desire to negotiate specifically on a morator-
iuTft, Premier Kosygin was restrained with rsnpect to claims
of soviet antimissile defense capability, but attempted to
make it clear that he wcis speaking froixi a position of
strength: "We are ready to so negotiate on nuclear disarma-
ment not because we have little of thern, but because we have
a lot of them,'" ~ The; comparison with relative United stciteti
progress in antimissile defenses was obvious e The thinly-
veiled.reierence to Urited States cost-effectiveness criteria
for defense programs also attempted to degrade United States
efforts.
Premier Kosygin *s remarks were generally neglected in
the Soviet press until 15 February when Fyodor B'urlatsky,
writing on difsannajaent and nuclear non-proliferation in
Pravda, turned to antimissile defense. He began by citing
United States actions:
Mow the united States is approaching a new
stage in the arms race. This concerns the
planned establishment of an antimJ.ssile




syr.tem, which according to the caIcul''^»tions
of Western specialists v/iil come, to about
forty billion dolIcjrH.^"^
He then *'quoted*' Premier Kosygin*s London remarks in a par-
ticularly liberal fuanner •
Speaking at a press conference in London,
A. l'» Kosygin declciracl uliat the Govxet c;ov~-
eminent is prepared to discuss the question
of halting a further arms race - in the
field of offensive as well as defensive
weapons.. -'"'
United States analysts interpreted these remarks by Burlatoky
as indicative of increased Soviet willingness to negotiate oti
CO
the existing strategic balance. ^''^
Two days later, "higli Soviet authorities" reported that
Burlatsky had "made a mistake."-^- Such confusion is 5:omewhat
rare considering the sensitivity of such crucial issvies and
suggested broader implications. Burlatsky is an experienced
and normally authoritative press commentator who previously
had been used to "float policy trial balloons." It is there-
fore obvious that he had received some guidance from high
Soviet authorities prior to the printing of the article*
Premier Kosygin-s termination of official Soviet silence on
President Johnson's moratorium proposal required that scxne
5^« Pravda, 15 February 1967, p. 2,
57, Ibid.
^^* The New York Times, 16 February 19G7, p.. 1,
^^' ^^g-gj}:^^-'^-^ ^^^ Sci ence Monitor, 18 February 1967, p. 3.
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overall guidance appear in official publications. To further
substantiate the arg\.upent that Bi?.rlatsky acted on the advice
of higher authority, it was noted that several hours after
prayda (the text of which requires official party approval)
appeared, Radio Moscow repeated the Buriatsky statement.
Two possible explanations for these events seemed likely.
The first is that the Soviet leadership changed its mind in
the period between 15 and 17 February so that the Burlatsky
statement hud to be reversed. A second explanation seems
more plausible. Given the five week silence following Presi-
dent Johnson's remarks up to Premier Kosygin^s guarded re-
sponse in London, the reversion to deliberately ambiguous
statements by military leaders during the period of silence,
and the reversal of the Burlatsky article, a serious split
probably developed over the issue. Perhaps Burlatsky "tipped
the Soviets* hand" before a climate for fruitful discussions
could be created or was "used" by one of the factions. The
Soviet officials who informed Western news agencies in Moscow
of Burls.tsky's "mistake" stated that the leadership's posi-
tion on arms limitation discussions was negative as would be
61
made clear in a subsequent corrective article. However,
this article did not appear, further substantiating a hypothesis
GO. Fritz Ermarth, "'Pravda' Comiaentator Positive on ABM
Moratorium," Radio Free Europe Research Report , 15 Feb-
ruary 1967 and "The ABM Plot Thickens," Radio Free Eur-
gP^ -_^gj^gf^ J^c^^ Report , 20 February 19G7.
61. Thooiac V7. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, 1945-70
, (Bal-
timore and London: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970)', p. 270.

that li tftrious split on thi.r> l,'j£:u« existed at that time,
Thir. contention also seems to ta supperted by disconti-
nuities which occurred at the outset of a resurgence of Sov-
iet military claims on antimissile defense capabilities in
statements timed to coincide wiih the celebration of the 49th
Anniversary of the Soviet Army and Navy. On 20 February,
General pave.l F. Batitsky, Corraiiaxider of the Air Defense For-
ces, stated that the Air Defense Forces "can reliably pro-
tect the country's territory froin any enemy air attack."^
On the same day. General Pavel A. Kurotshkin, Director of the
Frunze Military Acadciny, took a fc-.r less ambiguous stand!
"Detecting missiles in time and destroying them in flight is
no problem. *'^*^ The iiuplication was that the Soviet defenses
were impenetrable. This implication was quickly refuted by
three statements which appeared on 22 February, In hie Army
and Navy Day address. First Deputy Defense Minister Karshal
Andrei A. Grecnko returned to the late 1966 formulation
t
•Modern means of antiaircraft defense assure the destruction
64
of any aircraft and many kinds of rockets." The same
phrase v;«r^ repeated by Defense Minister Marshal Halinovsky
65
on 23 February. Marshal Vasily I. Chuikov, Corojnander of
^2. Tas f^ In ternational Service in English, 0734 GMT, 20
February 1967,
^^* ?i?Jlg-X^ltexnati(^2aj^_Servl in English, 1148 GMT, 20
February 1967,"
^^* I'^v^estia, 22 February 1967, p. !•
^^* Lf^a^t 23 February 1967, p. 2,
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Civil Defense rorcca* roore specifically refuted General Kur-
otshkinj "Unfortunately, there are no means yet that would
guarantee^ the complete security of our cities and most imnor-
tant objectives from the blov;s of the enemy* c weapons of iriass
destruction^" Deputy Defense Minister Marshal Ivan K. Bag-
rarnyan retreated to the forir.er contention that antiir.io£;ile
defense was a potential rather than a current capability in
a loose paraphrasing of the "all aircraft and m^^ny missilce"
formulation s
Important changes have been undergone by the
country's antiaircraft defense. The means
which it disposes insure the reliable repul-
sing of any aircraft. In recent years a
realistic possibility has c*risen for us of
effectively carrying out antirocket defense.^
^
Other statements made by military leaders regarding air
defense during the Armed Forces Anniversary substantiated the
hypothesis that firm guidance was absent. Marshal Zakharov,
Chief of the General Staff, failed to mention air defense*
stressing tlie destructive power of offensive strategic wea-
pony,"^ Marshal Sokolovsky implied operational capability:
*Our antiaircraft defenses have efficient missile intercept-
69ing systems," Marshal Kasakov, Commander of Missile Forces
^^» Fravda, 23 February 1967, p. 2,
^^
• 1123J^91^ ^9^'^^Ij-^ ^^^'£i^lE i^' Russian, 1120 GMT, 22 February
1967.
^^' Neus D<^utschland, East Berlin, 23 February 1967,
^^* i^ravdji
, 22 February 1967, p, 3,
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and Artillery, also strss&ed offensive forces and interesting-
ly returned to the 1962-65 formulation j "The Soviet Union has
solved the complicated and highly important problem of deB-
70
troying enemy missiles in flight,**
Thus, in the space of three days, the six~week silence
of the military on air defense was broken and the resulting
statements made by military leaders ranged from General Kur-
otshkin*s later refuted assertion of impenetrable defense to
Marshal Chuikov's tempered pessimism. Other leaders showed
apparent disagreement on system capabilities or neglected to
mention it at ail. That no firm guidance froir; higher offi-
cials was given prior to the publication or delivery of these
statements seems certain, indicating that a division of opin-
ion on this issue probably extended into the highest levels
of the civilian leadership. Apparently, military leaders
were truly divided over the importance of antimissile defense
and in this case were allowed considerable latitude in voic-
ing their opinions. In terms of the dialogue with the United
States, this lack of coordination seems to refute the assump-
tion that Burlatsky was censured for having "tipped the Sov-
iets* hand" "by indicating that the soviet Government was
ready to discuss arms limitation prior to a coordinated cam-
paign of military capability claims designed to prepare the
way for a Soviet offer to negotiate on strategic weapons from
70. MoBCOw Domestic Service in Russian, 1135 GMT, 22 Feb-
ruary 1967.
V, ' .f ,-, f
" 3.07 ~
e position of greater relative strength* It seems raore
plausible to suggest that even as late as 23 February, the
Soviet leadership had not decided vjhat response should be
made to President johneon*s moratorium proposal and therefore
no firm guidance on antimissile defense statements could be
handed dovm»
Although decisions on hov/ to proceed on the deployment
of antimissile defense cystemrs was a central point in the
assumed deliberations, the entire spectrum of conventional
and strategic weapons programs v;ere probably included. Such
a review would be expected to Vieighten internal bargaining
over future force postures since various military factions
and organisations would view such a debate as an opportunity
to alter previous decisions to their perceived advantage.
With respect to strategic weapons, hypothetical stances of
the various elements of the military bureaucracy could h«ve
been to take the follovring positions i
a. The Strategic Rocket Forces were then deploying in-
creased numbers of intercontinental ballistic mispiles
(mostly tVie large capacity 83-9 and the bnvalier SS-llj
similar to Minuteman but liquid-fueled), a program
'trhich had apparently begun in mid-19&6. After a period
of relatively low deployment rater, from mid-1964 to
ir.id-196o whicyi saw an increase in this force of 100
luissiies in two years, 160 nevj mist^iles were added be-
tween mid' 1966 and mid--1967. The deplo^went rate was





m5.<3-=195a, after ^s^hich it has sta'biiized at 210-:^50 per
71
year. It seems rsciscnable to asBume that the 1967-8
deployment rate had been established by early 19G7»
Aware of this prospect c.nd viewing the announced in-
tention of the united States to complete deployment of
the Minuteman system with a total of 1000 launchers by
mid-1967, the Strategic RocJiet Forces probably Etrong-
ly opposed any negotiations at least until numerical
parity could be achieved in early 196S v;'ith then-exist-
ing deployiTnent rates. However, as the proclaimed key-
stone element of the Soviet armed forces, it seems
more likely that Strategic Rocket Force spokesmen ar-
gued for continued deployments to attain a nutjerical
superiority. Subsequent statements by its Coioii^ander
,
Marshal Krylov, would seeia to support this contention.
With respect to antimissile defenses, they may have
argued that potential Un5-ted states antim.issile defense
deployxuent could be retardt=id by holding out the possi-
bility of aiiiifo control negotiations and that resources
prograrruTied for Soviet antiioissiie defense deployments
should be diverted to an increased deployment rate of
offensive missiles. The apparent suspension of con-
struction on the Moscow antimissile defense sites in
1968 and the increased rate of offensive deployments
'^^' I^.JliLL^£lI-^JLSil£lJ^.ll^ (London J The International
Institute for strategic Studies, 1971). p. 56. See fig-




United States and Soviet Strategic Missile Force Levels and
Annual Rates of Changes, 1961-71 (July figures for each year)
Year United States Soviet union
Number Change Number Change




1962 ICBM 294 198 75 25
SLBM 144 48 Some
^,
1963 ICBM 424 130 100 25
SIBM 224 80 100
„
1964 ICBM 834 410 200 100
SLB.M 416 192 120 20
1965 ICBM 854 20 270 70
SLBM 496 80 120
1966 ICBM 904 50 300 30
SLBM 592 96 125 5
1967 ICBM 1054 150 460 160
SLBM 656 64 130 5
1968 ICBM 1054 800 340
SLBM 656 130
1969 ICBM 1054 1050 250
SI^M 656 160 30
1970 ICBM 1054 1300 250
SLBM 656 280 120
1971 ICBM 1054 1510 210
SLBM 656 440 160
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from inid-1967 to mid-I9&8 would sopport this interpre-
tation.
b. The Air Defense Forces probably pressed for continued
deployment of antimisoile defenses, arguing that fur--
ther Soviet progress in this area could be expected to
enable the Soviet Union to extract reductions in United
States offensive forces if negotiations were initiated
and to serve as a hedge against the failure of negoti-
ations* It is also possible that the relief of Mar-
shal Sudets as Air Defense Force Commander in July
1966 may have indicated an earlier decision to proceed
with antimissile defenses on conj^iderably less than a
crash basis and that his replacement. General Eatit-
sky, sought to use this period to upgrade the priority
accorded to his branch based upon more bureaucratic
than strategic grounds. Whatever the motivation, the
Air Defense Forces probably opposed negotiations, par-
ticularly those involving a freeze or reduction of its
limited antimissile defense capability,
c, Thn Theater Forces could have been expected to favor
strategic arms limitation talks on purely bureaucratic
grounds, expecting that the resources thus freed could
be used to upgrade its capabilities. Perceived in-
creases in United States General Purpose Forces cap-
abilities as a result of their experience in actual
coirbat in Vietnam probably exacerbated its concern for
its relative state of readiness. However, qualitative
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drawdowns of United States forces assigned to North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (KATO) units and those
available to respond In areas other tlian Southeast
Asia should have tempered this concern, at least in
the short-run
»
d. The Navy probably shared the opinion of the Theater
Forces with one notable qualification. Since the
first "Yankee" class ballistic missile-launching sub-
marine appeared in mid-1968, the construction program
for these ships was undoubtedly in progress in early
1967, Although it is not knor.v-n whether operational
units of this class are under overall naval command or
are subordinated to the Strategic PsOCket Forces, the
the missile-iaunching submarines represent one of the
Soviet Navy's key contributions to the overall Soviet
defense effort. However, the counterpart United States
force », the Polaris submarines, apparently enjoyed such
high prestige in United States strategic analysis that
the Soviet l^avy could have concluded that the conduct
of strategic arms limitation negotiations would not
result in reductions in this area and would perhaps
enhance the importance of sea-based strategic systems.
Such a perception would have enhanced its bureaucratic
interest in diverting resources from the Strategic
Rocket and Air Defense Forces to submarines or other
naval progrcims.
One important caveat should be attached to this hypothesis.

- 112 -
If the Soviet military had been faced with real opposition to
what its various elements considered to be their broader in-
terests, such as the maintenance of emphasis on heavy indus--
try or downgrading the perception of the threat imposed by
the West, these buieaucratic differences would have been
suppressed. The overall military position in such a case
would preEuir»ably have been to oppose negotiations on the lim-
itation of strategic arms. The divergent statements traced
above viith respect to antimissile defense during this period
seem to indicate that the military did not feel compelled to
close ranks at this time. If this analysis is correct, their
overall viewpoint was not threatened. As will be discussed
in more detail below, * other nonmilitary elements of the
Soviet bureaucracy have interests which are involved in any
decision to engage in discussions with the United States on
possible limitation of strategic arm.s. At this time, it ap-
pears that the assumed military viewpoint, which stressed a
continued strategic buildup with a delay in the initiation of
negotiations until a strategic balance closer to parity could
be achieved, carried the day. By any general m.easure of mil-
itary capability other than numerical strength of conventional
forces, geographical proximity to potential crisis areas, and
deployed antimissile defenses, the Soviet Union was distinctly
inferior to the United States. Only a demonstrated willing-
ness on the part of the United States to reduce its existing
72. See below, pp. 286-303.
i 1 I' f. vf
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forces would have been likely to induce the soviet union to
negotiate at this stage. "^^ VJhile the subsequent Soviet butld--
up could have been viewed as likely to induce force level re-
sponses by the United States based on the Soviet experience
in the "Eioinber Gap" and "Missile Gap" periods, the Soviet
leadership ctppears to have taken Secretary McNairirj re. * s e.tc>te-
ments concerning United States restraint for granted and con~
eluded that the United States would not respond a?^ it had to
previous Soviet actions. Delay could thus be expected \:o
improve the overal barg^iining strength of the Soviet Union.
During the latter Vialf of February, united Stares efforts
to move the Soviets toward negotiations continued* On 17
February, President Johnson stressed the futility of another
round in the arnis race which he concluded would leave both
the Soviet Union and the United states with the same relative
strategic balance. He stated that he was "determined to use
all the resources at my cojwnand to . , .avoid a further rautual-
74ly defeating buildup." On 18 February, Ainbassador Thompson
conferred vrith Premier Kosygin for over two hours. No report
of the Gubjecti? discussed was released, but it seeir:cd justi-
fied to assume that the antimissile defense deployn'.ent issue
73. Uri Ra'anan, "Soviet Global Politics and the Middle East,"
Naval V7ar College Review, September 1971, p. 21. See also
the forthcoming pcxmphlet The Deterioration of__ the
_ US^
Soviet Strategic Balance? Some political Implications by
the same author to be presented to the Senate Committee
on Governmental Operations, Subcommittee on National
Security, in February 1972.
'^^*
-TllgJ^'^^ shl ngt on Post, 18 February 1967, ;?. Al.
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was included, secretary McNaiaara, appearing on the 20 Febru-
ary BBC "panordjna*' television prograra, stated that *Mt may
well be desirable** for the United states to build a thin area
antimissile defense to guard againet the Chlncise nuclear po-
tential an'5 protect the uniced States Bicrateglc retaliatory
forces against any attack. However, in an obvious nignai to
the Soviets, he repeated his earlier ctand that the possi-
bilities of defending cities against the rrlEBile attac): of
75
a major nuclear power were futile. On 21 February, State
Dep>artment Press Secretary Robert J. McClosky reported that
the Kosygin-Thowpson discussions had included th« antivaissile
defense deplo^nnent moratorium proposal. Ke then hinted that
the prospective discussions might he. expanded to include
offensive weapons: "These continuing ccntciCtsii reflect interest
on both sides in arriving at an understanding on strategic
missile problems." On 25 February, General barle B. vrneci-
er. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, repeated hie ra-
tionale for United States antimissile defense deployment?
"Deterrence is a combination of weapons and a state of mind.
I feel that a measure of defense adds to the posture of our
77deterrent," '
United States efforts to reach an agreement with the
Soviet Union were rewarded by some tangible progress on 2
"^^^ The Hew York Times, 21 February 1967
^ p. 7,
"^^^ Ih^y^^^"^^^^^^ Post, 22 February 1967, p. hi,
"^^
* 1h!^l^i..l21}iJL±EB^.» 27 February 1967, p. 27.
r*.
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March. At a news conference. President Johnson made the fol-
lowing announcement
J
I have received a reply from Chairman Kosygin
to my letter of January 27. This reply con-
finned the v;illingneF>s of the Soviet Govern-
ment to discuss means of limiting the p^rms
race in offensive and defensive nuclear mis-
siles. 7S
In subsequent questioning, President Johnson made it clear
that the United States was moving into these discussions
with the option to proceed with antimissile defense deploy-
ment fully open should the negotiations not Iccid to an early
agreement. The mood was one of greatly restrained optimism.
He concluded his remarks by emphasizing that United States
research and development would continue.
Repeating the pattern following Premier Kosygin 's Lon-
don news conference, the Soviet press omitted President John-
son's announcement of the impending arms limitation discus-
sions from its reporting of his press conference. However,
again following the pattern of the aftermath of the Presi-
dent's State of the union Address, the East European press
reported the Johnson announcement. The Polish took the leadi
At last night's press conference in Washington,
President Johnson stated that the U, S. Govern-
ment is about to begin talks with the Soviet
Government on limiting the arms race in rocket
missiles, offensive as well as defensive - the
so-called antimisslles.^^
"^^^ The New York Times
. 3 March 1967, p. 14.




This report, which directed itself to factual reporting of
the President's remarks ratlier than nev/s analysis, correctly
stated that the talks vould begin in Mokcow at an undisclosed
date. A tligVitly later Hungarian release avoided specific?
regcirding the content of the johnson~Kos>'gin exchange and
cited the economic pressures of a resuiced army mce as having
compelled the two leaders to seek another option t "The two
superpowers must slow dov;n this race as soon as possible to
use the tremendous sums needed for missile-building programs
Of)
for more productive purposes." ^ The release v/as optimistic
about the prospects for future negotiations* Taken together,
these articles represented a fairly realistic and optimistic
East European response to the Johnson-Kogygin exchange.
The Soviet silence on the prospective negotiations per-
sisted. The election speeches delivered by Pcirty leaders in
early March did not refer to any Soviet-United States contact
on this issue. General Secretary Brezhnev stressed the cor-
rectness of the 23rd Party Congress line on the increased
imperialist threat, but concentrated the bulk of hi 51 foreign
policy discussion on events in V7est Germany and China,. -^ Pi-e-
mier Kosygin specifically credited the United states with
having created the accelerated arms race 1
®^* Budapest MTI International Service in English, 0909 GMT,
3 riarch 1967.




The united States has continued the arms race
and has even increased its pace. For the
flret time In postwar years, direct U.S. mil-
itary expenditures reached vast figures - 70
billion dollars. An even larger sum - over
73 billion dollars - has been requested by
the U*S. Governiacnt in the form of allocations
for the current year. Naturally, in this sit-
uation the soviet Union could not lessen its
attention to questions of defense « We have
also had to increase allocations for military
needs. ^2
Although Premier Kosygin devoted a section of his address to
illustrations of soviet efforts to reduce international ten-
sion, prospective discussions with the united States on any
issues were not included.
In the absence of Soviet statements during the remainder
of March, united states cotriinentators began to express doubts
about the sensibility of an antimissile defense deployment
moratoriuro. On 15 March, the influential Air Force Associa-
tion, & civilian-military group which favors a high state of
military preparedness, expressed concern that the urgent
pressures of Vietnani operations were obscuring the United
States* long-term strategic requirements c Thus, in their
wordSi the nation was "beginning to be exposed, at worst to
a surprise nuclear attack, at best to nucleai* blackmail,"'^-'
To support this contention, the Association pointed out that
offensive missile accuracy improvements threatened the hard-
ened Minuteman ciios, that underwater detection breakthroughs
®2. P£?L.r:2£? ^ March 1967, p. 3,
^^' The Uew York Times, 16 March 1967, p. 10,
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could negate the value of Polaris submarines by making them
vulnerable to counterforce attacks, that nuclear effects pos-
sibly known only to the Soviet Union could neutralize incoming
United States warheads, and that antimissile defense possibil-
ities had been degraded before all avenues of then-existing
technology had been examined. Clearly, in their opinion,
negotiations, on strategic weapons systems were ill-advised.
On 21 March, the Senate approved the appropriations bill
for military procurement for Fiscal Year 1966, Included in
this bill were the standby funds requested by President John-
son to cover the contingency that discussion?? with the Sov-
iets on antimissile defenses would not prove successful. In
its report on this bill, the Senate Armed Services Committee
expressed concern that the Soviet Union was merely buying
time vfith its professed vrillingness to conduct discussions
»
The Committee considers that it would be
unwise to perT.it these negotiations to be
extendf^d interminably ...and if «,, an agree-
ment cannot be concluded within a reasonable
period, the Committee strongly believes that
the United States should begin procurement
for deployment of an antiballistic missile
defense system, ^^
Implicit in this statement was an awareness that the agree-
ment to negotiate did not commit the Soviet Union in any way,
but v/hile negotiations were in progress acted as a political
and psychological barrier to antimissile defense efforts in
^^« The New York Times
, news article by Hanson Baldwin, 25
March 1967, p. 12.

- 119 -
the United States, Nevertheless ^ it constituted a v?arn5.ng
to the Soviet Unior. that efforts to prolong the prospective
negotiations unnecessarily would place their continuation in
jeopardy.
In the 30 and 31 March editions of Krasnaya Zvesda ,
Lieutenant General Ivan Zavylov challenged the eraphasis plac
ed on nuclear weapons involved in planning for modern war:
A fetish should not be made of nuclear v/ea-
pons. The new methods and forms of a^rmod
struggle, arms, and military material best
serve the winning of victory over the eneny
when they are being used by a people snd
army conducting a war of national libera-
tion. S5
Rather than full reliance on nuclear weapons, v/hich he con-
ceded have required "a cardinal, revolutionary change of
existing views and principles in all fields of tVie art of
war," he argued for forces trained and supplied for action
with or v^ithout nuclear weapons. The unstated corollary was
that fundF should be proportionally diverted from strategic
to theater forces. He did not refc-ir to Presidetit Johnson's
initititive or Pismier Kosygin's London press conference, but
implied military opposition to any limitation of antimissile
defenses by arguing strongly for strategic defense in overall
£oviti.t military posture.
On 31 March, Marshal Rodion Ya. Halinovsky died of




cancer* He was buried with high honors on 3 April* Rurr.ors
of his illness had begun to circulate before he was hospital-
ized aft^r his final public appearance at the military parade
on 7 November 1966 « In the months before his death, he con-
tinued to issue proclamations but the bulk of his former
duties were carried out by Marshal Andrei A» Grechko, First
Deputy Defense Minister. It seems likely that the terminal
nature of Marshal Malinovsky's illness was determined in the
early fall. This contention seems to be supported by sonie
clianges in important military posts beginning in October
when General Batitsky vae named as Marshal Sudets' successor
as Comiriander of the Air Defense Forces and named as a Deputy
Defense Minister ^ and Marshal Krylov, Coiranander of the
Strategic Rocket Forces, was promoted to Fir at Deputy Defense
Minister, On 22 December, it was announced that Marshal
Kiril Moskalenko, v.'ho h3d co.nr.manded the strategic Rocket For-
ces frcOTi 1960 to 3 962, had been reappointed a Deputy Minister
87
of Defense. Prior to this announcement, it had not been
known in the West that he had been dropped from his Deputy
Defense Minister post when Khrushchev removed him from the
Strategic Rocket Force command in April 1962, presuK-.ably over
the decision to place etrategic missiles in Cuba.
86 1 Krasnaya Zvey.da (Red Star), 29 October 1966,
^^
* ,Ta.ss^ Tnt^-^rnational Service in English, 1826 GMT, 22 Dec-
ember 1566. Nornaliy the Sovie^t Defense Ministry is
c<:Maposed of a Minister of Defense, two First Deputy Min-
isters, and eight Deputy Defense Ministers. These num-
bers may vary slightly.
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Irriniediately following the burial services for Marshal
Kalinovsky, tho Soviet civilian leadership took steps to
establish the guidelines for the role of the military under
his successor. On 4 April, General Secretary Brezhnev and
Premier Kosygin met with the Central Committee and military
leaders, while no text of Brezhnev's address was released,
it was reported that he had discussed the international sit-
uation and "some questions of military development and the
training and education of Army and Navy personnel." He
assured the military that, while promoting a "peace-loving
foreign policy," the leadership would "continue to show cori-
stant concern for the strengthening of the defensive might
of the Soviet state,"
A 6 April article in ICrasnaya Zvezda more specifically
discussed party-military relations. After a typicial histor-
ical analysis of these relations, a thinly-disguised warning
was offered I "An important role in strengthening Party leader-
ship of the Armed Forces was played by the October 1957 Ple-
89
num of the CPSU Central CoiTunittee. " Significantly, this
was the Plenura which removed Marshal Zhukov from his post as
Minister of Defense, accusing him of "Bonapai tism, " failure
to subordinate the military to Party leadership. The article
^^» Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, 1900 GMT, 4 April
1967";
89. Colonel A. Babin, "The party - Leader of the USSR Armed
Forces," Krasnaya Zvozda (Red Star), 5 April 1967, p. 1.
1-!E*
then proceedecs to outline the "present stage of social devel-
opment" and how it affected party-military relations. First,
the author concluded that a future war between socialism and
capitalism would be a nuclear war?
In connection with the threat of such a var,
the extremely coinpiicated and responsible
tasks emerged of working out correct views
on its character and special features, a
correct assessment of the aligmrient of class
forces on the international scene, of pro-
found analysis and estimate of the v7orid
military-political and military-strategic
sitxieiticn, ciiid. the adoption of reliable and
resolute means to repel the aggressor and
fully smash him. The growing complexity of
these tasks will undoubtedly increase even
more the role and responsibility of the
Second, the teciinical revolution had complicated rhe tasks
of military planners eind required new approaches to the de-
velopment of the rezi.ouv. military Bervicest Third, the ?.3rd
Party Congress had established that:
• •.the defensive mig}it of the state depends
on the state of its economy, that modern
weapons arf^ becc.aing increasingly compli"
cated and expensive, and that their pioduc-
tion reqairc'G a high standard of science
and technology ...e Therefore, there aJ so
arises the complex tasks of working out a
correct militery-econcmilc and military-
technical policy, the most expedient organ-
ization and location of military production,
and of determining properly substantiated
proportions concerning the manufacture of
the various types of v;eapons and mats-rial
conforming to the interesi:s of the reliable




defense of the country. Naturally, this
9
fcictor also conditioned the enhancenient^pf
the CFSU role in military organization.
Finally, modern warfare had increased the need for the "spir-
itual fortitude" of both civilians and the military. Lenin's
emphasis on the Partv*e role of instilling consciousness in
the people v?as invoked in support of the need for increased
party activity within the military.
The immediate effect of this article was to create spec-
ulatioix in both the '.Vest and East Kurope&n press that Marshal
Malinovsky*E successor as Minister of Defense would be a civ-
ilian, rxnitry F. Ustinov, a high Party official who had
specialised in arras production, was mentioned as the likely
candidate* ''
This speculeition v/as tenninated on 12 April when the
Soviet Union announced that Marshal Grechko had been appoint-
ed Minister of Defense. Having laid down the guidelines
for party supremacy over the military, the leadership appar-
ently did not choose to antagonize the military by appointing
a civilian to this post over the obvious heir. Marshal Grechko,
91. Babin, "The party^" Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), 6 April
1967, p. 1,
92, See The Kew York Times, news article by Raymond H. And'sr-
son, 7 April 1957, p. l.j Prague Domestic Ser\^ice in
Czech, 1300 GMT, 7 April 1967; Belgrade Tanvug Inter-
ns tional service in English, 2103 GMT, 6 April 1967;
and "No McNamarsky Yet," The Economist, 28^ March 1967.
^^*




However, two factors cz^ra to point to the probability that
that this decision was not taken lightly. The nature of Mar-
shal Malinovsky*s illness must have alerted the leadership
to the necessity of choo'sing a successor. The intensified
juggling of liigh military posts in lata 196G and early 1967
indicated that come fjort of a "nev; order** was being imple-
mented. However, fully twelve days passed before the suc-
cessor was publicly named. Presumably, additional delibera-
tions were required before the decision to name Marshal Grech-
ko was made.
In addition to Marshal Grechko*s appointn\ent, three
other senior vSoviet military men were promoted to key Defense
Ministry posts on 12 April. ^- These three officers were vet-
eran Arny troop coioiuandeia in Uieir mid-fifties who, prior
to their appointments, held important Theater Force commands.
Since these appointments did not result in the replacement
of the established heads of the Strategic Rocket and Air De-
fense Forces, Marshal lOrylov and General Batitsky, they seem
to have had relatively little effect on the intramilitary
power balance. Nevertheless, the fact that these men were
not elevated to broader cojiuinands or responsibilities was seen
as slightly raising Theater Force influence in the highest
reaches of the military hierarchy.
Subsequent Soviet statements on general military policy




during the spring and early SLuraiier of 1957 poi!ite<5 to the
continuance of the vigilance anc3 pi-eparednes8 theroes of the
23rd party Congress, In an address coirtmemorating the 22nd
Anniversary of the defeat of Germany in World war II, Mar-
shal Grechko set the tone
;
The Communist Party- leading the Soviet People
on the path or the building of cornrounisra and
persistently implementing a Leninist peace-
loving policy, at the same time displays un-
rcimitting conctirn for tne further raising of
the defense capability of our iiomeland and
the strengthening of the Soviet Armed Forces,
We have no intention of advertising the cora-
bat potential of our Armed Forces, as some
militaiy leadercT in the West are fond of
doina,^^
He quickly cautioned that such an absence of militant state-
ments should not be misinterpreted as a lack of resolve. In
view of the confusion which seemed to have resulted from, the
diverse February statements regarding antimissile defenses,
such a course seemed prudent. The reluctance of the Soviet
military to comment openly on prospective arms limitation
negotiations indicated that this issue was being intensely
debated during this period. The only open reference to anti-
missile defense was made by Marshal Chuikov, Commander of
Civil Defense Forces, while discussing civil defense prepar-
edness In mid-June after the Arab-Israeli Six Day War:
Soviet military doctrines proceed from t}ie
fact that the best means for defending our
^^' E£^vda, 9 May 1S67, p. 2.
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state from nuclear attack c*re our powerful
rocket crocp? ciuO. our antimissile laissiies
and interceptors, v^hich arc designed to
prevent eneniy nuclear irissiiec cind planes
from pen^-itre-tinq cor air space. They \7ill
be destroytid even before they approach our
borders. ^^
It is interesting to recall that the scupe Marshal Chulkov v;aF.
the most pesaijr.istic of the military leaders to connnent on
the capabilities: of antimissile defenses during the preceding
February. Withiii four months, his public statements had
changed from denial of complete protection to impenetrabil-
ity. His 3arl3er stand could be credited to his bureaucratic
need to justify resource allocations to his area of responsi-
bility, the Civil Defense Forces ^ The motivation behind the
June stat€iment was less apparent e.nd could have indicated
thtit at thj.r time the supporters of extensive antimissile
defense deployment held the upper hand.
During this period, an open split between the civilian
and military leadership of the Department of Defense devel-
oped in the United States over deployment of an antimissile
defense system. On 6 April, Secretary McNamara discussed dif-
fering estimates of whether or not the soviet Union v/ould
deploy a nationwide antimissile defense system at a pentagon
press conference. He stated that, in the absence of informa~
tion to the contrary, the United states would be forced to
base its pl^mning on the assumption that such a defense v;ould
^^* Izvestia, 15 June 1967, p, 4.
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be builtv 'ihc impreGsian give<i war? that contrary indica-
tions would be v.'clcowed, "^ On 4 May, in testimony before
the House Military Appropri cations Ss-ibcommittee, General VJheel-
er, Cliairmsin of the jo?'.nt. Chiefs of Staff, outlined the dif-
ferences of opinion between tie Ooint Chiefs and the Secre-
tary of Defense* "" He disagreed with 5ecret<?.ry HcNamara • s
oplnjon that the Nike-X eystera would not reduce civilian fa-
talities in a full-scale nuclear exchange "in any meaningful
sense," Tne iToint Chiefs contended that the system might
save 30 to 50 million lives. He further argued that the
probable soviet response to a United states antimissile de-
fense deployment would not necessarily be to increase its
offensive missile forces due to the traditional Soviet pre-
dilection for strategic defenses. Finally, he stated tlriat
a United states antimissile defense deployment v/ould deny
the Soviet Union "an exploitable capability** which might re-
sult from a mistaken Soviet perception that their existing
system had sufficiently eroded the previous United States
nuclear advantage. According to General V7heeler, failure to
deploy would create
j
e .strategic imbalance both within our for-
ces and between united States and Soviet
forces e«.. Deterrence is a combination of
forces in being and state of mind. Should
the Soviets come to believe that their
^'^^ 'lh^_^^sh±nqton Post, 6 April 1967, p. Al. Canplete text
^^^ The yew York Times , 6 April 1967, p. 7,
^^* The New York Times, 4 Way 1967, p, 1.
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ballistic missile defense, coupled i^^ith a
nuclear attack on the united state g, would
limit damage to tlie Soviet Union to a level
acceptable to theruj whatever that level is,
our forces v;ouid no longer deter . . « . Deploy-
ment iG essential to maintain the total stra-
tegic nuclear capability or balance clearly
in favor of the united States. ^^
From the Soviet point of view, the implications of these
statements was clear. While believing in a strategy of de-
terrence, the Joint Chiefs felt a clearcut superiority in
strategic weaponry, both offensive and defensive, was neces-
sary to maintain the credibility of that strategy.
Subsequent statements by key Defense Department civil-
ians during the month of May attempted to soften the impact
of General V»"heeler's testimony. -On 10 May, Deputy Defense
Secretary Cyrus Vance and Director of Defense Research and
Engineering John S. Foster appeared before the Disarmament
Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Coiwnittee, Sec-
retary Vance testified that a decision on antimissile defense
deployment would not be made during then-current discussions
with the Soviet Union regarding a possible freeze of these
systems. He further stated that an anti-China antimissile
defense system, v/aa technically possible. Dr. Foster's
testimony was largely concerned with technological factors.
Ke discussed kill mechanisms of potential antimissile defense
systems to support his contention that the employment of
^^* The New York Tiriien, 21 May 1967, p. 1.
100, The Washington Post, 10 May 1967, p. Al,
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x-rays made area defense systems feasible. He specjfically
stated that an area defense system would provide a defense
against small-scale attacks such as China might mount in the
next ten yearcr piecing the cost of this system at four bil-
lion dollars. In an attempt to insure the credibility of
United States offensive forces against the existing Soviet
defenses » he ?^tated "chat tV»e defenses around lloscow probably
employed an x-ray Iclll mechanism and that the United States
had initiated, a program of hardening it.S:; wctrheads against
this effect in late 1964. In a press conference on 18 Kay,
Secretary KcNamara discussed attempts to bring the Soviet
Union into strategic arms negotiations. Although he "contin-
ued to be hopeful," he reported "vary little progress in this
area." Repeating his contention that neither the Soviet
Union or the United states could defend itself against a
heavy attack by the other, he speculated that perhaps the
Soviets were determined to maintain a light or tViin defense.
In an obvious signal to both his Pentagon opponents and the
Soviets, he further speculated that it might be easier to
102
agree on seme missile defense than none.
The June issue of Fortune carried a strong endorsement
of United States antimissile defense deployment. Since this
magazine is considered to be representative of big business
opinion, its siapport of a rationale similar to th?.t put forth
*^^^-' The Washington Post, 10 May 1967, p. Al.
102. Thg.,New York Timeg
, news article by Robert C. Phelps,
19 Kay 1967, p. 1.
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by Geijeral vrneel3r must have been noted by the Soviets, al-
though not specifically ccmm.entc^l upon t
In future psycho-political conflict, V7hich
ussd v/eapons c'.s manipulative symbols* the
decisive advantage v/ould lie with tha side
that possesses defenses. Even though these
may be ineffective, the undefended side can-
not determine this without exposing itself
to mortal risk* A situation in which bot'n
sides had defenses would balance uncertain-
ties and might well produce greater stabil-
ity than the previous state of anxious
nakeaneDS,-^*-^-^
The significant difference between this rationale and General
Wheeler's statement was that the Fortune article implied
equality V7hile General Wheeler advocated United States super-
iority,
China conducted its first test of a thermonuclear weapon
on 3 7 Juno 1967, While it had been correctly predicted by
United States officials, it seemed to add a sense of urgency
to the deliberations on antimissile defense deployiaent. Rep-
resentative Craig Hosmer of the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy reported that the detonation had been a weapon ''proof*'
test, a test of a developed weapon rather than a scientific
104device, with a yield of two to seven megatons. Several
other Congressional leaders, headed by Senator Henry M, Jack-
son, called for immediate deplo^'ment of a thin area defense.
103, Richard j, Whalen, •The Shifting Equation of Nuclear
Defense," Fortune, June 1967, p. 85.
^^'^' !£lHJ5^*.J(2IiS^l£i^» '^t-ws article by John W. Finney,
20 June 1967, p. 3,
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The Soviet response v;as the familiar one sentence announce-
ment without coiwTientaryf "Hsinhua reports that the firct Chi-
nese hydrogen bomb was detonated on June 17, 1967, in the
105
northwestern region of Chinao"
In a surprise development. President Johnson and Premier
Kosygin met at Glasboro, Kew jersey, on 23 and 25 June, Pre-
mier Kosygin was in New York to attend sessions of the United
Nations. The discussions were conducted in private and were
followed by the issuance of brief general communiques. After
the second and final meeting. President Johnson held a press
conference where he briefly reported that that arras limita-
tion discussions would be held by Seicretary of State Rusk
and Foreign Minister Gromyko in New York later in the v/eek.
Premier Kosygin held a news conference in New York on his
return from the second session. After stating that an end
to the United States involvement in Vietnam was the first
requirement for better Soviet-American relations, he turned
to possible strategic arms limitation
j
We believe that the discussions should center
not on merely the problem of an antimissile
defense system. Because, after all, the anti-
missile system is not a weapon of aggression,
of attack; it is a wc&pon of defense. And we
fetl therefore chat what should be considered
is the entire complex of weapons and disarma-
ment questions. Because, otherv/lse, if - in-
stead of building and deploying an antiballis-
tic missile system - the money is used to
build up offensive missile systems, mankind
will not stand to gain anything. It will, on
105. Pravda
, 18 June 1967, p. 5.
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the contrary, face a still greater menace
and will come closer to v;ar. And we there-
fore are in favor of considering the vhole
range of questions relating to arms and
disarmament, and we are ready to discuas
that question » the general question of
disarniament.^^^
This statement is strikingly similar to that made by Premier
Kosygin at his February London press conference and indicated
that no policy changes had been made during the late winter
and spring of 1967. Subsequent information revealed that
Secretary McNanara had passionately argued against Soviet
antimissile defense deployment at the Glassboro Suirimit. If
his arguments ruide any impression on Premier Kosygin p it was
not apparent at his press conference
^
Soviet press reporting of the Glassboro meetings was
interesting. The first meeting was briefly reported two
days later in a thirty-seven wo2?d anr.ouncement without core."
1 07
mentary. T^vo days after the second session » an analyti-
cal article appeared in Pravda and Izyestia and exerpts frcnn
Premier Kosygin 's news conference whic'n included his remarks
on antimissile defenses were vrommented upon. The meetings
were not directly linked to the subjects discussed at the
press conference and neither event was reported in the Sov-
iet military press. The analytical article on the Glassboro
meetings reported that "the exchange of opinions touched on
^^^» The Nevy YorkTimes , 26 June 1967, p* 16 „ The same quo-
tation was printed In Izvestia, 27 Juno 1967, p. 3.
^^'^* Pravda and Izvestia, 25 June 1967. p. !•
f.v
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several internationaJ. probleins," Inc3.n.ded v/are the Middle
East, Vietnam, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and a
'general survey of bilateral Soviet-American relations."
Arms control and antimissile defense were not mentioned &pe-
cifically- Although the discussions V7€:re described as '"use-
ful" for both sides, the United States press was termed "un-
scrupulous" for concluding that the meeting implied a change
") 08
in Soviet diplomacy. The omission of antimissile defense
from the list of subjects discussed at the Glassboro Surruuit
and its inclusion in the report of Premier Kosygin*£ press
conference may have indicated that a decision to conduct such
discussions openly at high levels with United States offi-
cials had not been made at that time. It was emphasisred
that Premier Kosygin*s press conference dealt with general
subjects and 'was not necessarily tied to those di&cvissed at
the Glassboro meetings.
United states discussions in mid-1967 revealed that the
Department of Defense v;as studying more complex strategic of-
fensive and defensive weaponb systeins. On 31 May, the Direc-
tor of the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), Charles
Herxfeldj testified to the House Military Appropriations Sub-
committee that the "time is getting ripe again" to reexamine
the 1964 decision to suspend research on the "Bambi" boost-
phase intercept antimissile defense system* This project
108, Pravda and Izvestia, 27 June 1967, p, 1.
^^^» The New York Times, 31 May 1967, p. 1.
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had been suspended due to projected high costs, but Herzfeld
pointed out that recent developments in the reliability of
advanced technology may have reduced these costs sufficient-
ly. Another boost-phase Intercept system then under feasi-
bility study was the Navy's Seaborne Antiballistic Missile
Intercept System (SABKIS), which involved the possible em-
plyment of surface ships and subsequently submarines which
would carry search and guidance radars and interceptor mis-
siles. This system, which v;as portrayed as supporting
rather than competing with Nike-X, was reported to have two
unique advantages. First, it v^as designed to intercept
missiles during the boost or mid-course phase of their
fliglit before decoys could be deployed. Second, its mobil-
ity v;ould allow it to be moved to areas under threat of bal-
listic mistlle attack. The Air Force was also believed to
be conducting similar studies of C5A-based airborne systems
having similar capabilities. Also under study was a
follcv7~on offensive missile system designed to survive a
counterforce strike on its silos and penetrate known and
112projected antimissile defense systems. Project Strat-X.
In July, Marshal Krylov, Commander of the Strategic
Rocket Forces, mvade the first strong Soviet statement on
110, Aviation Week and Space Technology , 17 July 1967, p.
43.
111. Ibi^*
^^"^^ The New York Times
, news article by William Beecher,
17 July 1967, p. 18.
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saturation of antimissile defenses?
The enormous speed, especially v;hen approach--
ing a target, and the various forms of tra-
jectories laake the strategic rockets prcc-
tically invulnerable in flight, especially
when used on a mass scale. Moreover, their
short flight duration ensures the eleitient of
surprise. Therefore a retaliatory strike by
Strategic Rocket Forces may have the greatest
and decisive iraoortance in a future war, if
it is unleashed by the imperialists, ^i-^'
Since this formulation was repeated in early September as the
United states domestic debate sharpened , "" it was probably
made to degrade any presumed anti-Soviet capabilities of a
thin United States antimissile defense system. Inasmuch as
the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces had about 720 intercon-
tinental ballistic missiles in October 19S7,"^-^-^ Marshal Kry-
lov*s claim sec.v.ed credible to United States strategic plan-
ners. The phrase "various forms of trajectories*' preceded
United States adr.iission that Soviet missiles had fractional
orbital and depressed trajectory as well as normal ballistic
capabilities and probably was also intended to imply a cap-
ability to penetrate proposed United stcxtes antimissile de-
fenses.
113. Marslial N» I, Kxylov, "The Strategic Rocket Troops,"
Voyenno-JBtorichesky Zhurnal (Mill tary-K i stor ica
1
Journal), no, 7, July 1967.
114. Ta s s I nterna t ipnal^ Service in English, 1305 GMT, 2
September J 967*
115. Robert S. KcNamara, Ficcal Year
^-^^2~J±S''±^P^" P^Q"gram and Fiscal Year 1969 Defense'budget ,
~ DaparUTient
of Defense monograph, 1 February 196B, pe 54,
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An informed Soviet analysis of United States strategic
force levels and the development of United States strategy
appeared in August, Ko mention was made of antimissile de-
fense system efforts. The Poseidon and Minuteman II and III
programs were pictured, as a "fresh increase in the 'assured
destruction' forces." Poseidon v;as simply treated as a re-
placement for Polaris. Mo mention of multiple warheads or
the enhanced capability of tViese systems to penetrate anti-
missile defenses was made. These development programs were
portrayed as having an aggressive nature: "Such a buildup
of mass destruction weapons is certainly not dictated by
] 16the requirements of defense, "'
Congressional pressure for United States antimissile
defense deployment incr<?ased in the late sumiwer of 1967. On
5 August, the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee, in report-
ing out a defense appropriations bill, urged the President
to initiate deployment "immediately," citing the Chinese
weapons developments and the apparent lack of progress with
the Soviet Union concerning strategic arras limitation dis~
117
cussions. The entire Senate approved the military appro-
priations bill on 22 August. This bill included $730,0 mil-
lion for the development of Nike-X. In early September, con-
servative Senator John G. Tower spoke to the convention of
116. Be Teplinsky, "U. S, f^ilitary Programme," Mezdunar-
2^„^^_2hizn2. (International Affairs), August 1967,
p. 48.
^^"^' T^^e New York Times. 6 August 1967, p. 1.
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the equally conservative Ycung Americans for Freedom in Pitts-
burgh. He charged that the Johnson Administration was dan-
gerously delaying the eintimissile defense deployment deci-
sion and that Defense Secretary Mcl^ai-nara was chiefly respon-
sible for the delay. He v.'arned that, based upon some of his
past decisions. Secretary McKawara*s judgment was question-
able, He specifically attacked the excessive absolute cost
arguments **It is at least as important aa Vietnam, and if
we can spend twenty-five billion dollars a year there we can
find four billion dollars for a light Nike-X defense that
118
can be beefed up later or as necessary." Senator John
Oe pastorCf speaking at a nuclear-powered submarine launch~
ing on 9 September, seconded Senator Tower's assertion that
a nation that could afford Vietnam could afford to protect
itself. He left no doubt that he was referring to a thick,
anti-Soviet system and also advocated expansion of the size
of the Polaris submarine fleet. ^^^
On 14 September, unannounced Republican Presidential
candidate Richard M. Nixon spoke of increasing Soviet for-
ces. In the absence of a "satisfactory agreement," he urged
the Johnson Administration to "go ahead at all costs to
120build an antimissile missile system," He noted that many
118. The Washington Post , 4 September 1967, p. A15.
119. The Nev/ York Times, news article by Evert Clark, 10
September 1967, p. 1,
120. The New York Times, 15 September 1967, p. 9.
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analysts had argued that 5.n antimiesile defense arms r-ace
with the Soviet Union vould only result in a more expensive
stalemate, but pointed out that a thin system would be effec-
tive against a less-developed nuclear pa;'?er, such as China,
The grov7ing pessimism of the Johnison Adj-aini strati on
over the prospects of substantive discussions with tho sov-
iet Union was evident in a statement rnada by Secretary of
State Rusk c*t an 8 September press conferences
Time is be':or:iing urgent. VJe'd like to have
dircus.-iior.G aj^out both offensive and defen-
sive missiles just as soon as possible, Vve
would hope very much that the Soviet Union
would si^t a datci for Uir^itJC; discussions and
that both f:ido3 would be prepared to put in
specific proposal ti chat would bring tliis
matter under control. I would like to say
to you today that no such date has been es-
tablished. We'll con-cinue to try and V7S*11
see Vvhat happens, but this is a matter of
some urgency, •^'^
The signalling to the Soviet Union was obvious.
With domestic pressure for an antimissile defense de-
ployment decision building in the United states in the ab-
sence of indications of readiness to negotiate frora the Sov-
iet Union, a deplo^went decision seemed irraninent, Marslial
Krylov's July statement of soviet penetration capability
indicated that the Soviet Union felt that such a decision
was forthcoming and of no great concern.




Septemper _ 1957 to March 1969
Speculation regardino a United States antimissile de-
fenoe deployment decision endod on 18 September when Secre-
tary ncKcJiTiara announced that production of a thin, Chinese-
oriented aritindssile defense system vj-ould begin by the end
of 1967. in a.n address delivered to Uiiited Press International
editors in San Francisco, The deployment announcement was
wade at the end of his address. The bulk of the speech was
devoted to an eloquent discussion of his assessment of the
realities of then-current nuclear strategy. After defining
key terms and outlining the futility of a Soviet or Ameri-
Cctn nuclear strategy based on the ability to achieve a first
strike capability against the other, he discussed the re-
sults of uncertainty about a potential opponent's v/eapons
acquisition policies, citing the loassive United States inter-
continental ballistic missile buildup of the early 1960*6 as
an example*
But the blunt fact remains that if we had
had more accurate information about plan-
ned Soviet strategic forces, we simply would
not have needed to build as large a nuclear
arsenal as we have today .... V^hat is essen-
tial to understttnd here ij that the United
States and the Soviet Union mutually affect
each other's strategic plans. Vfhatever be
their intentions, whatever our intentions,
actions - or even realistically potential
actions - on eltlier side relating to the




off^'nsive or defeiiGive weapons p necessarily
trigger reacviions on the other side. It is
precisely this action-reaction phenomenon
that fuels an armc race.^
After discussing the irony of nuclear weaponry, that even
substantial numerical superiority does not effectively trans-
late into political control or diplomatic leverage as he saw
it, he described the Soviet buildup and possible United
States responses. Secretary McNamara intimated that he fav-
ored the establishment of some sort of strategic parity:
V7e do not want a nuclear arms race with
the Soviet Union - primarily because the
action-reaction phenomenon makes it fool-
ish and futile. But if the only way to
prevent the Soviet Union from obtaining
first strike capability over us is to
engage in such a race, the United States
possesses in ample abundance the resources,
the technology, and the will to run faster
in that race for whatever distance is re-
quired. But what we would much prefer to
do is to come to a realistic and reasoncibly
riskless agreement with the Soviet Union,
v;hich would effectively prevent such an
arms race.^
Having laid out his interpretation of then-current stra-
tegic reality, he moved to the specific case of antimissile
defense. He acknowledged that the Soviet union was deploying
an antimissile defense system and stated that with a proper
United States response it was not «i cause for alarm
t
1. •Remarks by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara,
September 18, 1967," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
,





The Soviets are now deploying an antibal-
listic luissile system. If we react to thic
ciepioyTnent intelligently, we have no reason
for alarnie
The system decs not impost; any threat to
our ability to penetrate and inflict mas-
sive and unacceptable damage on the Soviet
Urion, In other v^ords^ it doec iict pres-
ently affect in any significant manner our
assured destruction capability.
It does net po^o svch ^ threat because v^e
have already taken the nteps necessary to
assure that ovir land-based f-lir«uteman mis-
siles, our nuclear submarine-launched new
Poseidon missiles, and our strategic bomber
forces have the requisite penetration aids
and in the sum, constitute a force of such
magnitude, that tViey guarantee us a force
strong enough to survive a Soviet attacJt^
and penetrate the Soviet ABK deployment:, -^
The penetrability of the proposed united states defensive
system was seen as the key reason why deployment would be
futile with respect to the Soviet Union e Secretary McNamara
made it clear that absolute cost was not the problem. He
then appealed to the Soviet union to clarify its intentions
regarding antimissile defenses?
The plain fact of the matter is that we are
now facing a situation analogous to the one
we faced in 1961; we are uncertain of the
Soviets* intentions.
At that time we were concerned about their
potential offensive capabilities j now we are
concerned about their potential defensive
capabilities. But the dynamics of the con-
cern are the same. We must continue to be
cautious and conservative in our estimates
3. ''McNamai-a
• s Remarks," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
Decembfer 1067, p. 29.
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leavi.nq r.o room ir our calculations for un-
necessary talk. And at the same time, we
must roeasure our owii responses in such a
ma.niiey that it does not trigger a senseless
spiral upward of nuclear anas*
Now, as I have emphasized, we have already
taken the necessary steps to guarantee thc',t
our offensive strategic weapons will be able
to penetrate future, more advanced, Soviet
defenses Keeping in mind the careful clock-
work of lead-time, we will be forced to con-
tinue that effort over the next few yearts if
the evidence is that the Soviets intend to
turn what is now a modest and light htH'I de-
ployment into a massive one. Should they
elect to do so, v;e have both the lead-time
and the technology available to so increase
both the quality and quantity of our offen-
sive strategic forces - with particular
attention to highly reliable penetration
aids - that their expensive defensive efforts
will givs them no edge in the nuclear balance
whatsoever. But we v/ouid prefer not to have
to do that. For it is a profitless waste of
resources, provided we and the Soviets can
cojfie to a realistic strategic arms Ijraitation
agreement. As you know, ve have proposed
U. S. -Soviet talks on this matter. Should
these talks fail, we are fully prepared to
take the appropriate measures that such a
failure would make necessary.
The point for us tc keep in mind is that
should the talks fail - and the Soviets de-
cide to expand their present modest ABM de-
ployment into a massive one - our response
must be realistic. There is no point what-
soever in our responding by going to a massive
ABM deployiTient to protect our population,
v/hen such a syste.Xi would be ineffective
against a sophisticated Soviet offense. In-
stead, realism dictates that if the Soviets
elect to deploy a heavy ABM system, ve must
further expand oui sophisticated offensive




s Remarks," Bulletin ot the Ata.ijc Scientists
,
Decembe:: 1067, p. 30.
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Kaving made as strong a case as possible against de-
fense of urban areas against a massive sophisticated attack,
he described three feasible objectives for a defense system
i
protection of strategic offensive forces and bases, area
defense against a minor nuclear power such as China, and
population protection in the improbable but possible case
of an accidental launch by any nuclear power. Secretary
HcKamara then announced that the United States was going to
begin an anti-China defense system and cautioned that this
thin defense deployment contained two possible psychological
dangers. First, that it would encourage future lapses into
what he regarded as the former oversimplification about the
adequacy of nuclear power and second, that it could fuel the
"mad momentum" of another nuclear arms race. He concluded
by attempting to assure the Soviet Union that this decision
did not prejudge agreement on limitation of strategic wea-
pons 8
Let me emphasize - and I cannot do so too
strongly -- that our decision to go ahead
with limited ABM deployment in no way in-
dicates that we teel an agreement with the
Soviet Union en the limitation of strate-
gic nuclear offensive and defensive forces
is any the less urgent or desirable.^
In an attempt to reach the widest audience \-;ith his ar-
guip.ents relating to antimissile defense. Secretary McKamara
5. "McNamara's Remarks," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
,
December 1967, p. 31,

- 144 -
granted a rare exclufiive interview to Life raagazine vfhich
appeared on 23 September. In a slightly le<^B sophisticated
fashion, he repeated the major pointr, of the san Franci^jco
speech. This interviev; contained two significant statejments
not previously released to the piibliCa First, he described
United States efforts to persuade the Soviet Union to enter
discussions on limitation of antimissile defervses^ including
direct attempts by himself and President Johnson at the
Glassboro Summit. He did not comment on the possible ef-
fects of the United States deployment decision on soviet v.-ill-
ingness to negotiate. More importantly, he mc.Ce tlie first
clear public reference to the previoucly classified multiple
independently-targeted reentry vehicle (KIRV) as a counter
to antimissile defensesi
• ..vre're capital^ ising on a major nev/ tech-
nological advance. We can now equip our
boosters with many warheads, each of which
can be aimed at a separate target. We call
this MIRV .... We're buying MIRVs for both
Minutemc^n and Poseidon. We believe that we
have a substantial lead over the Soviets in
this imoortant technology. Through the use
of MIRVs, we will redesign our strategic
force to increase the total number of v/ar-
headSr This v;ill do two things i exhaust
their defenses and at the same time better
match the size of weapons to the targets
to b3 destroyed. The net result will be
an increase in military effectiveness with
some reduction in the total megatons in our
force »... [mIRV] is one of the things that
makes us eo confident that we can overcome
6. "Dofeiis-e Fantasy Kcw Comes True," interview v/ith Secre-




the Soviet A.B.M. But in a fev? yeors the
Soviets covild have their own KIRV?.; and that
is one of the rGaf:onG »;« are pessimistic
about deploying an effective raore expensive
A«B.M« agiiinst the-m. Both our missile de-
fense EVGtem and theirs were designed before
MIRVs came along as a serious possibility.
The optimistic st&tements mside by A.B,H.
proponents on both 3ioes haven't taken such
things as HIRVs fully into account,'
Viewed in conjuction v;ith hin speech in San Francisco, sev-
eral signals to the Soviet union clearly emerged. Most im-
portant was thrit the United States sought to maintain the
mutual assured destruction strategy based upon secure second
strike forces th^^t had evolved during the previous decade.
While antimissile defenses could threaten that situation, the
United States was moving to assure its continuation. Every
effort \/as being made to coiriraunicate to antimissile defense
supporters on both sides that population and city defense
would not provide additional security in a superpower con-
frontation. The MIKV announcement also supported United
States adherence to a second strike strategy. By intimating
that warhead size was being reduced to bring it into balance
with the targets to be destroyed, Secretary McNamara was at-
tempting to signal that the capability of these warheads to
Qdestroy hard targets was being reduced,* thereby reducing
7. "Defense Fantasy," interview with Secretary McNamara,
Life, 29 September 1967, p» 2SB.
8. This decrease in warhead yield could be baicinced by iin-
pro%'ed guidance accuracy which was not mentioned. In
terms of signalling, yield reductions connote a second
strike mission for a given strategic weapons system.
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the first strike capability of these weapons.
United States reaction to Secretary McKamara's speech
was generally favorable ? but deplored the fact that inter-
national pressures had forced the decision. Some influen-
9
tial coluoinists discussed the domestic political overtones,
a theme that was later seiiied upon by Soviet and other for-
eign comnientatorB. Others pointed out that technological
progress in offensive systems had already by-passed antimis-
sile defense. Multiple warheads and saturation tactics
were seen as assuring the continued supremacy of offensive
forces, as Secretary lnCNam>ara had argued.
In the wake of Secretary McNamara's announcement, pther
government<?.l agencies with arms control responsibilities at-
tempted to reinforce his assertion that the deployment de-
cision did not adversely affect the possibilities for an
agreement with the Soviet Union. On 19 September, Adrian S.
Fisher, Deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency (ACDA), spoke to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Con-
ference in Geneva and repeated Secretary KcNamara*s argument
that urban defense for either the Soviet Union or the United
States was impracticable:
•..limited nature of the proposed United
States anti-ballistic missile deployment,
^* The New York Times, news article by James Reston, "The
Anti-Republican Missile," 22 September 1967, p. 46.
10. The New York Times, news article by Robert Kleiman, 9
October 1967, p. 1.
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even in its completion, and our intention
to keep it limited. The depio^'tnent v/ill
consist of on *araa* defense of the United
States and a termincil* defense of Bome of
our iVinuteraan sites. The United States de-
plo;^nTient will comprise no terminal defense
of urban areas and will not attempt to pro-
vide defense for those areas against a large
scale strategic missile attack of the kind
the Soviet Union is capable cf launcliing.
We do not believe that it is feasible for
either the Soviet union or thf*- United States
to provide real protection for our populated
areas against the strategic power of the
other, -^^
A State Department release on the same day stated that, *'We
believe it is still very highly desirable for the United
States and the Soviet Union to discuss means of limiting
12
competition on strategic weapons." It expressed the John-
son AdnUnistration' s hope that the "nevj focus on the anti-
bailictic missile problem" would stimulate Soviet interest
in negotiations. Such logic could have been countered by
the probability that precipitous Soviet reaction could have
been interpreted as giving in to United States pressure and
therefore was unlikely. Another possibility was created
when Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Secur-
ity Affairs Robert Warnke alluded to arms limitation by par-
allel weapons acquisition and deployment actions in a 15
1-5
October speech • '
11. The New York Times
,
20 September 1967, p. 18.
12, Ibid,
^^*
'P}9^-'^^^ York Times, news article by WilliaiTi Beecher,
16 October 1967, p. 1,
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Soviet reaction to secretary McKair.ara • ss San Francisco
sppech was sparse, A 24 Septc^raber F.rticle. established an
analysis of the forces which had produced the decision to
deploy antimissile defenses which still persists. The de-
ployment was viev/ed as a concession to the interects of the
arms industry. Concern vjas expressed that domestic pressure
for systerr, expansion would prove irresi stable* In general,
the arguments reflected the United States domestic debate
and made no mention of Uie anti-China rationale. Although
the article quoted liberally from an editorial condemning
the decision vjhich had appeared in The New York Time s on 20
September, it o:r.itted the Times' arguix>.ents about United .
StatriE-Soviet strategic force interactions and arms race
pressures.^ A later article, which appeared in Izvectia
on 4 October, responded to the Life interview with Secretary
McNamara. Despite the Secretary's statements to the contrary,
1*5
the cost of the system was seen to be crucial, * Concern
was expressed that the deployipent decision would open a new
round in the anus race. Again, no mention was made of other
reasons for the decision or the MIRV announcement.
The East European press was far more candid, A Czech
article, which appeared on 2S September, reported Secretary
Kcllamara's argument that the proposed United States system
^^* prctvda, 24 September 1967, p. 1.
15. Yuri Barsukov and s. Zykov, "^Tho Mas an Interest in
This?," ly.vostia, 4 October 1967, p. 2.
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was not impenetrable, but omitted the specific conditionii
which supported this assertion. Deployment was seen as a
result of pressure from the joint Chiefs of Staff, not the
arms industry or the Republican party. The cinti-China ra-
tionale was accurately reported, but probable anti-Soviet
motives v;ere also seen:
Regardless of the proclaimed anti-Chinese
orientation of the Ki];e-X antiballistic
missile system, the i^iineiican press itself
has carried speculation as to the true in-
tent of the American Administration. Con-
cern is expressed that the building of the
antiballistic missile defense mig]it evoke
anoth€-;r upswing in the armament race. In
this connection, The__Kew^ Yor k^ T _ime s has
pointed out that the Soviet Union knov7s
quite well that present American intent may
change, and that don\estic political pres-
sure manifests itself in the United States
before elections. 'What seems clear to
Americans, • it writes * namely, that the
antiballistic missile defense system is
being built primarily against China, may
not be clear to the Russians. • These ut-
terences possibly stem from, views proported
in Washington that the Soviet Union will
hardly believe stories about efforts to
•neutralize' the so far just emerging Chi-
nese nuclear and ballistic missile power
and no more.
Substantial attention has been given to the
fact that the United States informed the
Soviet Union of its decision in advance,
which so far has not been the custom. This
is one aspect of the matter which might be
explained by the fact that the American Ad-
ministration wanted to forestall an unfavor-
able reaction on the part of the soviet
Union, The statement by the spokesman of
the state Department McCloskey, howevei
,
introduces a new element into the entire
affair. McCloskey indicates that by a de-
cision to build a limited antiballistic
missile system the United States would like
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to induce the Soviet Union to begin a dis-
cussion on the suspension of the race in the
field of strategic weapons. It i£$ probable
that this is connected with the Soviet head
Ftart in the construction of an antiballis-
tic missile systera, about which ths United
States is rather concerned e They proceed
from the asjGuiaption that in this situation
it raight be disadvantageous for theiri to
freezfi the existing state of affairs* Ac*-
cording to /kmerican estimates, the United
States will continue to be superior in of-
fensive ballistic missiles and th.e Soviet
Union in defensive ones.
Apart from these considerations, the Ameri-
can Administration defends its decision with
the t^rgument that a * light nuclear uiabrella*
does not basicalJy affect the balance of
missile power between the United States and
the Soviet U'nion* It appears that the only
one v;ho needs persuading in this respect is
the Soviet Union.-*-^
While it cannot be docuiaented, it seems likely that this in-
terpretation was shared by many in the Soviet leadership.
Although the article avoided policy advocacy, it reflected
uneasiness over the implications of the United States deci-
sion. Although the deployment decision v/as somewhat pre-
dictable in view of United States domestic politics, it
represented a deviation from the stand-pat trend which had
characterized United States force posture developments in
the mid-1960* s. Taken in conjunction with Secretary McNam-
ara^s announcement of the development of multiple warhead
offensive systems, it may have appeared to some elements of
16. Pavel Cipka, ^'Light Nuclear 'Umbrella:* The Intentions
of the United States in Building an Antiballistic Mis-
sile System," Eratisla\/a Pravda
, 29 September 1967, p.
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the Soviet bureaucracy that this trend was about to be broken*
Those who based their arguirents for various military arid fo.c~
eign policy decisions on the perception that secretary KcNam-
ara*s professed concerii for the action-reaction phenomenon
would inhibit increases in United States strategic forces
were probably raoj->t concerned. Tc- those *vho Ijad presuinc\bly
argued that Soviet force posture planning should anticipace
some increases in United States strategic forces, the Sen-
tinel antimissile defense system and multiple warhead an-
nouncements v;ould seem to have vindicated their judgment
that the United States had not abandoned a quest for some
degree of strategic superiority* No overt indications of
an internal debate on hov; the Soviet Union should proceed
in light of these decisions and developments appeared in the
Soviet press. Given the apparent intensity of the debate
which had occurred earlier in the year, the Soviet leader-
ship may have concluded that it was most prudent to continue
to implen\ent the weapons system decisions which had been
made previously. It is also possible that the earlier de-
liberations had anticipated the actions taken by the United
States and had planned accordingly.
The differences between the responses of the Soviet and
37
East European presses were noteworthy. In general, the
17. For a fuller analysis of these differences, including
bibliograp'nic references, see Fritz Ern:<arth, "Soviet
and East European Views or- the AEK Raciif*" Radio Fr ee:
Europe Research Report, 26 November 1967,
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Soviet- response stressed arras race considerations, I\o refer-
ence was made to the stability of the international oystern
or that the United states antimissile defense system deploy-
ment had a professed anti-Chinese mission. This silence m.ay
have been intended to avoid lending credence to Chinese prop-
aganda concerning Soviet-American collusion. Further, no
intimation v/as rnade that the United States decision could
have been made in response to Soviet antimissile defense or
offensive missile deployments, probably reflecting a desire
not to strengthen the case of those in the United States who
favored broad deployment of Sentinel. There was little to
suggest that the East European press response was coordinat-
•
ed with that of the Soviet Union. The anti-Chinese ration-
ale was reported, but the Sentinel deplo;imtent was seen as
basically anti-Soviet in its true intent. Given the existing
Soviet defenses, the united States decision was pictured as
a response to the Soviet deployment. The moratorium propos-
al was viewed as an attempt to negate the Soviet advantage.
A general conception that rough strategic parity between the
superpowers enhanced international stability and thereby the
security of smaller nations appeared to be the basis for this
analysis. From this perspective, the Soviet antimissile
defenses were assumed to partially offset the United States*
offensive superiority, thus contributing to the attainment
of the desired parity. Hov/ever, an antimissile defense-based
arms race was viewed with concern. Apparently having become







had evolved in the pariod following the Cuban Missile Crisis*
they were concerned over the potential instabilities whj ch
could result from wide dv^ploriaents of antimissile defenses
by the United States and the Soviet Union* At one extrerae
was the pOBsibilifcy that possession of effective antimissile
defences by the superpowers would remove the perceived inhi-
bitions on the use of force in the international systems
The unspoken source of this concern involved the potential
actions of the Soviet Union. Less than one year later » this
erroneously-based faith in the existing relationships V7as
exposed when the Soviet Union led Warsaw Pact forces into
Czechoslovakia
»
A more polemical attack on the United states decision
appeared in the Soviet press on 11 OvCtober, It cliaracter-
ized those who believed that the deployraent would remain
limited as "simpletons. *' The decision vras seen to have been
made for "internal political reasons, not m.ilitary-strategic
considerations" to avoid charges of allowing an "antimissile
gap," Finally, it was asserted that Soviet retaliatory
power was sufficient to discourage United States strategic
planners from concluding that a first strike strategy could
be advocated I
The aggressors v;ould .like to take cover from
retribution behind tlie shield of ABM. Even
two years ago. Fortune, magazine of U. S.
business circlet, warned: 'Appearance of the
Nike-X system can be interpreted jn the Sov-
iet Union as a preparation for attac?< on the
USSR** We are not saying that the illusion
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of .1.!r\puni'cy engendered by the ABl^i Bystem
ccu^d turn Iniperia] ist policioa to c^ pol-
icy of lOackiriail which is so close to
their hearts. ^^
Although th€5 article attsi?>pted to do'^ngradc this issue, the
fact remains that, in simply addressing the qaestion» the
e>uthor reflected some Soviet concern that such a strategy
might be adopted. A more highly speculative explanation may
be that at that time some Soviet military leaders had bc-en
arguing for a Soviet first strike strategy based on similar
considerations and that the author was attempting to dis-
credit this movement.
The eagerly anticipated military parade cciTunemorating
the 50th Anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution took place
on 7 November. Although a large intercontinental ballistic
missile, subsequently referred to as SS-9 in the West, was
shown for the first time- the Soviets failed to produce a
spectacular display as had beer, predicted by some V'Jestern
intelligence analysts. For the first time in several years,
an antimissile missile was not included. The Air Defense
Forces (PVO) were represented by the comiaon SA-2 antiaircraft
19
guided missile. Articles 'vi-hich conunented on the parade
produced a minor split on Soviet antimissile defense cap-
abilities. Izvestia e.n6 lOreisnay-f^ Zv^'zda stated that Soviet
18, G. Geraslmov, -'About the ABM," Literaturnaya Gaaeta
(Literary G^^zotte), 11 October 1967,~p. 9^
^^* Tl)g- New York Tlrns s , 8 November 1967, p. 1.
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'antirockets permit the creation of a reliable defense of
20
separate targets and broad regions of the country." This
statement implied both point and area defense capabilities,
not actual deployments. Only area defense was implied by
Pravda t "Our antiaircraft troops are capable of destroying
enemy mass air and space attack at any altitude and at great
distances from the defended objectives," ^ Other Anniversary
articles by military leaders omitted even veiled references
to antimissile defense.
In summary, the Soviet response to President Johnson's
moratorium proposal and the subsequent announcement of United
States antimissile defense deployment was more notable for
what was omitted than for what weis said, Ko mention v;as made
of Soviet deployments. Defense capability was the theme of
rare comments on antimissile defense. Articles which survey-
ed overall Soviet defense preparedness generally avoided any
mention of antimissile defense, WVien antimissile defense
was discussed, it was generally in the context of commentary
on Western reports* For example, a fairly sophisticated
analysis of Western penetration aids technology failed to con-
22tain any reference to Soviet defensive capability. While
the anti-China rationale for united states deployment was not
^^* I^g^yestia and Krasnaya Zyezda (Red Star), 8 i;ovember 1967.
21. "A Reliable Shield," Pravda, 8 November 1967, p, 2.
22. Engineer-Captain First Rank p. L. Sergeyev, "problems of
Penetrating an Antimissile Defense," Morskoy Sbornik
(Naval Digest), 9 September 1967, pp. 91-96,
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discussed by the Soviets, their corrjrtentary generally warned
of a new rouiiu in the arms race v^hich intimated that they
considered that the United states decision affected the Sov-
iet-United States strategic balance. No indications v^ere
given t'nat the United States decision had been mads even
partially in response to Soviet strategic force or defensive
deployn\ents« Election year doraestic political pressures on
President Johnson and the grcjwing influence of the "'military-
industric.l coinplex," a concept which fits neatly into Marx-
ist ideological interpretations of history, were depicted as
the driving forces behind the United States deployment deci-
sion. While Soviet stress on the costs inherent in the.
United states decision would support a Marxist analysis, it
could also have reflected the Soviet internal debate.
In a news conference on 2 November, Secretary KcKamara
revealed that the Soviet Union had been testing a fractional
23
orbital bombardment system (FOBS). While not specifically
designed to penetrate antimissile defense systems, this sys-
tem has the advantage of shortening the warning time of im-
pending attack. The FOBS employed a lov? altitude flight
path (about 100 miles in altitude, vice the normal 800 miles
for a minimUiR-enargy ballistic trajectory) at orbital speeds
and is deorbited by decelerating rockets about three minut2s
prior to iiop6ct. The higher speed and lower altitude reduce
the time the reentry vehicle can be tracked by radar. When
^•^* The New York Times, 3 November 1867, p. 1.
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fired over norrral intercontinerstal ba3,lintic missile flight
paths, the flight time is about ten minutes shorter than a
ballistic trajectory over the same flight path. The system
can also be fired over fractional orbital flight paths to
approach targets through gaps in radar coverage, such as
then existed in the southern approaches to the United States
«
Disadvantages include reduced payload and accuracy. Secre-
tary McNamara predicted that FOBS had an anti-bomber base
mission v;here these parameters were less critical. He con-
cluded that it did not threaten the United States' assured
destruction capability. The timing of this release suggests
that Secretary McNamara vras attempting to minimize any over-
ly pessimistic reaction to the possible display of such a
weapon at the 7 November military parade in Moscow, The
rocket x/as shown, but its capabilities were not discussed
beyond generalities.
Movement by the United States toward a more anti-Soviet
mission for the Sentinel system vras intimated in mid-Novem-
ber. In testimony to the Joint Atomic Energy Committee on
10 November, Deputy Defense Secretary ^aul ^'itze stated,
"The deployjTient of the Sentinel permits us at any time within
a year to make a decision on whether or not we want to defend
O A
the Minuteman silos." A similarly worded Department of De-
25fense release on 1j Noveinber supported his testimony. The
^^^ The New York Tiroes
, 11 November 1967, p. 1,
^^* The V7ashinqton Post, 14 Novem.ber 19S7, p. Al,
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fact that a decision h?Jid not been reached was stressed. Al-
though the defense of some Hinutemckn sites v^as not necessar-
ily seen as blatantly anti-Soviet, it represented an escala-
tion in united States deployment intentions. The addition
of the time factor v/as also a signal to the Soviets.
On 19 November, the Soviets celebrated Strategic Rocket
Forces Day. Although the emphasis was on offensive v/eapons
and their capabilities, antimissile defenses were referred
to by Marshal Krylov: "Among their arms, our country's anti-
air defenses have accurate interceptor-missiles of enemy
26
nuclear carriers and missiles." Marshal Krylov 's remarks
regarding offensive missiles were more significant in that
they contained the first specific claim that Soviet missiles
carried penetration aids. In the earlier part of his arti-
cle, he repeated the July formulation that Soviet missiles
were "invulnerable to the enemy* s antimissile defenses."
After describing improvements such as smaller and more power-
ful warheads* longer range, greater accuracy, and solid-
fueled intercontinental missiles mounted on tracked vehi-
cles, he stated, "The warheads of these rockets carry devices
to break through the enemy's antirocket defenses." In another
19 Noveitiber article. Colonel General N. V. Yegorov, Chief of
the Political Administration of the Strategic Rocket Forces,
emphasized the accuracy of Soviet missiles
t
26. Marshal N. I. Krylov, "The Rocket Might of the Mother-
land," pravda, 19 November 1967, p. 2.
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Our intercontinerstal raiesiies have a prac-
tically uniiir.ited range of action and, what
Is especially iraportcuit, great accuracy Id
carrying v.-arheads to the^.r targets. This
high accuracy has been convincingly demon-^
strated in numerous experimental launches5»^'
This unusual stress on accuracy carried first strike impli-
cations. Accuracy had normally been referred to in general
statements on the capabilities of Soviet offensive missiles,
but not emphasized to this extent. General Yegorov's refer-
ence to '^nurrierous launches" connoted an established opera-
tional capability. Finally, a film shcv;n on Soviet tele-
vision in honor of strategic Rocket Forces Day Included the
Galosh antimissile missile in action, but it was not new
footagt^r
A more detailed description of united States offensive
missDle developjp.ents vms provided by Director of Defense
Research and Engineering John S. Foster in a 13 December
speech in Dallas^ He described a v;ider dispersal for multi-
ple independently-targeted reentry vehicle (MIRV) warheads
than had previously been disclosed, pointing out that one
missile with MIRV warheads could attack several cities. Dr.
Foster pictured the MIRV program as a response to Soviet
antimissile defenses and increased offensive forces. In con-
cluding his remarks, he stated that the purpose of the MIPV
27. Colonel General N, V. Yegorov, "Formidable and Invinci-
ble," Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), 19 November 1967, p. 1.




program was to provide continusd Ur.ited Stc^.tes assured des-
truction capabilityj ''They will assure penetiation of soviet
antimissile defenses and can deliver unacceptable dcrniacje to
the Soviet Union even after we have suffered an ail-out nuc-
29lear attack." To bolster the credibility of the second
strike mission for these developments, on 12 January 1968
the Defense Department announced the cancellation of tl^c
Kiark 17 warhead program.. Thia program involved a single,
large-yield warhead for the Poseidon and Minuteman III mis-
siles which would have had a significant capability against
hard targets given the estimated accurccy of these v/eapons.
The statement indicated that the funds released vjoul.d be re-
allocated to MIKV development.""^
On 1 February, the annual Defense Posture Statement was
published. Secretary McKamara generally repeated the basic
themes of his San Francisco sppech. The overall impression
given was one of orderly progress in strategic forces, v^ith
no cause for alarm. He remained confident of the assured
destruction capability of existing and programmed United
States strategic forces. With regard to antimissile defenses
he strongly reasserted that defenses would not be effective
against a heavy, sophisticated attack an that the best re-
sponse to expanded soviet antimissile defenses would be to
increase United States offensive forces. In support of this
^^* The New York_Tiroes. 14 December 1967, p. 1«
^^' The Washington Post , 13 January 1967, p* All*
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contention * Secretary McNaraara listed United States actions
which had been taken in response to the Soviet antimissile
defense deployment
i
1. The production snd deployment of the
Poseidon missile i';ith MIRVs.
2, The production and deployment of im-
proved missile penetration aids.
3, The Increase in the proportion of Min-
uteman Ills (with MIRVs and a nev7 third
stage) in the planned force.
4. The initiation of development of new
small reentry vehicles in order to
increase substantially the number of
warheads (or penetration aids) v;hich
can be carried by a sinyle missile. ^^
Future options available also placed their primary emphasis
on offensive v^eapons systems i
We can convert the entire force to Minute-
man III, increase the number of warheads
each Minuteman missile could carry, emplace
the entire h!inuteman III force in superhard
silos, and/or protect the Minuteman force
with an ivBH system.
There are, of course, still other options
available, such as the construction and de-
ployiuent of more Poseidon submarines, and
the development and production of a new
land-based missile. Although a new land-
based ICBM does not appear to offer any
particular advantage over the Minuteman III
in superhard silos, I believe we should
keep that option opnn by starting develop-
ment now of a silo which could be used for
either the Minuteman III or a new ICBM. The
!}.. Robert 3* McNamara, Fiscal Year 1969-7 3 Defense Pro-
gram and Fi scal Year 1969 Defense Budget
, Depar tmen
t
of Defense Monograph, 1 February 1968, p. 53.
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its cltieF was reiterated:
Nothing has occurred during the last year
to change my conviction that the deploy-
ment of the Nik'^-X system for the d3fense
of our cities aoaj.nst a sovist attack vould,
unc^.er present circumstances, bo a futile
v/aste of our resources, I believe it is
clear from my earlier discussion of the
trendi? in the nature of the threat, as
evaluated l>y our intellicjence ccmr.\unity,
that the Soviets are determined to main-
tain a nuclear deterrent against the United
States. If this is true, as I believe it is,
any attempt on our part to reduce their *As~
sured Destruction* capability below vrhat
they might consider necessary to deter us
would simply cause them to respond with an
offsetting increase in their offensive for-
ces. It is precisely this process of action
and reaction upon which the arms race feeds,
at great cost to both sides and benef j.t to
neither. ^^
While the prospects for city defenses against heavy sophis-
ticated attacks were held to be not promising, an examina-
tion of the budgetary proposals for Fiscal Year 1969 revealed
that, of the $1,232 billion lor antimissile defense, $268.0
million were set out for research and development progrcUDS
36
not related to the Sentinel system.
Secretary Z-ivCNamara ' s overtures to the Soviet Union for
negotiations on strategic arms limitation were repeated by
President Johnson in a message to Congress which accompanied
the Annual Report of the Arms Control and Disarniament Agency
(AGDA): "The United States urgently desires to begin discus-






cions V7ith the Soviet Union about the-? buildup of offensive
and defensive missiles of both sides.*'
During the first tv70 months of 1968, the relative si-
lence of the Soviet Union on air defense capabilities was
broken in articles which appeared during the celebration of
the 50th Anniversary of the Soviet Armed Forces. Although
the divergence of statements did not reach the scale evident
in mid-February 1967, the absence of guidance or a formula-
tion was apparent. General Batitsky, Cc«iinander of the Air
Defense Forces, was the most vague. On 28 December 1967, in
an article which surveyed the entire Soviet defense estab-
lishment, he quickly passed over his area of responsibility:
*Today, the Air Defense Forces constitute a mighty branch of
the Armed Forces. They are provided v/ith the l6.tost conibat
38
equipment." A subsequent article was slightly more specif-
ic, although the text seemed to reflect antiaircraft capabil-
ities t
The armament of the Air Defense Forces con-
tains complexes-? of antiaircraft guided mis-
siles capable of destroying practically all
modern means of air and space attacks at
significant distances from defended targets,
at high and low altitudes, and at supersonic
flight speeds. In the process the results
of their actions are not dependent on time,
or weather interference.-^^
^"^
* The New York Times, 13 February 1968, p. 1.
38. General p. F, Batitsky, "Toward the 50th Anniversary of
J the USSR Armed Forces," 3^.rasnaya zve zda (Red Star), 28
December 1967, p. 4.
39. General p. F. Batitsky, article in sovetskiv Voin
(Soviet Soldier), January 1968, p. 3.
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This apparent antiaircrc'It defense emphasis v.'as repeated .in
a Prayda article v;hich appeared on 3 February* Ant.irdGs=iie
defensjes were not mentioned. General Batitsky included a
strong plea for the importance of strategic defenses
j
Military circles in the imperialist countries
place the main errrihasis on air- space fsurprise
attack in their plans to unleash a nuclear
rocket v;ar . , . • In these circumstances the
CPSU, the Soviet Goverrmient , and all \:he peo-
ple, are taking the necessary steps to fur-
ther strengthen the country's defenL';e cap-
ability. VJe devote special attention to
perfecting our antiwar defenses of st3*ategic
importance in the present situation, ^^
This theme was repeated in an Izyestia article on 21 Febru-
ary, although in this case General Batitsky failed to invoke
the image of a United States first strike
t
Antiaircraft defense forces are among the
most important of our armed forces. They
are destined to defend administrative and
political centers, industrial and economic
regions » and tlie population against enemy
air-cosmic forces. Vie know very vjoll, that
the United states and other meiribers of the
aggressive imperialist bloc maintain power-
ful armed forces in constant coiribat readi-
ness .... In recent years, the United States
has continued to actively develop thair
strategic forces, to increase individual
allotments of ballistic rockets, and to
develop new systems for air-cosmic attack.
Under those circumstances, the Comirainist
Party^, the Soviet Government, and the entire
Soviet nation, in taking the measures neces-
sary for a further strengthening of the de-
fensive power of the motherland^ pay special
attention to the perfection of air defense





which has acquired such treiaendous signifi-
cance in modern conditions.'*^
It is interesting to note that General Batitsky did not men-
tion the Sentinel antimissile defense system ajv.ong the grow-
ing United States strategic forces. Viewed from a bureau-
cratic perspective, it is possible that General Batiusky was
resorting to the typically American technique of slightly
downgrading the capability of his forces while exagerating
the gravity of the threat.
Marshal Krylov of the Strategic Rocket Forces was the
second most prolific commentator on antimissile defenses
during this period. On 17 February, he repeated his general
assertion that Soviet missiles were "capable of overcoming
the antimissile defenses of an eneiny,"*'' In a survey article
on Soviet defense capabilities which appeared on 23 February,
he repeated the fajniliar Marshal jMalinovsky formulation:
"The Air Defense Forces are capable of destroying any air-
craft and many missiles of the enemy. "'^^ Significantly, Mar-
shal Krylov* s most interesting statement did not c^ppear in
the Soviet press. In an interview with a Polish newspaper,
he seemed to advocate continuad research and development
41. General P. F, 3£.titsky, "Guardians of the Air Ocean,**
Izyestia, 21 February 1968, p, 1.
42. Marshal N. I, Krylov, interviev/ in Pravda , 17 February
1968.
43. Marshal N, I. Krylov, -powerful shield of the Mother-




prograins on antimissile defenses
ive are closely \';afcching the developn^ent of
rocket technology in the armies of other
major countries and we know their present
state, V^e also know the solutions to the
prohlejTis of antlrocket defense. The concept
is that the existing systems of antirocket
defense are not in a position to insure the
effective defense against the power of Sov-
iet rockets. These rockets possess unus-
ually excellent guidance systems. That is
why it is almost impossible to disturb their
flight. However, this does not dull our
vigilance. Soviet military specialists are
closely watching the latest scientific
developments in rocket technology and anti-
rocket defense and are increasingly per-
fecting our own military technology and
the entire system of the country's defense.
Soviet rockets are in sure hands. They
are handled by people who do not threaten
world peace but who are always ready to
defend it.^'^
In two articles which were published during this period,
Marshal M. zakharov of the General Staff repeated Marshal
Malinovsky's farailiar "any aircraft and many missiles" form-
45
ulation and repeated the assertion that Soviet offensive
missiles could penetrate a United states antimissile defense
46
system, Marshax Grechko avoided Marshal Malinovsky's form-
ulation, choosing a more vague statements
The Air Defense Forces have changed beyond
44. Marshal N. I. Krylov, interview in Trybuna Ludu , Warsaw,
6 February 1968, p. 1.
45. Marshal M. Zakharov, "The party and the Armed Forces of
the Country of the Soviets," Partiinaya zhizn* (Party
Life), February 1968, p. 18.
^^» Pravda, 17 February 1966, p. 1.
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recognition. They comprise antiaircraft
rocket troops, i\±r defense aviation, s.nd
radiotechnical troops capable of v/aging a
successful struggle against manned and un-
manned means of air attack under any con-
ditions and at a considerable distance
from defended objectives. -'
Marshal Grechko's statement resembled an earlier evaluation
of Soviet air defense capability which seemed to assert ircpen-
etrabiiity for the manned bonvber and its cruise missiles:
soviet antiaircraft rockets can hit enemy
manned and unmanned aircraft at a great
distance from the defended objects, in any
meteorological conditions, and despite
radio interference. Antiaircraft defense
aviation can operate at altitudes vhich
m^ke it possible to <^estroy any aircraft
and winged rockets. "^^
A similar capability x^as claimed by another article which
stressed "antiaircraft missiles and fighter planes** as the
major equipm.ent of the Air Defense Forces i
The military endeavour of the Soviet state
is also aimed at building up the country's
defence against possible nuclear attacks
by aggressors. It is tor this purpose
that the Air Defense Forces; have been de-
veloped. They are equipped with modern
antiaircraft missiles and fighter planes.
The ui.c}\ stctndard of technical equipment
cf the air defeiise units ensures their
ability to cope with the tack of protecting
47. Marshal A. A. Grechko, 'Born Under Fire," riovetskiy Voin
(Soviet Soldier), February 1968, p. 4,
48. "The Mighty Guard of the Gains of Socialism, •• unsigned





the country from nuclear attacks.
The v5.ewpoint of those who advocated continuing efforts
to re-establish United States strategic superiority vas
expre-f^sed by Senator Strom Thurmond on 26 February. He called
for less candor in describing United States strategic capabil-
ities to deprive potential adversaries of intelligence infor-
laation, a program of increased strategic offensive forces to
approach or attain a credible first strike capability, and
expansion of antimissile defenses to reduce damage and cas-
ualties in a possible nuclear exchange with the vSoviet Union.
Ke also delivered a general attack on the civilian "amateurs"
in the Defense Department and advocated greater influence
for the military and Congressional •'professionals.'* He made
it clear that he considered that "the Soviet danger is the
main threat."
The announcement of the rep] aceioent of Secretary McKam-
ara by Clark Clifford on 20 February provided an interesting
insight into Soviet concerns about United States antimissile
defense policy. It was reported that Soviet diplomats were
primarily concerned over the answer to one questions "v,^at
does this mean regarding ABM?*'^^ While the Soviet press did
49. Colonel General N. A. Loniov, "On Guard over Peace,"
Meztidunaroanaia zhizn* (International Affairs), August
1967'," p. 12.
50. Strom Thurmond, "The Realities of Military Preparedness,"
yita 1_ Speeche s , 1 April 1968, p. 357.
^•^» The Kew York Times, 25 February 1968, p. 46.
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not address the queBtion and Secretary Clifford avoided the
Bubject during the early roonths of his relatively brief ten-
ure » it seems likely that Soviet uncertainty over the depth
of opposition to Secretary MciTamara's methods and strategic
conceptions and what influence it would have on antimissile
defense deplow»ent decisions was acute during this period
and complicated the internal Soviet debate on this issue.
An important article on antimissile defense appeared in
the March 196S issue of Scientific American. Its authors,
physicists Richard L. Garwin and Hans A. Bethe^ carried Sec-
retary McNamara*s pessimism concerning antimissile defense
capabilities farther by arguing that the proposed Sentinel
system would have little ultimate effect in restraining the
Chinese from attacking the United States. They pointed out
that the sam^e assured destruction forces whicVi deterred the
Soviet Union were adequate to deter China, Their chief fear
was that the Sentinel system would "nourish the illusion that
an effective defense against ballistic m.issiles is possible
and will lead almost inevitably to demands that the light
system ... be expanded, ••" Seconding secretary McKamara*s
argument that penetrability, not costs, was the key issue,
they stated that the Chinese could also devise penetration
aids adequate to assure their ability to penetrate the Senti-
nel system. Importantly, Garwin and Bethe disagreed with
52, Richard L. Garv^in and Hans A, Bethe, "Anti -Ballistic




Depcirtinent of Defense statements on the roissioi\ of raultlpla
independently-targeted reentry vehicles (MIRV): "MTRV is not
a penetration aid, but is rather ^ counterforcs weapon? if
each of th^^ reentry vehicles has very high accurpcy, tlir^n it
is conceivable that each of them .may destroy an eneny missile
53
silo," They did not elaborate on this point. Other than
the MIRV statement above, the artic3e contained little that
was new at the time of its publication, it was an important
article because it provided a frame of reference for antimis-
sile defense opponents both within the United states and the
54Soviet Union.
Internal opposit.'on to thv. deployment of the sentinel
system became more apparent in April. Whereas individuals
and small group?; had previously opposed the depiovmenty the
opposition in the United States becsine better organized
during this period. The Senate co-opted Secretary McNamara '
s
former role. V7hile it was unsuccessful in stopping the de-
ployment, the Senate became the focal point for the efforts
of antimissile defense opponents. In its first attempt to
remove $342,7 million in appropriations for Sentinel system
deployment from the Fiscal Year 19C9 Defense ."^.ppropriations
55
Bill, the Senate opposition was defeated by a vote of 41-17.
53, Garwin and Bethe, "Anti-Ballii^tic Missile Systems,
Scientific American, March 196G, p. 25.
54. See below, pp. 161-184,
^^« The vJashington Post, 19 April 1S6G, p. Al,
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Soviet fears that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
would seek to deploy antindssile defenses were redv;.ced when
its Nuclear planning Group rejected a plan for European de~
56
fenses, barring a major technological advance. The Federa-
tion of American Scientists went on record as favoring a halt
in all nuclear weapon tests and suspension of the Sentinel
57deployment on 25 April. The senate opposition gathered
strength during May and June. On 19 June, Defense Secretary
Clifford "broke his previous silence on the issue in a letter
to Senator Richard Russell, Chairman of the Senate Armed
Services Committee. He stated that postponement of the Sen-
tinel deployment would be a "serious mistake" and that fail-
ure to appropriate the funds requested would set the program
53back at least two years. Secretary Clifford's insistence
on the necessity for the Sentinel system was notably harder
than Secretary Mct;amara's had been, but he emphasized that
he did not consider an anti-Soviet system to be feasible.
Influential editorial comrrventary during this period urged
movement toward arms control rather than Sentinel deployn\ent.
Perhaps the strongest such editorial appeared in the 23 June
59issue of The New York Times as a crucial vote on Sentinel
^"^^ The Mew York Times, news article by Robert C. Doty, 20
April 1968, p« 1.
^"7- The^J£ew_York__Times, 26 April 1968, p. 87.
^^* ybe New York Times, nev;s article by John Finney, 20 June
1968, p. 1.
^^* The New York Times
,
23 June 1968, p. 46.
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approachedo It pointed out that the apparent slippages in
the Chinese olfensive missile development program could be
paralleled by slippages in sentinel deployment if the anti-
China rationale was sound. The editorial further argued
that in light of the recent breakthrough on the t^uclear Non-
proliferation Treaty, a delay by the United States would
stimulate the soviet Union to begin negotiations on limita-
tion of strategic arms.
The United States internal debate was temporarily re-
solved on 24 June v;hen the Senate rejected a motion to elim-
inate funding for sentinel deployment from, the Military
fin
Construction Bill by a vote of 52-34. Senator Russell
stated that he had "no doubt that this is the first block"
in an anti-Soviet system.
Indirectly-associated developments in arms control in
the month of June renewed United States optimism. In an
obvious appeal to Premier Kosygin and the Soviet leadership,
President Johnson returned to Glassboro State Teachers Col-
lege in New Jersey to deliver the Comn\encement address. His
speech contained a broad appeal for disarmament talks without
a specific reference to strategic weapons or antimissile sys-
61
terns. In a subsequent address to the United Nations Gen-
eral Asse^nbly, which followed a breakthrough in negotiations
^°' The Washington Post , 25 June 1968, p. Al.
61. Lyndon B. Johnson^ ''Comniencement Address at Glassboro
State Teachers College; 4 June 1968, • Vital Speeches
,
1 July 1968, p. 481.
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concernirq the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on 12 June,
president Johnson appealed to the soviet Union for an early
initiation of strateqic arms limitation talks?
We desire - yes, we urgently desire - to
begin early discussions on the limitation
of strategic offensive and defensive -wea-
pons systems. Vve shall search for an
agreeiTient that will not only avoid another
costly and futile escalation cf,the arms
I ace, but will de-escalate it*^"^
He repeated his appeal at a White House ceremony the follow-
ing day where he signed a consular treaty v.'ith the Soviet
63Union.
References in the soviet press to antimissile defenses
were absent during the spring of 1968. No assertions of Sov-
iet defensive capabilities v;ere made. An otherv/ise authori-
tative survey of United states defense programs was published
in April. It failed to mention the Sentinel program. In-
stead, it focused on iirprovements in offensive forces, includ-
ing improvement of penetration aids. These developments were
reviewed in a somev;hat polemical fashion and policy advocacy
was avoided.
In June, a direct statement linking President Johnson
witVi the war in Vietnam appeared in Izvestia . The article
^2. The Few York Time s , 13 June 1963, p« 18.
^^' Tlie Washington Fost^ 14 June 1968, p. Al.
64. Major General v, Zomskov, "The Escalation of Mili-
tarism," Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star ) » 18 April 1968,
p. 3,

asserted that it was not possible to discuss international
questions \vitli the united stcates as lonq as its involvement
6S
in Vietnam continued. Thas viewpoint was disputed one V7eek
later by an JLsi^^AS. «^clitorial, T.t cited General Aseerobly
approval of the Nuclear ision-proliferation Treaty as evidence
that ^it is quite possible to settle other disputed inter-
national questions." The soviet Union was seen to be occu-
pying the political center, v;ith the Chinese on the left and
the United States on the right* Finally, the editorial hint-
ed at moveraent on arms control by lauding Article VI of the
proposed t;uclear Mon-Proliferaticn Treaty: "It is the first
time that an international treaty has made i t binding on its
parties to press for realistic measures to achieve disarma-
ment." This period was clearly one of sharpened debate on
overall soviet foreign policy, particularly with regard to
soviet-American relations and tViCir related arms control con-
siderations. In a speech to the Supreme Soviet on 2 7 June
v;hich was attended by the m.erabers of the Politburo, For€>ign
Minister Andrei Gromyko reviewed overall Soviet foreign pol-
icy. Near the conclusion of his address, he announced Soviet
readiness to enter into arms limitation discussions with the
United States:
^^»
.?^Yil§.hAil» r.ews comirentary by stanislav Kondrashcv, 13
June 1968, p. 1.




One' of the unexplored regions of disarma-
ment is the search for an understanding on
mutual restriction and subsequent reduction
of strategic vehicles for the delivery of
nuclear v.'eapons - offensive and defensive -
including antimissiles. The Soviet Govern-
ment is ready for an exchange of opinion
on this subject.^^
Having made this announcement, he provided a thinly-disguised
indication that an intense factional debate had arisen over
this decision and that it had not been fully resolv^ed:
V7e say to the good-for-nothing theoreticians
who try to reproach u,o and all supporters of
disarmament that disarmament is an illusion -
you are marching in step v;ith the most die-
hard forces of imperialist reaction and are
thereby weakening the front of the struggle
against it.^°
There is little doubt that the "good-for-nothing theoreti-
cians** Gromyko was referring to were Soviets, or possibly
Chinese, Had he chosen to do so, there were abundant West-
ern statements v.'hich could have been referred to which would
have demonstrated that disarmament would continue to be a
difficult problem to resolve.
It is possible to construct a highly speculative scen-
ario which could explain Soviet actions on antimissile de-
fense systems in the first half of 196&. Foreign Minister
Gromyko's specific reference to antimissile defenses in his
Supreme Soviet address seems to indicate that this issue was







the key initial arms control question that they so'jght to
resolve with the United States. The absence of strong asser-
tions of soviet antimissile defense capabilities during this
period, particularly by Air Defense Forces Cor.-jr.ander General
Batitsky, seems to indicate that substantive irr.provemerits in
this capability had been postponed and that major defense
funds for strategic systems would continue to go to Marsltal
Krylov's Strategic Rocket B'orces, Subsequent depioynicnts
support this contention. Construction of antimissile defense
launchers in the sites around mobcow was suspended in early
701968 and have not been substantially resujued as of early
1972. Further, it seems likely that extensive research and
development efforts were continued on improved antimissile
defense systems. Such a course v?ould be prudent should the
negotiations fail and would also serve to dull opposition by
air defense supporters. Those supporters could have been
expected to recall the relief of former Air Defense Forces
Commander Marshal Sudets by General Batitsky which took place
in July 1966 and was presumed to have reflected to some de-
gree Marshal Sudets* strong advocacy of antimissile defense
systems. The •'lesson" they should have drax«m, if this hypo-
thesis is correct, was that there were limits to the vehe-
mence peimitted in the advocacy of one*s own bureaucratic
70, u. S., Congress, House of Representatives, Subcom-
mittee on the DepartiT'.ent of Defense of the Committee
on Aporopriatj cm, gafegurird Antiballistic Mi ssile
System, 91.st Congress", First session, Twashington,
1969), p. 57,
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interests -r General Hatitsky was prcinioted to Karshal and v.^as
71
made a Hero of the Soviet Union on 15 April 1968, Although
it is not possible tc determine whether these honors v/ere
based on his adherence to directives from above, they pre-
sumably v7ould not have been accorded him if General Batitsky
had opposed those directives. E'inally, the absence of Soviet
statements degrading the military capabilities of antimissile
defense systems and frequent references to the costs of the
United States system seems to indicate that the real issue
was how to allocate limited defense funds. Having made the
decision to probe United States intentions through negotia-
tions, conclusion of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty
and its Article VI provided a rationale for negotiating which
vjould not give the appearance of capitulation to united states
pressure or collusion. The timing of Foreign Minister Gro-
myko's speech, four days after a key senate vote on deploy-
ment of the Sentinel system, has been cited by United States
72
officials as a response to American resolve. With Presi-
dent Johnson's 31 March announcement that he would not seek
a second term. Secretary McNamara's replacement in February,
and the formation of a substantial opposition to antimissile
defense system deployment in the senate in the late spring,
the Sovl^.t leadershio*s concern over what direction United
'^^' TasB International Service in English, 2209 GMT, 15
April 1963.
*^^* Th^. Nev^ York Times, 15 July 1968, p. 3.
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States policy would take v;as probably increased. While the
Senate vote may have provj ded a catalyst which broke an inter-
nal Soviet deadlock, the gravity of this issue certainly
required a longer period of deliberation than four days.
Other than guarded favorable coraments by White House
Press Secretary George Christian, no official public response
by the Johnson Administration to Foreign Minister Grariyko's
Supreme Soviet speech was made. On 30 June, President John-
son broke this silence in a speech delivered at a dam dedica-
tion in btashville, Tennessee, After praising the successful
conclusion of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, he turned
to possible arms limitation negotiations without specifically
mentioning the offer made by Foreign Minister Gro-nyko, How-
ever, on the! next day at a ceremony V7here he signed the Nuc-
lear Non-proliferation Treaty, the President made the follow-
ing announcement:
Agreement has been reached betv^een the Gov-
ernments of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics and the united States to enter in
the nearest future into discussions of the
limitation and reduction of both offensive
strategic nuclear delivery systems and sys-
tems of defense against ballistic missiles.''^
A simultaneous announcement was made in the Soviet Union. Its
English text differed slightly:
^^* The New York Times, 1 July 1968, p. 1.
"^^^ The Washington Post
. 2 July 1968, p, Al.

An understanding has been reached beti^^een
the GoveriiiTiGnts of the USSR and the United
States to open early tc?.lks on a comprehen-
sive limitation and restriction both of
cynteius of delivering strategic offensive
nuclear weapons and antiballistic missile
defense systems, it is officially reported
here.^^
The differences were not significant. President johnson com-
mented that this development was in the spirit of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty, that the United states had no illu-
sions about the difficulty of achieving success at the talks,
and that the negotiations would probably be lengthy.
Soviet statements in early July echoed these American
evaluations. kn Izvestia article published on 3 July stress-
ed the connection with the signing of the Nuclear Non-Iroiif-
eration Treaty and reported a favorable world response to the
announcemei^it. ^ On 8 July, General secretary Brezhnev addres-
sed recent military academy graduates. He supported efforts
in arms control, but warned of continued Western hostility to
77the Soviet Union.
In a message to the. delegates of the Eighteen Nation
•Disarmament Conference in Geneva on 18 July, President John-
son linked future reductions in conventional arms to success
^^* Tass International Service xn English, 1530 Gf<'T, 1 July
1968.
76. Vikenty Matveyev, "Let Us Advance Further," Izvestia , 3
July 1968, p. 3,
77. Speech by Leonid I, Brezhnev, "Loyalty to the Homeland,




in '-headingoff a ctrategic arms race*** He stated that a date
for the couxmencement of bilateral United States-Soviet talks
on strategic arras limitation would be set * shortly," ^ His
desire to maintain the arms control momenturti generated by the
signing of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty was apparent.
h rare insight into the nature of the thinking of a seg-
ment of the internal Soviet opposition to the deployment of
antimissile defense systems was provided by the publication
of an essay allegedly v;ritten by Soviet physicist Andrei D.
79Sakharov. "^ This ess-ay, probably v/ritten in June; report-
edly had been circulated hand-to-hand among the Soviet scien-
tific opposition without official sanction, sakharov dis-
cussed three aspects of nuclear p?»ril; simple destructive
power, t?ie cheapness of warheads, and "the practical impos-
sibility cf preventing a massive rocket attack." Ke cited
"^^^ Scientific American article written by Richard Garwin
and Kans bethc as being representati'^'e of t>ie opinion of
'"specialists.** He described his assessment of the factors
v;hich assured the continued supremacy of offensive forces
t
Improvements in the resistance of warheads
to shock waves and to the radiation effects
of neutron and >:-ray exposure, the prob-
ability of the mass use of relatively light
and inexpensive decoys that are virtually
indistinguishable from warheads and exhaust
"^^^ Department of State ..Bul_letin , 5 August 1968, p. 137,
^^* T^iG Nev^ ^-^Q^^'j-'^j^gs^ news article by Theodore shabad,
22 July 1968, p, 16. Full text of the essay printed
on p. 14.

the capabilities of an antimiissile defense
system, the perfection of the tactics of
massed and concentrated attacks in time
and space that overstrain the defense de-
tection centers, the use of orbital and
fractional-orbital attacks, the use of
active and passive jamrriing and ether meth-
ods not disclosed in the press - all this
has created technical and economic obstacles
to an effective missile defense that, at the
present tirae^ are virtually insurmountably.'^'-^
While the above analysis was held to be true for nations of
similar economic development, antimissile defense systems
and a first strike strategy might be employed by major nuc-
lear powers against vastly weaker states. Although he has-
tened to point out that this situation did not exist for the
United States and the Soviet Union v;hen confronting each
other, it is possible that he was attempting to address a
rationale for an anti-China system
j
An exception to this would be the case of
a great technical and ecoiio.nic difference
in the potentials of the two enemies. In
such a case, the stronger side, creating
an antimissile defense system with a mul-
tiple reserve, would face the temptation
of ending the dangerous and unstable bal-
ance, once and for all by embarking on a
pre-emptive adventure, expending part of
its attack potential on destruction of
most of the enemy's launching bases and
counting on impunity for the last stage
of escalation, i.e., the destruction of
the cities and industry of the enemy.
Fortunately for the stability of the world,
the difference between the technological-
economic potentials of the Soviet union
and the United states is not so great that
®^« The New York Times, 22 July 1968, p» 14.
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one of the sidas: could undertake a 'pre-
ventive aggression^ without the almost
inevitable risk of a cestructivfi retal-
iatory blow. This situation would not be
changed by a broadening of the arms race
through the development of antimissile
defenses «^^
The use of the pejorative words "adventure*' and "preventive
aggression" indicate that he probably did not favor such a
rationale. His argument that development of antimissile
defense cystems was futile was reminiscent of Secretary
McNainara and his analysis* Finally, he advocated a morator-
ium on construction of antimissile defense installations a.s
a eyiTibolic and practical response to the situation:
In the opinion of many people, an opinion
shared by the author, a diplomatic formu-
lation of this mutually coroprehended sit-
uation, for example, in the form of a
moratorium on the construction of systems
of antim.issile defense, v/ould be a useful
deiHoni-tration of a desire of the Soviet
Union and the United States to preserve
the status quo and not to widen the arms
race for senselessly expensive antimissile
systems. It would be a demonstration of a
desire to cooperate, not to fight. ^^
Significantly, sakharov did not tie his antimissile defense
system construction mvoratorium to limitation of other stra-
tegic arms. The tenor of his essay indicated that he did not
consider that offensive force deployments seriously thred.c-
ened the status quo. His sentiments were generally well




received in the United States,
Statements by Soviet military leaders on antimissile
defense were infrequent in the summer of 196S. In a radio
interview on 25 July which reported the conduct of "Exercise
Sky Shield,** Marshal Batitsky continued his previous adher-
ence to vague generalities v;hen he stated that Soviet Air
Defense Forces **have learned to make use of the miost modern
fighting means and are destroying the enemy at all altitudes
83
and in all maneuvering conditions.*'
As the United States Presidential race sharpened with
the approach of the national political party conventions, the
leading Democratic Party candidates spoke out on antimissile
defense systems* Vice President Hubert H. Huniphrey doubted
the wisdom of deployment, referring to *'nuclear defense that
84
would not defend anyone*" Senator Eugene McCarthy proposed
a halt in Sentinel construction pending the conclusion of a
'•speedy agreement" on a mutual deploimient moratorium during
which further arms limitation negotiations would continue.
This proposal was strongly endorsed by the editorial board
85
of The New York Times .
The announcement of the scheduling of the first flight
tests of the Poseidon and Minuteman III missiles for mid-
August attracted the bulk of press analysis and editorial
^^* Tass Domestic Service in Russian, 1600 GMT, 25 July 1968.
^^' The Wa sh i ng ton_ Post . 31 July 1968, p. A5.
^^* The New York Times
, 31 July 1968, p. 46.
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cciTjnent during the first two v/eekc in August. Most commen-
tary advocated test postponeraent pending initial discussions
on arms limitation, pointing out that once multiple indepen-
dently-targeted reentry vehicles had been tested they would
be particularly difficult to control through agreement due
to tlje inspection and verification problem. These protests
were not heeded and the tests were conducted on 16 August,
This dual test was a deinonstration to t)ie Soviet Union of
United States determination tc maintain the superiority of
offensive v^eapons in an antindssile defense environment. The
timing of the tests was obviously intended to press home the
point. Department of Defense spokemen declined to comment,
but press analysts indicated that the tests had been success-
86ful. The conduct of these tests was not mentioned in the
Soviet press,
Soviet and V7arsaw pact forces invaded Czechoslovakia on
20 August, While limited editorial commentary during the
months of tension which preceded the invasion linked arms
87limitation progress to Soviet restraint in Csiechoslovakia,
the United States Government failed to make a direct linkage
openly. Initial press reports indicated that the Johnson
Administration held to a view that strategic arms limitation
discussions should be pursued and that the Soviet union might
^^^' The Washington Post , 17 August 1968, p. Al,
67, Typical was an editorial by James Reston in The Kev; York
Times, 24 July 1968, p. 40.
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feel coiripellecl to rr?ovf^. faste^^ on these negotiations to coro.-
pensate for adverse world reaction to the invasion* Svibse"
quent events revealed tho v^ishful thinking inherent !« B-uch
an analysis. Wiitc House Press Secretary George Christian
announced that tht-i-e v^^as * no change." in the Administration's
G&
desire to negotiate. During this period, rumors that an
accord on a date for the commencement of Ltrategic arms lim-
itation talks had been reached just prior to the invasion
circulated In V^ashinnton, Subsequent information from John
P. Roche of the White House staff revealed that a suiamit
meeting between President Johnson and Premier Kosygin to dis-
cuss strategic arms limitation, the Middle East situation^
and Vietnarr. was scheduled to have been announced on 21 Aug-
89
ust. The circuiTiStances of the cancellation of this announ-
cement have not been further clarified. While most editor-
ial commentary during this period advocated moving ahead with
negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms, a majority
of Congressional opinion seenied to have favored an increase
in United states spending for strategic weapons, Johnson
Administration officials were silent on the negotiation issue
until 5 September when Secretary of Defense Clifford spoke
to the National Press Club. Although he did not completely
rule out the possibility of negotiations » he strongly stated
^^* The New York Times, news article by Max Frankel, 22
August 1968, p. 1.
^^* '^'^G New York Times, news article by k. s. Handler, 24
September 1968, p. 5,
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that recent events had strengthened his •'intention to seek
diligently to preserve our margin of advantage" in strategic
weapons. president Johnson held a press conference the
next day. In response to a question about progress on dis-
armament talks he stated, *'The developments of the past few
91days haven't advanced the possibility of those talks." The
attitude of the Johnson Administration during the month which
followed the invasion of Czechoslovakia seems to have been
one of signalling a slight qualitative change in the united
States' desire to begin negotiations* In retrospect, election
year domestic politics probably played a major role in this
shift. No direct attempt was made to link the slight revi-
sion in policy to the events in Czechoslovakia, but such a
cause was intimated.
Two major Soviet addresses in October and November re-
peated the readiness of the Soviet Union to begin discussions
on the limitation of strategic arms. On 3 October, Foreign
Minister Gromyko spoke to the united Nations General Assem-
bly. He lauded general and complete disarmament and the suc-
cessful conclusion of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty,
Among other Soviet proposals for additional action in the
disarmament area, he referred to the limitation of strategic
arms t
90, The New York Times, 6 September 1968, p. 2.
91. The Washington Post, 7 September 1968, p. Al.
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The So'^iet Go,'ernn^'i;Dt prooooes B.r\ agrcrTrient
on concrete steps in the field of the .liui-
iteticij and subsequent reduction of. strate-
gic nuclear weapon delivery vehicles „ The
Gene re. 1 Asj?errbXy is, of course, awaie t?.u-\t
acreenicnt has been reached betvreen th«
Governments of the USSR and the USA on
limitation and subseq'jent reduction of
strateqic nuclear weapon delivery vehicles,
both cCfensive end defensive, including
antimifsilor. , The soviet Governsaant is
prepared to start a serious oxcliange of
vi ev s on thi s ma tter * ^
2
The phrases us-isd were identical to his June Supre'.ne Soviet
address* Althovjgh the major Soviet nevfrpapers carried full
93
accounts of this? address, Kra sna ya_ 2v£%da , the mi 1 1 ter y
organ, omitted Foreign Minister GrovnyKo's reference to stra-
tegic ar.T.s limitation. It reported his other proposals
related to arms control and disarrnamente ' ^
On 6 Kovember, the eve of the 51st Anniversary of the
Bolshevik Revolution, Kiril T* Mazurov delivered, the tradi-
tional address on behalf of the Politburo. In hie revievr
of the events of the past year, he discussed tlie question of
liniiting strateaic weaoons and their dc » iverv rvstemsj
It is relevant to recall in this connec-
tion that we h3.ve expressed readiness to
conduct negotiations with the UrJ.ted States
on the entire range of these problems* Ex:!t
their positive solution doss not depend on
^2. F^I3:£5^£? -'^ October 196B, v, 4.
^^* F.£^'i5H» '^ Ocjtober 1968, p. 4 and ijiwstia, 5 October
1963, p. 4.




the Soviet Union alone
o
This reference was omitted from soviet press remarks concern-
96ing this address, h similar omission was made in Soviet
press coverage of remarks made by Soviet Ambassador lakov
97
Kali): at the united Nations on 13 November. Clearly, a
split had developed V7ithin the Soviet leadership over the
desirability of strategic arms limitation negotiations at
this time.
As the united states Presidential election finally devel-
oped into a contest between Hubert Humphrey, Richard Nixon,
and George Wallace, it is useful to examine the probable Sov-
iet perception of their positions en antiraisLile defenses*
Vice President Humphrey opposed United States deplo;i'Tnent.
Nixon hac*. issued a carefully worded statement supporting
deployment in September 1967 and had remained silent on t'Mis
specific issue while advocating increased united States stra-
tegic force strength in the ensuing months. Cn 25 September,
Governor Wallace announced that he favored antimissile defense
98
system deployment.'' In early September, Vice President Hum-
phrey and Richard bjixon became involved in a minor disagree-
ment when Nixon advocated postponement of Senate ratification
^^» The New York Times, 7 November 1968, p. i.
^^» Pravda and Izvestia, 7 November 196S, p. 1,
^"^* Pravda, 14 November 1968, p. 5.
^^* IiI^^?IlJ[2£lLJli!i}£l» 26 September 196S, p. 53.
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of thfs Nuclear Non-Prolitercxtion Treaty until aft-3r th-: I'lov"
ember elections. On & October, Tl}£,.^^<r^J^riii5„.TAi"^;5. «^ndorsed
Vice president. Ktcnphrey for the Fresidencyr largely on the
basis of ills apparent corrj-aiteient to arms coritrol. On 24
Cctcbei , Kixon made a strong speech attacking the acceptance
of strategic parity with the Soviet Union. Faced %.'ith a hos-
tile reaction to this position, he moved to g lersn contro-
versial statement that he favored "meoningful armn control
agreements wit.h our adversaries"-'^ on ?6 October. Presup-
posing that the Soviet leadership sincerely desired to nego-
tiate on strategic armS: lindtatioii, tliey ;vO'j.ld have ranked
the Presidential candidates in a Huii'>phrey-Nixon-Wailace
order* On the strength of their p»>bj ic stcite'r.ents, it would
have been reasonable for the Soviets to have concluded that,
compared to President Johnson's position, Vice President riuta-
phrey v/ould Viave been more willing to negotiate, with Kixon
Ctnd Wallace lese so. In any event, it made little i;erse for
the Soviet Union to conduct serious negotiations on substan-
tive issues with the Johnson Adiainistration. The interim
period untiJ. a new President was to take office provided the
Soviets v;ith an opportunity to £ittempt to divert attention
from their actions in Czech.oslovakia by picturing United
States intransigence as threatening to cause a new arms race,
Although a fev such statements were made, they repeated pre-
viously-used phrases and avoided oolemical overtones.
99
* !iM.J:^.§lilM!:'2iL.Z2£:^» 27 October 1968, pc A2.
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In Gtaten7,ents vJhich were issued in conOTeraoratiorj of
Strateqic Rockciit Forces Day on 19 I?cv5iaber, the relative Sov-
iet silence on antimissiie defenses was moderated. In a vir-
tual repetitiori of the pattern established tho preceding
year, stress viSi'. placed on the invulnerability of Soviet
offensive missiles* Marshal Krylov*G statement set the tone
j
"The great speed; the complete ciutomatic control over the
flight of the missiles, and some otljer properties of the wea-
pons make theia practiced ly invulnerable to exxj^ting systems
of enemy missile defense*" The inclusion of "Lome other
properties of the weaponG** in this previously employed form-
ulation probably was intended to infer a penetration aids
capability. General shevtsov asserted complete invulnerabil-
ity,' An unsigned article in 5oyet s 'ciy Patr iot referred
to antimissile defense
c
In connection with the rapid development of
nuclear-rocket technology, the combat power
of the we^apons of air warfare "nas increased
considerably. Therefore, the Communist
Party and the sovj et Government manifest
constant concern for the anti-aircraft and
anti-rocket defense of the country. A main
component cf our PVO forces is now the anti-
rocket troopB, which in cooperation with
100, Marshal K . I, K^rylov, interview in pravda, 19 November
1968, Oo 2. This statement '.-.'as repeated by Ta_ss__Inter-
national Service in Enqlirihj, 2300 GMT, .IB November
19 6 8. and Tass pome;:;tic Service inRusfiian, 1530 GMT, 18
November 1968,
101 « Colonel General A. Ghevtr.ov^ 'The Homeland's Mighty
Shield," VC'yen;iye Znaniya {.Military Krio^'ledge) , 19
NovemJoer 1963, p„ 7,

other branches of the. anti-aircraft defense
force, reliably defend the Soviet skies from
all methods of air attack by an aggressor
»
Our anti-airciiaf t rockets can v/ith great
accuracy destroy all types of modern flying
apparatuses at all altitudes and speeder. ^C/2
The assertion of the impenetrability of Soviet defenses was
the first since Marshal Chuikov's statement on 15 June 1967,
During a visit to Moscow, forraer Defence secretary Robert
McKamara had a Kremlin interview with Premier Kosygin on 12
November* United States Embassy spokesmen stated that the
Soviet Government had requested the meeting. After he met
v;ith Premier Kosygin, KcKamara in^^isted tliat "no messages had
been passed'* and had "no comjTient" on whether antimissile de-
104
fense systems had been discussed. One v/eek later, Senator
Albert Gore met with Premier Kosygin, He stated that he had
told Premier Kosygin that arms limitation negotiations would
be difficult to initiate until the Soviet occupation of Czech-
oslovakia was terminated.
On 13 November, the Department of Defense announced that
it was conducting surveys in Montaoa and KorcVi Dakota near
105
two Minuteman bases for possible antimissile defense sites.
This action signalled to the Soviets tliat the United States
was considering v^n expansion of tlie mission of the Sentinel
102, Unsigned article in Sovetskiy ratriot (Soviet Patriot),
17 November 1968, p. 1,
103. See above, pp. 125-126,
^^^' .The VJg
E
hing ton_Post . 13 November 1968, p. Ai .




h probcihle ins?lght into t'ne thinking of the Soviet mil-
itary with respect to antimissile defense systems was pro-
vided in December, An article Dy Lieutenant Colonel V. Bon-
darenko pointed out that the "rniiitDry-technical revolution"
continued to offer possibilities for attaining railitary super-
iority. He bluntly asserted that "political organizations
and their leader^:'' r.\ight '*fail to use the emerging possibili-
ties'* of this revolution.-^ VJhether he was "used" by raore
senior military leaders or by a faction in the Soviet civilian
leadership was uncertain, but the message was clear. Seen in
conjunction with editing of political speech coverage in Kras-
naya Zvezda during the fail, it seeras clear that t?ie dominant
faction within the lailitary opposed strategic arms limitation
discussions at this time but was apparently vinabie to convince
the civilian leadership of the v;isdom of their course of action.
The fact that they were allowed to behave as they did indicates
that the consensus which opposed their recommendation? vras not
particularly secure,
V\^ith respect to Soviet force structure and allocation of
priorities for weapons systems^ Colonel Bondarer-ko emphasized
offensive missiles, which he stated were "urstoppable. " No
106. Candidate of Philosophivjal sciences Lieutenant Colonel
V. Bondarenko, '"The. Conteirporary Revolution in Military
Affairs and the Combat Reediness of the Armed Forces, ••
K2*HL^i£ii^_J££9Xy^C}iri^ (Con\munist of the Armed
Forces), 15 December 1968 fno. 24), p» 23,
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mention Vv'as m-ide of Soviet antimissile defense capabilities.
Costs of antimissile defenses were regarded as crucial t
,. .according to preliminary calculations,
the coBt of a liTaited anti-ballistic mis-
sile system, the development of which has
been initiated by the USAj will constitute
4-5 billion dollars, and a complete anti-
ballistic riisslle defense Byste:ri will cost
up to 40 billion dollars. ^^'^
The context of thir> scatenient indicated that ColoneJ Bond-
arenko was referring to anti'iiissile defense systems in gen--
eral» not specifically the united States system, Hov.'ever^
the cost figures quoted were those frequently St-'socirted
with tlK-j Sentinel systera in the Western press*
During the remainder of the Johnson Adiuinlstration, j.
t
was persistently rumored that President Johnson sought to
initiate strategic arms lir.iitation talks before leaving office
on 20 January 1969. In early December, Defense secretary
Clifford spoke of the readiness of the united states to con-
duct negotiations. President-elect Nixon declined Adminis-
tration overtures to become involved in the£;e discussions,
preferring to withhold judyraent until he had officicilly
asi>umed the Presidency, La.ter in the month, lie directed his
newly established staff headed by Henry Kissinger to initiate
ii complete study of United States defense capcibilities and
107, Colonel Bondarenko, "The Conteinporary Revolution in
Military Affairs and the Combat Readiness of the Armed
Forces," KomiTajnist yooruzl-ennykh 511 (Coirjr,uni st of the




requirements. This directive v;as interpr«ted as indicating
that the new Adminictration vj-ould not be ready for serious
discussions with the soviet Union at least until the late
spring of 1969* This viev,' V7as supported at a 13 January nevjs
conference by Secretary of Defense-designate Melvin Laird
when he stated that the Nixon Administration should be wary
of arms limits; tion discuKr,ions until it v;.?s properly prepared
and the prospects for success were high.^"
A Soviet article wViich appeared in early January 1969
attempted to discredit the officially unspoken United States
linkage of the Soviet invasion of Chechoslovakia v^ith the
delay in initiating strategic arms limitation negotiations,
an aliegacion which had been edited from the published ver-
sion cf Nazurov's speech of 6 Koverriber 1968. Opposition to
world opinion was invoked at this times
Ther€i was a strong response in many countries
of the world to the agreement reached by the
USSR and the \jSh on starting bilaterc.l talks
shor-tly for limiting and subsequently reduc-
ing strategic nucleai. delivery vehicles. A
sharp polemic developed over the issue in
U. S. ruling circles. Influential American
circles have "been blocking the start of the
negotiations, using the C2.echoslovak events
as a pretext, d.nd on thB grounds that such
negotiations would alarm ,?Unerica*s allies.
Those v7ho favor negotizitions argue, for their
part, that the creation of new weapons sys-
tems would entail vast expenditures for the
USA, something like ^.60, 000-100, 000 million
over a period cf stverc-.l years. They insist
^^®* 1}}.9^liJ^^.J^PSK SlPJI^ ' ^^''-v^s article by William Beecher, 14
January 1969, p, 1.
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on an ii^uTiedicite implerr=;rjtatior: of negotia-
tions. ^'^'^
VThile specific reference to artiinissile defence syEtGi.io was
renoveo from the formulation \^'hich beGQ'i this statement , the
cost arcaiiTteint reflected eiirlier Soviet interpretations of
i^imerican considerations ^ The dialectical .interpretation of
the United States domestic debate created the possibility
of having forcec suitable for the soviet Union to appeal to
vvithout cacrificing their "progressive approach" to the pro-
spective discussions.
Anot>ier Soviet statement linked progress on strat'icic
amis limitation negotiations to further developraents in the
disarmament field. On 20 January, L, M, zamytin, heari of
the press department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
held a nev.-s conference. In a general survey of the overall
disarmament agenda he also invoked world opinions
The General Assembly welcomed the agree~
inent reached by the U.S.S.R. and the u,S,
Governments in 196S to corrumence talks on
reciprocal limitation cind subsequent re-
duction of strategic means of delivery of
nuclear weapons, including defense sycteirs,
For its part, the Soviet Goverriment deems
it necessary to reiterate its readiness to
begin a serious exchange of views on this
important issue. In so doing, we proceed
from the premise that the steps taken to
curb the strategic arms race would be con-
sonant V7ith the interests of strengthening
international peace and security, Tnis
109. A, Alexeyev, '-'Nuclear Non-proliferation Tresty aiid
Security," N'^?^>^gunarodna ia zhj zn ' Ccrtternational
Affairs), Jtanuary 1969, p, 15.
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woul-3 also crecite n;ore favorable conclitJ.ons
for solvina other important guestionr. in
the field, of disariuarnent, •'-^^'
This stateniGnt returned to the previous formulation on the
aqreeraent tc negotir-.te, vhich specifically included antiiv^is-
sile defense systems. Its timing, v?hich coincided vith the
inaijguration of Pre*3iident l^ixon, was probably intended to
put the Soviet Union on recent record to counter ar»y pos-
sible dir>arniarnent or axra« control statements to be made in
his address. The generally propagandi t> tic tone of the stcite-
ment supported such a contention.
Defense Secretary Clifford's annual Defense Posture
Statement was published on 15 January, five days before he
v/as replaced by Helvin Laird. Although he quickly pointed
out that Soviet numerical strength had grown in calendar
year 196G, his overall ass<.issment of the quality of Soviet
strategic forces attempted to demonstrate that newly devel-
oped or deployed Soviet systems were five to ten years behind
their United states counterparts. For example, the SS~11 and
SS-13 solid-fueled intercontinewtal ballistic missiles v?ere
compared, to M j nuteman I v;hich had initially been deployed in
19G2, the ''Yankee" class nuclear-powered ballistic missile-
launching submarine to the SSBK-598 ("George vvfashington"
)
class deployed in 1950, and the Galosh antimissile defense
110. L. K, Zamytin, "Concrete and f-ositive Program^" pravda
21 January 1969, p. 1» Aii;o ciiirried by I^vesj:_ia, 21
January 1969, p. 1. and by Tass International Service
in Russian, 1115 GMT, 20 Januarv 1969.
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nystern to the Nike-Zeus vhich had 'osen ebn^.ndoneca in tha t-ariy
1111960 *s. He concluded that the proper response to tlixs
overall threat ivas to niaintain a credible ajjsured destruc-
tion capabilityi
We remain convinced, hov?ever, that irscfsr
as the Soviet threat is concerned, v;e should
continue to give first priority in t)\e allo-
cation of resources to the primary objective
of our strategic forces, narrialy, "Assured
Destruction," Until technology prcgresscs
to the point where an effective ABM defense
against the Soviet Union beconries feasible,
our major hope for iiniting damage if a
nuclear war occurs is that it can be stop-
ped short of an all-out attack on our cities.
We try to bring this about by providirig our
forces with characteristics that will permit
them to be used effectively in a limited and
controlled retaliation as well as for 'Assured
Destruction, ' thereby being prepared for any
type of soviet attack.-^^^
V7ith respect to Soviet intentions for antimissile de-
fense, he asserted that the Galosh system around Moscow could
be penetrated by existing United states offensive missiles.
Hov/ever, in the absence of a workable agreement with the Sov-
iet union on the limitation of antimissile defense systems.
Secretary Clifford pointed out that the United States would
have to continue to plan its strategic offensive forces "on
the assumption thr^t they will have deployed some sort of an
111. Clark Clifford, Fiscal Year 1970-74 Defense Program
and Fi scal Year 1970 Defense Bad_qet» Department of
Defense monograph, 15 January 1963, p, 46,
^^^" Ibid
, , p. 48,
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A:bm system arouncl »:heir cities: by the mici-i97D* 3, "-'--^" This
statement reflected a slower estiniate of the pace of >SGviot
deployments. One year earJier, former Defense Secretary
Mclxlainara had stated that such planning was to be based upon
the aSv=5UK)ption that Soviet city defenses v^oald be in plscs
by "the early 1970' s.** Secretary Clifford repeated Sec-
retary HcNamara's contention that the proper response to
expanded Soviet antimissile clefenses involvea United States
offensive forces?
In addition to the actions alreaily tciken,
we have a nuinber of other available optioTis.
We can increase from 40 to 60 per cent the
proportion of bombers held on 15 .ninucf:
ground alert; expand the present Sentinel
system to include tlie defense of our Kinu'ce-
man sites; accelerate the deployraent of
Kinuteman III; load the Poseidon v;ith more
warheads than presently planned (or add pen-
etration aids).; and construct new ballistic
missile submarines. If the emerging threc).t
requires, we can accelerate development of
a new, larger land-based or sea-based missile,
a. new manned bomber (AT-iSA), or all three. --'^
Ke hastened to add that these steps were not urgently required
and could be taken as the threat emerged, keeping in mind the
various leadtiines involved.
In addition to the anti-China rationale previously estab-
lished for the Sentinel antimissile defense system. Secretary
113. Clifford, 1970-74 Defense Program., p» 44*
114. See above, d. 161,
115. Clifford, 1970-74 Defense Program, p, 51.
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Clifford provided a partial endorseruent of the "'i>ui3.d:;.r.g--
blocK'" rationale and defense against accidental attack;
The Sentinel system vculd also have oUier
advant'7i.geso It would serve as a foo.ndaticn
to which we could add defense for our Min-
uteman and boiDher forces if that later be-
comes desirable. Or, if technology pro-
gresses to a point where the deployment of
an ABM defense eigainst the Soviet Union
becoif.es feasible, it could serve as a base
for a larger, more extensive system. Finally,
it could protect our population against: the
improbable, but possible, accidental Iciunch
of a few ICBK;S by any one of the nuclear
powers,^ ^^
Having outlined these possibilities, he stated that a defense
against Soviet attack was "not presently attainable,*' Pre-
supposing that the Soviet Union was determined to deter the
United States through an assured destruction capability of
its own, he described probable Soviet responses to an exten-
sive United States antimissile defense dsployment by increas-
ing the effectiveness of their offensive forces
i
They could do so by installing MiRVs and
penetration aids in their currently pro-
jected missile forces, deploying a new,
larger payload mobile ICBy, deploying
more SLFiMs, etc, in than event; we would
still find ourselves in a position where
a Soviet attack could inflict unacceptable
dcimage on our pooulation and cities^ even
after we have spent many billioijs of doJ .lars








The loqicai 'conclusion he clrevj- from such an analy^-is ws.e? that
antimissile defence deployiinent 'ivoulcl Fimp.ly fuel the anns
race, with great costs and no coriimei^surate gain in securiiiy
for either side.
The proposed budgetary allocation for the Sentinel sys-
tem was $1,733 billion, a.n .increase of ^826.0 million from
allocations for Ficcal Year 19C9. Funds requested for anti-
missile defense-associated research and development not re-
lated to the Sentinel sybtem totalled $175,0 million, a reduc-
tion of $93.0 million from the budget request of the previous
lisyear.
From the Soviet perspective, Secretary Clifford's state--
ment lacked the aimcst missionary zeal vith which former
Secretary Kcb'amara had opposed antimissile defense systems.
The approach was more pragmatic and more directly keyed to
Soviet actions in both offensive and defensive strategic wea-
pons systems. A slight movement toward further United States
antimissile defense deployments to defend Minuteman bases was
perceptible. Although made by a "lame duck" whose successor
had already been appointed, it represented the consensus of
opinion of the Department of Defense bureaucracy which would
essentially remain under the new Nixon Administration, Frora
past statements made by President-elect Mixon and Secretary
of Defense-designate Laird, it would have been logical for
lis, Clifford, 2-2J£lIi_?£t££l£^_££££££!"/ P* ^^
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the soviet-^ to expect, that the rJ.xon Adiriinlntration vrcald
raove farther frora former Secretary Mci^cunara * s position.
Such a perception wcis supported by Representative Laird
in his remarks at senate hearings on tha confirmation of his
appointxuei:'t as Secretary of Defense on lb January, He sup-
ported r?.ntimissile defense systeii). depiovmenty conversion of
Polaris submarines to launch the rfiultipir» warhead Poseidon
micslle, d&velopitiGnt of a new strategic boa'ber to replace
the B~52, and research and developj.ment of an improved inter-
continental ballistic missile to replace Minuleman, As a
general statement, he tended to fa;ror lending increased
vv^eight to the opinions and recommendations of: the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Finally,, it was his opinion that discus-
sions with the Soviet Union on strategic arms liiTiitation
would not conuTience until the sunnier or fall of 1969 at the
earliest. ^
On 27 January, PreEidei\t nixon held his first press con-
ference since a&suir.ing the Presidency. Tv;o iir.portant state-
ments with regard to armo limitations were made, although
antimissile defense systems weie not specifically mentioned-.
He began by admitting that clear-ciJt military superiority in
strategic arms by one superpower would severely destabilize
the ariTis race. Rather than '*parity*'' or "superiority, *' he
favored the concept of "sufficiency" to provide security
without creating undue pressures which might stimulate an




srwE race^ Aft<?r r;tating th.Tvi 'ne favored strategic arms lim-
itation talks with the Soviet Union $ the President pointed
out tliat th.e context cf the talks v;<\s a-? irr-portant as when
they would begins The ccnt'';:X.c he r-oooht "ws^s one vhich linked
progress on strategic arms lirritation to progress in rei?olv-
ina ma 1or political differences:
T*fliat I vrent to do is to pee to it that v;e
have strategic arms talks in a vay and at
a time that v;ill promote, if possible j.
progress on outstanding political problems
at the same time, for exa^nple, on the
problems of the Middle East, or other out-
standing problems in which the United
States and the Soviet Union acting t07
cether can serve the cause of peace. '^^
The statement provided the fij-st. direct evidence that the
United States was applying the concept of linkage to th^e
proposed negotiations on strategic arms limitation.
Secretary Lciird held his first press conference on 50
January. He stated that he favored arms limitation ta.lks,
but quickly added that to coffiR\ence the negotiations •v;lthout
continuing to deploy antimissile defenses would "tie one
12 ^hand bei\ind our back.*' "*" Vlhen questioned about President
Nixon* s use of the term "sufficiency*" he asserted that,
while he favored strategic superiority, he was v^illing to
call it. ''suf ficiency. •• If the President had intended to sig-
nal a slight change of attitude with the notion of sufficiency,
^^^'* InS..Il^yLy2lhJIlJ.!}S-l» 28 January i06S, p. 12.
^^-
• 1j1'^.S^^2K}LJA^^}!^^.^» r^ews article by William Beecher,
31 January l'^G9j p. 1,
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Secretary Laird* s. remarks would have negated its value and
created further uncertatrjty,
Soviet response to these two news conferences initially
stressed the favorable, attitudes of President Nixon Sind Sec-
retary Laird to negotiations on strategic arms limitation
«
ComiTkentary following President Nixon's remarlcs applauded his
movement to the concept of suf ficier cyi
As for Soviet-American relations, here tlio
President's stateinents in which he expreis?sed
the U. S. desire to hold negotiations with
the Soviet union on limiting the strategic
arms race are being pointed out. In this
connection, observers stress the fundaiaental
change in Richo.rd Nixon's phraseology. Dur-
ing his election campaign he spoke about the
United States having to aiin for military
superiority over the Soviet Union and to
talk with the Soviet Union from a position
of strength. Now Richard Nixon n^ntioned
neither the position of strength nor mili-
tary superiority I He stated that instes-.d
of military preparations one should now
only talk about sufficient military power.
This, some observers believe; » also mani-
fests a more realistic approach to foreign
policy questions. ^^-^
The use of the phrase "some observers believe" .Indicated that
final judgment on this concept was being v/ithheld and. that
official Soviet opinion "as split. The linJcagc aspect of the
President's statement was not referred to. Linkage v;as
^22, Tass International Service in English, 2000 GMT, 27
January 1969 and Tass International Service in Russian,
2005 GMT J 30 January 1969
«




wentioneu in « Fravda article v-hich appeared on 2 February,
However > the bulk of Uiis article w«is devoted to examining
the concept of ''svifficiency, *' Secretary Iraird was reported
to be adherlno to a doctrine of nuclear superiority* The
uncertainty over what President l\ixon meant by "sufficiency*'
and the necessity for early progress on strategic arms limi-
tation were stressed?
CoRimentators in foreign newspapers are try-
ing to comprehend what actually determines
the present 'nuclear policy* of the U.S.Ae ~
a striving for 'superiority* or a recogni-
tion of "sufficiency' in nuclear weapons.
However? soniC of thera e:r.phc.size above all
the senselessness of the nuclear arms race
and the necessity for nev\7 efforts in the
field of disariTiament. Truly time does not
wait. In the present complex international
atmosoliere, serious raeasures are needed to
curb the arms race and lessen the nuclear
threat. The reaching of an agreement in
this field is not an easy task, but life
has shown it to be a realistic task, one
in which all peoples have a vital interest.-^-''--
Cn 6 February, Secretary of Defense Laird announced that
deplo>Tuent of the Sentinel antiicissile defense system would
be suspended during a Defense Department review of strategic
forces v.'hich was expected to last about one month. ""~ At a
press conference on the sam^; day, pr«r'.sid.ent Kixon refuted
the striccly anti-China rationale for the sentinel system
which had been the system's foriner primary rr.ission:
124, Viktor Mayevsky, "l\'ot ar: r.-isy TasJ:, but a Ru^ilistic
^"^»*'' ?_£5:'£_4^„f 2 February 19f^9, p. S,
^^"'' The Washington post, 7 February 1969, p« Al.
«, »•,: -f'
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»..I do not buy Uie osciimptiori that the AP.K
systeia, the thin Sentinel systerri as has been
dejscribed, was simpav for the purpose of
protecting ourselves against an attack from
Coniinunist China. Thi& system - as the systera
that the sov/iet Linion has already deploved -
add.- to our overall defense capabili ty.^'^'^'
Washington ruiaors in tiie month of February seemed to indicate
moveuient toward emplcyaient of antimissile defense to protect
offensive missile bases from pre-emptive attc^ck. On 10 Feb-
ruary, Secretary Laird announced that conntructJ on v/ork on
Soviet antimissile defense sites around Moscow was being
resumed. He surmised tliat the one year suspension of this
construct.ion h'-^.d. been done to upgraae the supporting radar
installations. ' The number of launchers at ther>e site«
123has reraained constant at 64 from mid-1968 to mid-'19 71.
In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
on ratification of the Isiuclear Kon-Proliferation Treaty on
20 February, Secretary Laird repeated his previous stand tViat
he did not favor suspension of United States antimissile; de-
fense system deplo^^nucnt pending the outeoAne or opening of
J- 2^0 The New York Times y 7 February 1969 # p-, 16.
^27. Thj^.J^I.Ji2?l!S^?:jL9^f news article by william Beecher, 11
February J 969, p. 1»
128. Melvin R. J^ird, Fiscal Year 1972-76 Defense Program
and the 1972 D'^ifense Budget, Department of Defense mono-
graph", 9'iTarch 1971, p^ 165. A figure of C7 "Galos'h"
launchers t^^ajj given in The :4ilitary_ Balance 1970-71,
(London* T>ie Institute for Strategic studies, 1970), p.
7* The subsequent edition of this annual report, The
^jiJ:iy^Z..l^lL^.^^£^22Lzlh (I^ondon: The International




negotiations vrith the Soviet Union. He stated that United
States defenses were needed to f.'ounv.er tVie Soviet offensive
ndssile buildup and that the Soviets v;ere testing a 'sophiB--
129
ticated, new antimissile." This new weapon was said to
have a loiter capability, inuch like Spartan, to allov,' for
additional radar tracking of incoming reentry vehicles after
antimissile launch. However, he concluded that complete
defense against a Soviet attack would not be effective and
therefore he opposed it. Clearly, Secretary Laird felt that
antimissile defense could serve to extract an "entry price*'
from an attack by either of the superpowers against the
other
.
The concept of linkage was openly attacked by both sides
in February. The Soviet press disparagingly referred to it
as a means to pressure the Soviet Union "with the aim of
obtaining concessions in the solutions of certain interna-
130tional problems," Former Secretary of Defense Clark Clif-
ford argued that the technological pace of weapons develop-
ments made it mandatory to commence strategic arms limitation
13]
talks as F.oon as possible. ThiL assertion contradicted
his strong advocacy of linkage v;hich had appeared a month
earlier in the Fiscal Year 1970 Defense Posture Statement
-^2^» The lievj York Times, nevjs article by John Finney, 21
February 1969, p« 1,
^^^* ?^a Rubezhom (Life Abroad), editorial by Daniel F. Kra-
minov, 7 February 1969,
131, The New York Times, 18 February 1969, p. 1.
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v?here \\e lind stated?
The Soviet Incurslor- into Cjicchonlovakia
made tVi'2 opening of trxlkt: on. thif^ matter
inappropriate iap.t year. It is ovir hope
that ft-ie Soviet leaders v;ili reestablish^^
an atmos'ohG.re j.r. v:hich r,alkn ci?n beqi n.-'--^'^
Soviet statements commemorating the 51st Annivors^ry of
the soviet Armed Forces cGnerellY stressnd discipline rather
than military hardv/are or capabiliticD. "*-~"^ Addresses by .Mcr-
shals Grechko, Yakubovsky, and Zakharov j'ailed to even refer
to the Air Defense Forces, Marshal Batitsky's cirticle seemed
to stress c.ntiaircraft defenses
The Party cind Government have entrusted the
Air Defence Forces with the defentje of the
fatherland's air frontiers, having created.
all necessary conditions for fulfilling this
responcible task. The Air Defense Forces
are equipped with complex and highly effi-
cient combo t technology! pov;erful antiair-
craft missile compj.exss of various systems,
supersonic f ighter-intercciptors, and modern
radar stations* ^34
No reference v;as rsade to defense against ballistic missiles.
A brief article, accorripanied by a photograph of A.ir Defense
132, Clark Clifford, Fiscal vear 3 970-74 Defense Program
and F i scal Year 1970 Defen se rUidaety Depart^nent of
Defense monograph, 15 January J'3o9, p, 49,
133, B'or example, see Marshal w, l« Kryiov, 'Cne Man Com-
mand Must Be Strengthened in Every Possible Way,*'
lSl^i2§:YS_i^52d5. ('^Gf? Stiu:), 20 February 1969, p. 2,
134, Marshal p» F. Batitsky, "Or; G-.ic^.rd Over Peaces and
Socialism," Selskaya Zhlza' ^Rar^^l Life), 23 February
1969, Pc 3.

units of the Mofjco\7 K.ilitary District with antinissiies,
t^ppeared m l/.vepi-ia on 19 February," "' \i'he readiness of
th-3 troops of the vir.it pictured was streDsed^ not its rrds-
sile capabilities
c
By early i^aych, it v;as clear that Senate opposition to
United States antimi::sile delense syr:Jtem clopioyraer.t was grow-
ing, c:>pposition ieaderc in the Senate announced that they
felt they had 53 votes against deplo^nT.ent of the Sentinel
syslens bvit admitted that 5 of those probable votes v;ere
v;avering, Alt>iough the opposition in some v^ayr. vas tied
to Air.erican disiliurlonmcnt wj.th the^ war in Vietnam and to
a general dissatisfaction with military Eolntions to vfnat
were considered to be primarily political problems, niuc>i of
it was bnsed on the projected costs of antiini&sile defense
systeniG and the perceived mininial effectiveness of the tlien-
avaiiable systems v;hen deployed. Some influent ia.l anf3 highly
respected Senators argued that, once deployment v/as begun, the
domestic and bureaucratic piresr^ures to expand the thin «yrj-
teni v;ould prove irresistible. Senator Stuart Syinington, a
former Secretary of th€: Air Force, estimated thdt th.e tot^^l
137
costs of an anti-Soviet system could amount to $400 billion.
On 7 iMarch, in reporting out the Huclear Won-Proliferaticn
Treaty, t>;e senate ir'oreign Relations Coirjrdttee urged President
135. **Alx^ays on Guard 5" I^;Ve^ti£» i9 B'ebruary 1969, p. 3.
-^•^^' J2i?.Jl?,£ili!Hi^ii£L2P^^^^ 2!:> February 1969, o, ^.1
.
^'^"^' l]}Ui:2yLlP.E}lJEllil^> 5 :':aich l-^'c9, p, G,
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Kixon to delay antimissile defenBG deploiinent. Influential
editori-al opinion also strongly urgad the President to con-
1 3S
tinue the deployment suspension.
On 6 March, GCii^rd C. Smith, newly appointed Director
of the Arras Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA)^ appeared
before tVie Disarmament Subcomraittee of the Senate Foreign
Relations Conuaittee* Ke asserted th^^t en Ad;air..istraticn
decision to continue antimissile defense deployirient would
not adversely affect possibilities for stroteqic a:-nis limita-
tion negotiations with the Soviet Union, citing Soviet reac-
tion to the injtial Sentinel deployment decision in Septeni-
ber 1967. Ke stated that he tended to favor defense of
offensive missile bases as an antimissile defense miscion
least likely to result in an unfavorable Soviet response to
1 '-iOUnited States deploiwent. In other testimony before the
Subcommittee, scientists Daniel Eink, Hans BetVie, and Jack
P.viina testified that, in their opinion, there V7as no military
danger to the United States involved in delaying deployT:\ienc
of an antimissile defense system*
At a press conference on 4 Karch v\'hich follov^ed a Euro-
pean trip, president Nixon announced that a decision on anti-
missile defense would be made in the inj-aediate futures
138. For example, see James l^eston* "ABM, Administration's
Biggest Mistake," The Kew York Times, 12 March lSG9.o p.
46; Tom Wicker, "A Decision That Makes Itself," The New
York Times, 11 March 1969, p. 46 i and I'la^es editorials
of 12 and 13 March 1969, p. 46.
^•^^» The Washington Fost , 7 March x969, p. Al«
X f.
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The ABM was not discussed j.n any detai.l
in my conversations abroaa* As far as
the decision is concerned, there will be
a meeting of the National Security Coun-
cil tomorrow u'hich v?ill be entirely de-
voted to an assessiTsent of that systeitiy
then during the balance of the v/eek I
shall make some additionc.l studies on my
own involving the Defense Depart^.ient and
other experts whose opinionr* ~ value, I
will make and announce a decision at the
first of next week.-'-^'-*
He continued to adhere to the corcept of linkcige by stating
that bilateral discussions with the Soviet Union on the Mid-
dle East should come before negotiations on strategic arms
liraitation.
The early loonths of 1969 rr.arked th«-" high point of overt
linkage policy by the United States > a policy v;hich had been
dropped by the Soviet Union in mid-~136J3.
In suiTJtiary, the Sentinel period produced several trends.
Official statements and strategic force deplo^TCents on both
sides revealed a faith in the strategy of "mutual assured
destruction" to avoid nuclear vrar. In a^i^ition to the deploy-
ment of antimissile defense systems, each v;as conducting
extensive resee^.rch and development programs in an attempt to
insure that a technological breakthrough by the othet side
would not result in their increased vulnerability. Concern
in the United Stater- hcid shifted from response to Soviet anti-
missile defense deployment to growing anxiety over numerical
increases in soviet offensive missile forces. Rationales for
140, lilUf52L.)2^^£ilJIiilt^.» 5 March 1969, p, 8

United states antiJaissile derense aeployrr.env. to counter these
increases were gaining strength. Overt Soviet dialogue viai-.
remarkably silent cDnsidering the ideclogjcc;! opporturjitie.o
provided by the growing controversy in the United States
betv7een the '•military-industrial complex*' and the "iiherai
e£tablii;;hment" and increasing anti-wili tary and anti-anTss
race sentiment. This unusual reticence inay have refiactod a
deep split v^hich had evolved into a fragile consensus within
the Soviet leadership, a ccnvtction that that forces in the
United States would stop antimissile defense deployment and
that Sovier. meddling could prove counterproductive, uncer-
tainty over the direction that would be taken by the Kixon
Administration and a desire to probe its intentions, or a
corribination of these considerations.

Cliapber 5
Froir. Safequard to Helsinki
President Nixon announced Viis decision to proceed v;ith
limited c^ntimissile defense system dsployiTxent on 3.4 Karch at
a press conference. The basic irdnKion of the early phases of
this systeitiy which he referred to as "Safeguard, " was revised
to seek protection of United States strategic retaliatory
forces from a poi^sible Soviet counterforce strike. The
stated missions of this svstem were?
1. protection of our land-based retaliatory
forces against a direct attack by the Sov-
iet Union;
2* Defense of the Araericaji people against
the Kind of nuclear attack vrhich Conoriu-
nist China is likely to be able to mount
vjithin the decade;
3. Protection against the possibility of
accidental attacks from any source,^
In presenting this revised program, he stressed its defensive
mission and, in an obvious signal of limited restrc^int to the
Soviet Union, the phased nature of the planned deployment;
...the safety of our country requires that
we proceed now with the development and con-
struction of the new sysrem in a carefully
phased program; this program, will be review-
ed cumualJy from the point of view of (a)
technical developments j (b) the threat, and
1. "statement by President Richard K. Nixon," White House
Press Release of 14 Karcli 1969 j reprinted in the Depart-
ment^of S ta te £> u 1 1 e t i n , 31 March 1969, p. 273.
- 212 -

(o) tla.- dip.loinatic context, inclviding any
talks on cirms limitation.^
The modified syste^n has boen designed so
that its defensive intent is unmistakable
j
It.v.'il'i. be implemented not according to
some fixed, theoretical timetable but in
a manner clearly related to our periodic
analyBif; of the threat. '^
He portrayed the previously approved sentinel deplo;^aT:cnt
»
which provided thin area defense of cities, as possibly lead-
ing a potential adversary to conclude that the United States
sought to undermine mutual assured destruction by attempting
to create a thick nationv/ide defense, against balJistic missile
attack J
The Sentinel system approved by the previous
Administration provided more capabilities
for the defense of cities than the program
I am recorrm^ending, but it did not provide
protection against some threats to our
retalicitory forces which have developed
subsequently. Also, the sentinel sy;?tem
had the disadvantage that it could be mis-
interpreted as the first step toward the
construction of a heavy system., -^
Although President Nixon did not openly refer to the scenario
frequently analyzed by United states strategists which postu-
lated destruction of residual retaliatory forces after <* Sov-
iet counter force strike as a possible micsion for Soviet
antimissile defense forcesj the above statement implied his
2, "Statement by President Mixon," Department of State




conviction tliat Urzited states defenses ehould rot lend ere--
dence to such scenarios if employed hy their Soviet counter-
partG. If a similar analysis h^d developed among Soviet
BtrategistSy it had not 'been reflected in open literature
4
at that tj.me. President Kixcn aliuded to this fact vhen he
stated
!
I think the Soviet Union rccognJi.es very
clearly the differance hetwsen a defensive
posture and an offensive posture
e
I v;ouid cil30 point this out - an interesting
thing about Soviet, military and diplomatic
history: They have always thought in defen-
sive terras, and if you read not only thei.r
political leaders but their military leaders
the eiaphasis is on defense.-*
In another apparent signal to the Soviet Union, the
President concluded that defense of the Uniced Slates citiei
was not feasible with present technology. His statement
reflected the "gut" issue of governmental responsibility to
protect its citizens:
Although every instinct motivates me to
provide the American people with corr.piete
protection against a major nuclear attc'ckp
it is not nc\>/ within our power to do so.
The heaviest defense system v:e consideredj
one designed to protect our major cities,
still Gould not prevent a catastrophic
level of IJ. 3. fatalities from a deliberate
4, SubS'^-quent Stateuients hy Soviet military writex's in the
late suinner of 1969 addressed such a scenario^ see below,
pp. 279-282.
5» "President Nixon's News Conference of ^*arch 14," £§P^£t-
iuent of State Bui let in ^ 31 March 1969;. p„ :^78.
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all-out sov'iet. attack f/'
In addition to this statement ' s intention to discredit domes-
tic spokesmen v.'ho advocated a "thick" city defense system,
it also attempted to weaken possible Soviet assessments of
the feasibility of credible city defenGes against a cophis-
ticated Superpower attacker". However, in responsiie to ci ques'
tion concerning the willingness of the United, states to
abandon all antimissile defenses through mutvial limitations
with the soviet Union, he pointed out that both superpowers
might want to maintain some limited defenses against a pos-
sible Chinese attacks
I V70uld imagine that the Soviet Union would
be just as reluctant as we would be to leave
their country naked against a potential Chi-
nese Coiumunist threat. So the abandoning of
the entire sy^iten;, particularly as long as
the Chinese threat is there, I think neither
country would lock upon v/ith much favor. '
In support of this contention, he pointed out that the Soviet
antimissile defense-associated rc^dars, which previously had
been oriented only against possible United states attack,
had recently acquired a degree of additional anti -Chinese
orientation. Three explanations for this statement are pos-
sible. First, President Nixon may have^ been attempting to
6e "statement by President lUxon," Depart^Tient of State
Bulletin, 31 March 1969, p. 273,'
7, "President Nixon's !^ev;s Conference," I)epartoenc of State
L^iy;£M.£'' 31 March 1969, p. 279.
"' ~" "^"^
-( -^ *•• - :<" 'z-:-S-i'
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singal United States unwillingness to accept a "-^ero ABM"
posture at any subseqaent strategic arras limitation negotia-
tions. Second, he may h&ve been cittempting to strengthen
the image of his commitment to antimissile defense to allow
them to be a more effective bargaining point for the estab-
lishment of lower offensive missile force ceilings in the
prospective negotiations. Finally, by aliuaing that the
United States might accept a relatively small number of anti-
missile defense launchers in such negotiations, he may have
been attempting to quiet some possible concern aiaong elements
of the Soviet military that the United States v/ould take an
"all or nothing" position on antimissile defense. Taking
this possible rationale a step farther, this statement could
have been interpreted by the Soviets as a tacit indication
that the United States would not initially see]: arms £educ-
tion through negotiations. Such an interpretation v/culd be
substantiated by President Nixon's statement that prelimi-




Implicit in the President's decision to begin the Safe-
guard system deployment with defense of Minuteman sites was
a basic commitment to continue to base United States strategy
on the maintenance of an assured destruction capability. Hav-
ing convinced himself that city defenses would not save lives
8. "President Nixon's News Conference," Depdrtment of State
Bulletin, 31 March lf)G9, p. 279

in the face of a deteimined Soviet attcick, he; ccnciuded that
the only V7ay to save lives vat- to prp,vejat war from breaking
out by deterriviq the Soviet Unior) from attacking. He argued
that recent Soviet advancerceiits in offenc.ive stra.tegic we^^-
pons systems had made it necessary to begin dcployraent pro-
curement and site selection for antirnissile defenses iioiT-.e.d-
iately. Ho rioted that four raajor dcvGlopments in Soviet
strategic forces had taken place since tne initial Sentinel
deployment decision in 1967;
1. Tlie Soviets have already deployed an ABM
system which protects to soiae degree a
wide area centered around Moscow. We
will not have a comparabJe capability
for over four years. V7e believe the
Soviet Union is continuing their ABM
developni.ent , directed toward either
improving this initial system or, more
likely, making subs canciall y l-»ettei
second-generatj.ori ABM compnents.
2. The Soviet Union is continuing the de-
ployment of very large missiles with
v/arheads capable of destroying our har-
dened Minuteman forces,
3* The Soviet Union has also been substan-
tially increasing the size of their sub-
marine-launched ballistic missile force.
4. The Soviets appear to be developing d
somiorbital nuclear v;eapons system.^
Faced with this threat which he typified as growing. Presi-
dent Nixon discussed possible United States responses, stres-
sing their relationship to Soviet forces and perceptions.
9. "President Nixon's News Conference,'' Department ^f Stjate





First, v;e could increase the number of sea-
and land-based missiles rnd bomber j* . I have
ruled out this course because it provides
only marginal improvement of cur deterrent,
while it could be misinterpreted by the Sov-
iets as an attempt to threaten their deter-
rent. It v;ould therefore stimulate an arms
race,
7a second opt-ton is to harden further our
ballistic missile forces by putting them
in more stronoiy reinforced underground
silos. But our studies show that harden-
ing by itself is not adequate protection
against foreseeable advances in the accur-
acy of Soviet offensive forces.
The third option was to begin a measured
construction on an active defense of our
retaliatory forces.-'-^
In selecting the third option, he sought to provide "local
defense of selected Minuteman sites and an area defense
designed to protect our bomber bases and command and control
authorities." No local defenses were to be provided to
cities by this system., another major difference between Safe-
guard and Sentinel. Later phases of the deployment were to
provide a thin anti-Chinese area defense with additional
capabilit.y against accidental attacks. Despite President
Nixon's professed concern for Soviet m.isinterpretation of
the deployment of area defenses in the former Sentinel pro-
gram, seen from the Soviet perspective at this time, the end
result of the full Safeguard deploymenc v;culd have been to
10. "President Nixon's News Conference," DeparUTient of
State Bulletin., 31 March 196S . o„ 274.
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approximate the arsa defense capability of the Sentinel
system with the addition of heavier point defenses in the
vicinity of th.e Minuter-iars bases ? n Montana, North Dakota,
Wyoming, and Missouri. In addition to responding to v/hat
the Nixon Mministration considered to bo the raost urgent
threat, the phased nature of th.e deplovment and the provi-
sion for an annual reviev based partially on threat devel-
opments provided some incentive for the Soviet Union to r.sek
an agreement on limitation of antimissile defense systems at
an early point in the deployment, if in fact they sought
such an agreeiaent.
To reinforce what became known as the "bargaining chip"
aspect of the phased deployment plan^ the President closed
his prepared stateraent v;ith a discussion of hi5j perception
of how the Safeguard system deployment related to possible
arras control in i t i a t i ve s
:
Since our deployment is to be closely re-
lated to the threat, it is subject to mod-
ification as the threat changes, either
through negotiations or through unilateral
actions by the Soviet Union or Communist
China.
The program is not provocative. The Soviet
retaliatory capacity is not affected by our
decision. Their capability for surprise
attack against cur strategic forces is
reduced. In other words ^ our program pro-
vides an incentive for a respoasible Soviet
weapons po] icy and for the avoidance of spi-
raling U.S. and Soviet strategic arms budgets
I have taken cognizance oi the viev; that
beginning construction of a U.S. bailie: tic
missile dofen.se would complicate an agree-
ment en stratoqic arms with the Soviet Union.
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I do not believe that the evidence of the
ruccnt past bears out this conviction. The
Soviet interest in strategic talks v;3s not
deterred by the decision of the previous
Administration to deploy the Sentinel ABM
system -• in fact, it v;a5 formally announ-
ced shortly afterward. 1" believe that the
modifications v;e have made in our previous
progran^- v;ili give the Soviet Union even
less reason to viev; oar defensive effvort
as an obstacle to talks, Moreover, I v/ish
to emphasi-^e that in any arms limitation
talks with the Svoviet Union, the United
States v;ill be fully prepared to discuss
limitations on defensive as well as offen-
sive v.'eapons systems , -^-^
Although President Nixon's remarks indicated an active
interest i.n strategic arms limitation negotiations, the
tenor of his statement was such that negotiations v;ere not
overwhelmingly seen as beneficial hy themselves. Their
relationship to United States threat perce[>tions was the
key factor. A subtle drii't of United States primary inter-
est from antimissile defenses to strategic offensive systems
was discernable. In his reference to apparent Soviet v;ill-
ingness to raove toward negotiations after the 2h June 196 8
Senate vote on deployment of the Sentinel atitinissile defense
system, the President was careful iiot to indicate ti:at he
considered tliat further deployment decisions would force the
Soviet Union into greater willinaness to enc^r j.nto negotia-
tions. Such an assertion might bo expected t.c strengthen
the arguments of eiem.er.ts of the Soviet bureaucracy who may
11. "Pj;esident ;iixon's News Conference,*" Department of State
Bulletin, 31 March 1969, p. 275.
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have considered the proposed negotiations tc be a form of
"capitulciti.op.i snu. " Fvirthermore , he did not refei to tlie
rapidly cevelopiny Ur*ited States multiple indcper.deiitly-
tax"ge.ted reentry vehicle (MV.RV) capability as a counter to
the Soviet: ofver;sive force increases.
In avidlt.ion to th-3 ftatemeats quoted above v.'hich were
directed to both the domestic and Soviet audiences. Presi-
dent Nixon's announceipent included several assertions which
were primarily intended to defuse domestic opposition to
antimissile defense deployment. The psychological import-
ance of the attempt to bring the proposed Safeguard system
into line with tlie familiar and generally comfortable deter-
rence strategy ratlier than breaking new strategic giound was
significant. His emphasis that "this depJoyment will not
require us to place missile and radar sites close to our
cities" was intended to qviiet tliose critics who had opposed
deployment since they feared the accidental detonation of a
defensive warhead or that defensive sites would be a primary
target of attacking missiles. He also pointed out that the
short-term costs of the system would be less than the pro-
posed Sentinel costs for the same year. Since the majority
of those critics whc opposed the deployment on cost grounds
tended to focus their eittention on projections of overall
system costs, this short-term reduction argument may have
been counterproductive since it leant itself to charges of
duplicity.
The curious Soviet silence on the antimissile defense
..\':.:\
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-
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debate 3.ssv.e3 in the United States vcas abruptZ.y broken less
than one day before Presider't Nixoj-i's announcarriGnt of the
Safeguard program. The period of silence may have reflected
internal indecision aiid debate over several factors. First,
an uncertainty over Vvhat bv'>.sic changes in Unired States
foreign and defense policy would be msde by the Nixon Adrain-
istration and vihat their irr>plications for perceived Soviet
interests would be. Second, v/hat the possible effects of
overt Soviet statements on the issues would be and how they
might influence the outcorae of the United States debate.
The unpredictability of United States internal political
behavior which characterized this period iriay have deterred
the Soviets from attempting to infu'evioe that debate. How-
ever^ the apparently widespread public dis-s^rust of the civil-
ian and iTiilitary leadership ;.'ithin the Dcpartnient of Defense
which had grown oxit of the Vietnam 'War must have seemed to
offer a tempting potential. Finally, if. the Soviets v;ere
sincere m see);ing arms limitation negotiations at this
time, their posture on antimissile defense nad co be adjusted
to promote that objective. Each of these po::,Eibie factors
could have strengthened the arguments for adopting a "go
slov7" pojicy.
In breaking the silence of early 1969 y tv;'.> important
articles appeared in Izyestia and Pravda and several broad-
cast coTiimentaries on the Sentinel system v/c-re made. The
Izver.tia article by political coinruentator V, Matveyev estab-
lished the general point of view which v/as to be repeated
5. '^ ' *.'
during the spring of IS* -59. I/c was not an attack on anti-
missile defense systcnG themE^elves . No reference to any
interaction between liniteci States defensive systems and
Soviet , of fensivG force postures vror, made.. M^^tveyev did not
mention the then-current Nixon Administration reviev/ of
antimissile defense deployment questions, but he outlined
the basis for a "new, disLinative iiovement" v;h.lch was grov/-
incj in the United States in opposition to tlie Sentinel sys-
tem. In an attempt to demonstrate the cjrov^in'j strenr^th of
this iriovement , he cited opposition by former Secretaries
of Defense McNamara and Clifford:
The deraarcation betv;een nober-minded and
adventurous figures among the American
big bourgeoisie is becoming more evident.
The transformation of. tv;o figures - P.
McNamara and C. Clifford - who held the
post of Secretary of Defense - is char-
acteristic. Having left tlie Pentagon,
they nov; advocate the earliest possible
beginning of negotiations on disarmament
with the USSR.l^
He characterized this group as an "antiwar" movement, but
emphatically pointed out that it v;as not '"directly connectt-d"
to the anti- Vietnam War protests. while his approval of the
activities of this new movement was obvious, Matveyev stop-
ped short of describing it as "progressive." Its couipv-^si-
tion was seen to represent "diverse strata" of the popula-
tion, focusing its opposition on the Senate, where 4 7
12. V. Matveyev, "Armament and Disarmament," Izve s tia , 13
March 19G9, p. 4,
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Senators were reported to oppose Sentinel. Only 2 4 Sena-
tors Vvore said to support the syotem. The opposition v;as
f.e.en to be based on system cost, the probable obsolescenso
of the system v;h.en deployed, the chance of an accidental
detonation oi the Sentinel warhead, and "a struggle against
the arms race," In support of these arguments, Matveyev
cited the opinion of "specialists" who estiiaatcd that Seii--
tinei \x?oi.ild ''require allocations 10 times - if not dozens
of times" greater than the projected $6.0 bij.lion; Herman
Kahn's evaluation of air defense systems deployed in the
United States in the 19 50 's at a cost of over $30.0 bj. IJion
which proved to be relatively ineffective; and the B-.'32
accidents in Greenland and Spain involving nuclear weapons,
respectively. Those who favored the deployment of the Sen-
tinel system v/ere depicted to include an alliance of arms
manufacturers and Congressmen acting as "promoters for mili-
tary business." Their influence v;as pictured as being power-
ful within the leadership of the IJixon /idministration:
. . .different speeches are heard from the
higliest platforms in the United States.
Their authors suggest that there should be
'no hurry' for talks, and they call for
creating a 'position of strength' and so
on. Calling for speeding up the arms race
and developing the Sentinel system, these
leaders refer to the absence of agreement
with the USS}\ on these questions.
However, it is well knovm that the Soviet
Government proposes that negotiations be
started on limiting and curtailing both
of tensive and defensive nuclear v;eapons.
Steps that might be taken in the disarmament

- 2253 -
field shoulc, net place one t'tate or group
of states ill an unfavorable position with
respect to other state?;. The baiance of
power nov; achieved provides an opportunity
for concluding agreements on freei2inc, and
curtailing i.'uclear arms. Many V'estern
observers point this out.^-^
Several interpretations Cc^n be made of the above passage.
It attempted to convoy continued Soviet v;illingness to en-
gaga in strategic arms limitation negotiations-.. The respon-
sibility for the delay j.n initiating these talks v;as placed
on the United States. Three diverse groups might be expected
to have been the targets of this assertion. World opinion
could censure the United States for failure to respond to a
Soviet initiative to stop the arms rac?? that was regarded by
rriany as "sincere," Elements in the United States favoring
arras limitation would be encouraged to move more aggressively
foi initiation of talks on terms more favorable to the Soviet
Union. Internal opposition v/ithin the Soviet leadership
v/ould be stilled to the extent that the first two expecta-
tions wore met. The earlier assertion that cost considera-
tions were crucial to the United States antimissile defense
deploi-inent opposition v;as repeated in a manner u'hich suggests
that costs were also a key factor in the Soviet calculus:
Each day underlines the urgency of this
problem with nev; force, since ev^ery day
huge funds so essentl^/i. for peaceftil
13. Matveyev, "Aruiarnent and Disarmament," J.zvestia . 13
March 196 '«, p. 4.
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civilian, needs cjo into raili.tary production
Across the sea they love- to talk about the
potentialities of the Arcir^rican econoniy.
But the richest country in the world is
also increasingly feeling the burden of
armamen t s . ^ '^- [ I ta 1 i c s laine ]
The previous reference to the "balance of po\;er now achieved/'
taken in ccnjunction v;ith the above-inferred mutual economic
probieiTiy v;a3 probribly intended to b)unt any impression that
the Soviet Union \^3.s moving toward strategic ari-is limitation
negotiations from a position of less than equality with the
United States. V7hile international rjerceptions were undoubt-
edly a consideration,- tne internal imp licetions of this
statement seem most important, Matveyev strongly attacked
those who opposed progress on disarmament:
Efficient and effective steps in tne field
of disarmament are necessary net to one
particular country or group of counties,
but to all countries without exception.,
since this matter affects the vitally im-
portant interests of alj peoples. The
sorry theoreticians who are ganging up on
the struggle for disarraamenr, seemingly
from directly opposite sides, are trying
to efface and conceal this fact.-^--'
The reference to "sorry theoreticians" was similar to that
used by Foreign Minister Grom.yko in his 27 June 1968 speech
to the Supreme Soviet where he referred to "good-for-nothing
theoreticians." Matveyev 's statement caiae closer to the
14. Matveyev, "Armament and Disarmament," Izvestia, 13




asssrticD tiiat "he whr. is v/ith vs is againtrt us" vjhich p>.ob-
cibiy indicated thar a deep split within the Soviet Jcjd^r-
ship on the advisibilicy of coiiducting strategic arms limit-
tion negotiations v;ith the United States existed at that
time. The apparent abrupt change in tactics to partici-
pate actively in the United States internal debate on the
deployment of anti^.issile defense systems reflected probable
dissatisfaction of th^e dominant faction with the results of
the prolonged Soviet silence ori the issue.
Two similar analyses were broadcast to the Soviet dom-
estic audience on the same date. Their tenor was slightly
more Marxist, picturing a shrirpening dialecticcil confronta-
tion:
The more convincing the arguments put
forward by opponents of a nev/ round in
the arms race, hov/evcr, the greater the
pressure exerted on Washington by the
military-industrial complex and those
big business circles v.-hose appetite has
16. The failure of Soviet analysts to add "Western," "bour-
geois," or "capitalist" to pejorative references to
such statements regarding bodies of opinion noiinally
indicates that factions adhering to similar opinions
exist within the Soviet bureaucracy or within the
socialist camp. These failures to specify the sources
of pejorative references are not "errors of omission.
"
They are made to indicate the presence of factional
differences on given issues and to point out that such
opposition has not passed unheeded. Their purpose may
be to indicate the presence of factional conflict to
the overall Party membership and the socialist camp or
to publicly discredit the opposing faction, but they
are not intended to influence Western opinion. Other
indications of factional differences en issues may be
found in the use of the -.ntrodvictory phrases "some com-
rades say" and "some people say," Of ttiese two, the
former is ir.ore specific and indicates intraparty splits

- 22 8 -
been, v/hettc-d for new and unprccedentedly
large rni lit.ary appropr in t ionr- . -* ^
The opposition to antimissile defense d-^ployment vas acjain
seen to be focused on its costs r prooable ineffective opera-
tion, and the initiation of a "ntn'/ stage in the v;orld arms
1 R
race." No mention was ma^^e of Soviet strategic force
progress or possible negotiations oi\ arms limitation. This
general analysis was repeateo jn a short arcic.le in £2:cvaa
19
which stressed the internal debate m the United States.
A coincident broadcast to I^Jorway also repeated this
analysis of the United States domestic debate. However, it
stressed foreboding arms race predictions, noting thcit what
was required was achievement of a disarmament agreement.
After tracing the development of arms control agreements
from the Partial Test Ban Treaty tc the Nuclear Non-Prolif-
eration Treaty, it turned to the question of negotiations
on strategic arms limitation:
It wi.ll be recalled that the Soviet Unioii
has proposed that negotiations should start
on the limitation and reduction of nuclear
arms - weapons of attack as v/ell as defense.
Agreement has been reached between the U.S.
and Soviet: Governments for an exchange of
17. Moscow Domestic Se£^'ii-e in Russian, 174 5 GMT, 13 March
19 69.
18.
^i9£p.2^^ii^^^'-£_^iL!^-^J9- i" Russian, 20.30 GMT, 13 March
1969. ""
"~
19. B. Orekhov, "Sentinel: Passvi^ord for Military Boom,"
Pravda, 13 March i9Gi^, p. 5.

opinion regarding a mutQal liraitation and
subsequent reduction of strategic means
for delivery of nuclear weapons. The Sov-
iet Uxiion is prepared to enter into a ser- ^,
ious exchange of opinion on these questions.
Apparently convinced that the United Stotes ' desire to ini-
tiate such negotiations at an early date v.'as absent., the
tSoviet Union v/as probabjy attempting ^o probe West Eur.opean
opir-.ion for possible advantages and to discredit United
States intentions.
The initial Soviet response to President Nixon's an-
nouncement of the decision to deploy the Safeguard system
was interesting. The initial radio broadcast was typical
of the early reaction:
We have just received a report frorr\ V?ash-
ington. Speaking at a press conference at
the White House, U.S. President IJixon said
that the U.S. Government had decided to
embark on designing and building a ncv;
antimissile system. He stated that the
building of such a system v/ould not com-
plicate the achievement of an agreem.ent
v/ith the Soviet Union in the area of lim-
iting strategic installations , 2-
Subsequent early reports to the Soviet public failed to in-
clude any criticism of the decision-^ and approvingly quoted
20. Moscow in Norwegian to Norway, 19 30 GMT, 13 March
1969.
21. Moscow Domestic Service in F.ussian, 2100 GMT, 14 March
19 65.
22. The same short 'IjASS^ release was carried in ^l^y^^^t i^
March 13 G 9 and in Izvestia, 16 March 1969.
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President Nixon's professed willingnesv^ to engage in arms
3 imitation negotiations. A radio broadcast favorably noted
that the program's status would be reviewed aniiual.ly with-
23
out outlining the bases for this review,^ R^^ports were
concise, devoid of criticism, omitted any reference to the
system's announced mission, and consistcr.t in their cita-
tion of President Nixon's assertion that arms limitation
possibilities v/ere not affected by the decision.
The first lengthy analysis of the decision appeared en
14 March." It began by repeating the Matveyev contention
that the United States debate was essentially between the
"military-industrial complex" and a ''sober-minded" coalition
VNThich based its opposition on system costs, technical inef-
fectiveness, and arms race stimulation. President Nixon's
decision was seen as a compromise brought about by pressure
from both sides in this debate. It was accurately reported
that the first two sites would be located in Montana and
North Dakota, but the mission of the system was not mentioned
Curiously, it asserted that "exports" stated that the system
would cover Washington, The most logical explanation of
this statement v/ould be a desire to equate the deployment of
Safeguard with existing Soviet defenses around Moscow. Such
^^* Tass Interna tiona l Service in Russian, 19 33 GMT, 14
March 19 6 9.
"^
24. Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, 1030 GMT^ 15 March
1969. A similar analysis was broadcast by Hoscov/
DonieStic Service i ri Ru s s ian , 1200 GMT , 1 8 March~T9 6 9 .
.; .y- , -.--i^ .-;
?'.
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an interpretation would favor « facrioii vhich v/as arguing
that present and projected strategic forces were balanced
and that strategic arras liinitation negotiations v/ere there-
fore potentially prof itiible.
Predictably, Soviet broadcasts to external audiences
were luore critical. Comment^^ry ranged frorr. the assertion
that the decision liad "released the genie o.r ini iitarization
25from its Lottie" to quoted derogatory statements by oppos-
ing Senators v;ho criticized the role of the "military- indus-
trial complex" and viewed the deployment decision as one
v.'hich "can make happy only the Pentagon and the iftembers of
26Congress who support the armp. race." The raost extensive
analysis in this category stressed the basic United States
diiemna of reordering its priorities from the solution of
external to internal probleras. The Safeguard deployitient
decision was seen to indicate that external considerations
were still dominant and that the influence uf the "rriilitary-
industrial complex" was "unbridled" and the decision had been
made at "the expense of the American people."' For the
first time, the President's assertions tliat the dccisioii v/as
partially a response to the perceived Soviet threat and v/as
2 5 . Tass International Serv ice in Eng 1 i sh , 14 2 5 CMT , 1
C
March 19 G9.
2 6 , Tass Internat ional Service in V: ng 1 i sh , 1
4
b GMT , 1
5
March 196 9.
27. Moscow International Serv ice in English to liorth Amer-
ica, 2300" GMT, 15" March~l~9T9 .

poteijtially beneficial as a bargaining tool were mentioned:
As for those Vv?ho back the antimissile
project f tiiey ii^:>e such aiquments as a
Soviet tb.reat^ Wihich is nonexistent, or
, that the antimissile system would be a
useful ace at disarmament talks. These
arguments are ...prompted by the desire
to prevent any changes being made in the
United States foreign policy, clianges
which would contradict the interests of
the profit-seeking military and indus-
trial complex. 2
B
On a broader scale,- rhe decision v;as depicted as indicating
that tlie former "era of confrontation" had not yet been
replaced by President Nixon's proclaimed "era of negotiation."
In a coincident de-velopment , the Senate ratified the
Nuclear Non-Prolifeiation Treaty on 15 March by a vote of
83 to 15 V The Izvestia report of this action stated that
those Senators who had opposed ratification had "long been
notorious as representatives of the military-industrial com-
29plex." The article approvingly referred to Senator P'ul-
bright 's assertion that the results of the vote testified
to the widespread orientation toward disarmament of the
Junerican people. The Senator's reference to Article VI of
the Treaty was pointedly stressed. In this context, the
United States antimissile debate v;as seen to be indicative
of the future course of American foreign policy:
2S. Moscow Internat ional Service in English to North Amer-
ica, 23 00 ' i^'T'rTT'Ma}:cirT969\
29, Izvestia , 15 March 1969, p. 4. A similar article was
published in Pravda, 16 March 1909, p. 5.
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The Senate's ratification cf the Non-Frc-
iiferation Treaty is also signif ic£int m
that 'J.S» GoverriTrient circles are cu.rieiitly
discussing issoes connected v;ith a corr^plex
choice: to begin deploying the 'Sentinel'
so-called antimissile syst'iin that threat-
ens to give nev; impetus to the arms race^
or to t:ike the path of seeking vays to
limit and reduce the number of strategic
nuclear missile vyoapons, in line with the
USSR' s proposal . ^^
The apparent failure to reflect the President's announcement
of the Safeguard system deployment made on tiie previous day
probably indicated that this article v^ac prep)ared in advance
for release on the completion of the Senate's action. If
this contention is correct, the assertion of a Soviet ini-
tiative on negotiations on arrris control and the invocar,ion
of Article VI could have indicated that the Soviet leader-
ship tended to seek to explore possible short-t.erm propa-
ganda advantages of United States hesitancy with respect to
such talks. Another possible explanation of the stress laid
on Article VI was to rationalize the apparently dominant
faction's desire to begin negotiations with the United
States r.
In parallel letters to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament
Conference in Geneva on 18 March, President Nixon dind Pre-
mier Kosygin briefly referred to negotiations on the iiraita-
tion of strategic weapons systems. Prer/iier /kosygin' s refer-
ence was included among a number of issues related to the
30. Izvestia, 15 March 19 69, p. 4,

disarmament q^jer-;tj.._)ri ar.d railed to indicattj ar.y greater
v;iJ.lingness to dis":uss the issaa thap others traditionally
cited in general Soviet Sirticlii-s en this subjoct. Presi-
dent Nixon's reference indicatod \yi.s continued adherence to
the "linkage" concept: "..., t);e United States hopes that the
internatioii.-ii political situation v/ill evolve in a v.'ay which
will permit such talks to begin in the near future. ""*
From the Soviet perspective, a highly significant United
States development in the v;eek which folicv;ed the President's
announcement was a stcitement en 17 March that the Joint
Chiefs of Staff had dropped their advocacy cf a thick anti-
3 9
missile defence system deploynient. Except for a fev; Sena-
tors, Vaq. Joint Chiefs had been the raost persistent support-
ers of a nationwide area defense system. The removal of
their advocacy should have somevvhat allayed p.robnble Soviet
concern that the Safeguard systeva would be rapidly expanded
into an effective protection for cities and provided some
credibijity to President Mixon's claiifis that Safeguard's mis-
sion v;ouid not degrade Soviet assured destruction capabili-
ties. TJiis anncunceipcnt v;ou3.d also have v/eakened the stand
of those in the Soviet bureaacrncy '':A\c. v;ere presumably argu-
ing that the United States deployraent would inevitably expand
and consequently degraded the necessity of any countcriag
-^ • The New York Times , 19 March 19 69, p. 14. Full text:
of both letters were prinrsd.
^^' 'I'he WashingtoTi Fost , 18 March 19 69, p. Til.
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v/eaporis systems tJ-ey may have been advocating, VJhile this
analysis reflects the attribvition of the action-reaction
phenomenon to the Soviet decision-raaking process, it seems
reasonable to expect that the perceptions of both the Air
Defense Force and the Strategic Rocket Force regarding fut-
ure United States force posture trends were affected.
General United States domestic reaction to President
Nixon's decision was mixed. Those who had taken strong
positions on the previous Sentinel system deployment tended
to react in a similar manner to Safeguard. The decision to
move the antiniissile defense sites away from the cities
somewhat quieted tliose who had opposed their location within
major metropolitan areas. Influential editorial commentary
generally opposed the decision, but applauded its "packag-
33
mg."' The deployment's announced mission was seen to be
the least destabilizing possible v;ith respect to the stra-
tegic balance v;ith the Soviet Union and potential arms race
pressures. Most analyses were certain that the ultimate fate
of the Safeguard system would be decided in the Senate and
that the outcome was doubtful. The majority of these ana-
lysts were of the opinion that the Senate would reverse the
decision. An early commencement of strategic arms limitation
talks v;ith the Soviet Union was uniformly advocated.
^^' The New York Times, 15 March 1969, p. 32; James Reston,
"Washington: PresidenL. Nixon's Priorities," The New
York Times , 16 March 1969, p. 15; Tom Wicker', "But
What'^' in a Nam.e?," T]ie New York Times , 16 March 1969,
p . 1 6 ,
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On I'J March., bu interesting article tracing the devel-
opment of military theory since V^orld War II appeared in
34
Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star). The article's publication
date suggested that it was probably prepared before Presi-
dent Nixon's antimissile defense deployment decision v;as
announced. Although its tenor indicated that the author was
speaking in support of increased allocations and influence
for the Theater Forces and stressed ground action images,
several noteworthy statements were included which pertained
to strategic forces and their employment. As the title
indicated. Major Geiieral Reznichenko rejected the notion
that the objective of any military action should be anything
other than victory. V7hile he concluded that "nuclear wea-
pons have become one of the decisive factors in battle" and
had fundamentally altered the nature of tactics and opera-
tional skills, he quickly noted that they did not diminish
35
"the role and significance of conventional armed struggle."
To undersccre this point, it was argued that "victory cannot
be achieved by one single category of troops or by a single
branch of t:he armed forces," a probable counter to the claims
of Strategic Rocket Force adherents. In a probable rebuke to
34. Doctor of ^Military Sciences Major General V. Reznich-
kenko, "The Art of Winning," Krasnaya Zvezd a (Red Star),
19 March 1969, pp. 2-3. General Reznichkenko was Chief
of the General Tactical Deportment of the Frunze Mili-
tary Academy when the article was written. His articles
on military tactics have stressed the importance of tim-
ing and surprise in miJitary operations. His earlier





those in tlie Soviet military who advocated numerical super-
iority in various weapons systems, he asserted that "battle
is not a set of scales which falls on the more heavily
weighted side." Leadership and the skill of military com-
manders were seen to be able to counteract numerical dis-
advantage.
General Reznichkenko made several references to the
value of counterforcG and first strike strategies. Invoking
the v.'ords of Lenin that "activity" and the "struggle for the
initiative" were crucial in war, he stated that "the most
favorable conditions for displaying activity are created
during an offensive since the attacker holds the initiative."
Counterforce attacks v/ere viev;ed as a means to alter the
strategic balance in one's favor: "By the massive use of
nuclear weapons it is possible to change the balance of
forces and means to [the attacker's] own advantage almost
instantaneously." The closely related tactic of surprise
v;as held to be crucial:
Surprise is a very important principle of
military art which determines whether vic-
tory is achieved during combat operations.
Surprise makes it possible to anticipate
the enemy in delivering strikes, take him
unawares, paralyze his will, sharply reduce
his cornloat capability, disorganize control,
and create favorable conditions for the
defeat of even supei'ior forces. -^^
36. General Reznichkenko, "The Art of Winning," Krasnaya
Zvezda (Red Star), 19 March 1969, p. 2.
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V7hile he failed to refer specif icaliy to aniinissile
defenses, General Reznichkenko pointed out that in modern
warfare victory is inconceivable without measures to safe-
guard against weapons of mass destruction. Additionally,
dispersal of forces was a recoirimended countermeasure:
The conditions of nuclear war, if the im-
perialists unleash it, make it necessary
to take other steps in the interes-c of
minimizing losses in the event of i.\ nuc-
lear strike. It is deemed necessary to
employ the kind of distribution whereby
two adjacent and equally significant tar-
gets cannot be destroyed by the same nuc-
lear explosion which is big enough to
destroy only one of the targets. ^^
In summary. General Reznichkenko ' s article probably
represented the viewpoint of those military factions which
opposed a national strategy which placed too heavy an empha-
sis on the Strategic Rocket Forces. He apparently favored
further development of conventional and strategic defensive
forces, even at the expense of some numerical inferiority,
preferring to rely on tactics, leadership, and organization
to provide a war-winning capability. He did not refer to
any concepts related to deterrence. Seen from the perspec-
tive of some elements of the Soviet military bureaucracy,
the apparent highest priority given to the Strategic Rocket
Forces during this period m.ay have seemed like a movement
toward a deterrent rather than a war-fighting strategy.
37. General Reznichkenko, "The Art of Vs^inning," Krasnaya
Zvezda (Red Star), 19 March 1969, p. 2.
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Beginning on 20 March, Defense Secretary Laird and
other Department of Defense officials testified before Con-
gressional committees in support of President Nixon's deci-
sion to deploy the Safeguard antimissile defense system.
The testimony v;as notable in that it marked a major depar-
ture from previous Pentagon testimony by releasing previ-
ously classified intelligence information which markedly
upgraded the nature of the perceived Soviet strategic threat
to the United States. Although previous official statements
regarding the specific Soviet weapons systems discussed had
been made. Secretary Laird's unclassified testimony revealed
estimates of the accuracy of the large SS-9 intercontinental
ballistic missile, the current production rate of "Yankee"
class nuclear-powered, ballistic missile-launching subma-
rines, and described how the United States had detected test
firings of an improved Soviet antimissile defense intercep-
3 8
tor, all of which had previously been highly classified.
However, the most sensational aspect of Secretary Laird's
testimony was his assertion that: "With the large [mega] ton-
nage the Soviets have they are going for our missiles and
they are going for a first strike capability. There is no
39question about that." Although previous Administration
38. The New York Times , 2 J March 19 69, p. 1.
39. U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on International
Organization and Disarmament Affairs of the Committee
on Foreign Relations, Strategic and Foreign Policy




statements had expressed conce-rn over the possible mission
of the SS--9 f its preEumed first strike capability had not
been pictured ps being indicati^'o of future Soviet strategy.
Secretary Laird argued that the likelihood of the adoption
of a first strike counterforce strategy by the Soviet Union
in the inid~1970's made deployment of the Safeguard system
mandatory*
In discussing \:he capabilities of the Safeguard system
relative to estimates of Soviet offensive missile strength,
Secretary Laird stressed his concern with Soviet force pos-
ture developments and the futility of a United States deploy-
ment of a heavy antimissile defense system to protect its
cities
:
The potential threat from the Soviet Union
lies in the growing missile force which
could destroy a portion of our retaliatory
force. We cannot stop a massive Soviet
attack on our cities. Tecimically, we just
don't have the knov;-now. We must rely on
our deterrents to insure that a nuclear
attack doesn't start in the first place. '^'^
He repeated President Nixon's conviction that Safeguard did
not produce arms race pressures and expressed some doubt that
the Soviet Union was following the same nuclear strategy as
was the United States:
Our obviously thin protection of cities and
added protection of our deterrent forces
40. Strategic and Foreign Policy Implications of ABM
Systems , Part I, p, 17 8.
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will require no action at all from the
Soviet Union, providing that the Soviet
Union has a responsible deterrent nuclear
v;ar policy, as v/e do in the United States. -^
This concern that perhaps the Soviet Union v-as not adhering
to United States convictions regarding the dictates of what
it perceived to be the rational responses to a situation of
mutual assured destruction lay at the root of Secretary
Laird's apprehensiveness . It represented the strongest
official expression of doubt to that date that the "educa-
tion of the Soviets" attempts by the previous Administra-
tions liad been successful.
Finally, Secretary Laird strongly argued that the Safe-
guard deployment decision signalled important United States
policy convictions to the Soviet Union v;hile acting as an
incentive for serious Soviet negotiations on strategic arms
limitation:
The Safeguard system is not a stumbling
block to arms limitation talks with the
Soviet Union. On the contrary, under the
type of deployment we have chosen, this
measured deployment, the Soviet Union is
given an added incentive to negotiate ....
First, the modified ABM program would show
the Soviets that we are quite serious
about protecting our deterrent forces,
about assuring all enemies that they can-
not achieve an effective low-risk first
strike against the United States. Second,
it will show the Soviets that v/e are pre-
paring so that we vvill not be in a posi-
for a low-risk attack on them, and that
4 1 . Strategic and Foreign Policy Implications of ABM
Systems
,
Part I, p. 190.
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it is worthwhile to negotiate limits on
strategic arms , Under the proposed Safe-
guard, even the first tv;o installations
will not be operating before 1973. This
is ample time for the two countries to
negotiate agreements on these and other
weapoiis. Thub , the modified ^^BM opens
the door wider to a mutual arms control. '^^
In support of tliis analysis, he contended that Soviet press
reaction to the Safeguard decision announcement was encour-
aging in that it viewed the system as a "purely defensive
weapon." This contention is somev;hat misleading in that
early Soviet press response failed to directly comment on
the "of fensiveness or defensiveness" of the proposed system
deployment except as noted below. As has been outlined ear-
lier in this paper, " it v;as seen to have created arras race
pressures which would hardly seem to be "purely defensive."
The only reference by the Soviet press to its professed
defensive nature was an uncritical comraent on the content of
President Nixon's announcement: "During the press conference
Richard Nixon several times stressed that the antimissile
defense system which he proposed was of an exclusively defen-
44
sive nature." It is possible that Secretary Laird's remark
had been influenced by editorial commentary on the Soviet
4 2
.
Strategic and Foreign Po licy Impl ications of ABM
Systeuis , Part I, p. 183.
43. See above, pp. 229-232; specifically, footnote 26 and
Senator Fulbright's assertion on p. 232.




reaction •'.;Iiicli had appeared in the United States press.
James Reston's coron'.ent that the Soviets had "even reacted
to President Nixon's latest decision to buiid an antimissile
45
system as if v/e v/ere doing them a favor" was typical of
this comraentary
.
Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard's testimony gen-
erally repeated the same arguments. In his discussion of
possible United States responses to further increases in
Soviet force levels , he pointedly stressed that increased
United States offensive forces was an option which had been
carefully studied and rejected since it "v/as clearly an arms
race, the kind of a thing we want to avoid if we can possibly
4Gdo so. " (Italics mine] The intimation was that the deci-
sion had been close and the intended message to the Soviets
was clear.
The possible impact of this testimony on Soviet deci-
sion-makers was somewhat weakened by influential editorial
opinion published during this period. On 21 March, The New
York Times criticized Secretary Laird's "scare tactics" and
asserted that the gravity of the alleged Soviet threat was
47highly exagerated. Several days later, The Washington
Post denounced his apparent indulgence in "the incomprehensible
45. The New York Times , 19 March 19 69, p. 42.
46. The Washington Post
, 22 March 1969, p. Al.
47. The New York Times , editorial entitled "Nev; Pentagon
Ghos t s , "" "2 i iTarch 19 69, p . 46.
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jargon of tlie professional military man" and derogatorily
48
referred to the "mark of the deeply partisan politician."
What v.'ar required, the editorial argued, was a greater empha-
sis on the political intent of potential adversaries rather
than their military capabilities. The implication of Secre-
tary Laird's statement, that Soviet force posture develop-
ments connoted at least some indication of hostile intent,
was dismissed as outmoded analysis. The net effect of these
critical, frequently bitter analyses on the perceptions of
the Soviet leadership of the depth of the internal domestic
debate on antimissile defense deployment within the United
States is unknown, but it seems likely that they may have
concluded that a further deterioration in the influence of
the Department of Defense on United States policy formation
was probable. As v;ill be outlined below, growing speculation
on this issue was evident in the Soviet press during subse-
quent months.
A particularly outspoken and rare Soviet criticism of
the effectiveness of antimissile defense systems appeared on
23 March. After pointing out that "strictly speaking" the
United States antimissile defense deployment decision had been
made in September 1967, the mission of the Safeguard system
was revealed for the first time in the open Soviet press with-
out comment:
48. The Washington Po st, editorial entitled "The V7orld of




The current Administration has made a
decision in true soieiun fashion - to
build antimissile iaunching-sites near
existing missile iaunching-sites. As a
result, the purpose of the ABM system is
changed - it is no longer a defense for
cities, but a defense for ICBMs. ^
After specifically asserting that "the U.S. version" of anti-
missile defense systems would not insure defense against mis-
siles, the article criticized defenses in general:
To be effective in a nuclear attack, defense
must be 100 per cent. Only one missile need
break through and the target is destroyed.
But 100 per cent interception is impossible,
especially when you consider that any invest-
ments in the AB.M system are neutralized by
considerably smaller investments for addi-
tional offensive means and in improvements
for overcomina ABM defense. ^^
This is the familiar "cost-exchange ratio" argument used
persistently by former Secretary of Defense McNcimara, as the
article correctly noted. To reinforce this point, President
Nixon's 13 March statement that "there is no means whereby
51
we could defend our cities sufficiently" v/as cited. While
only Western statements were employed to support the author's
contention that effective antimissile defense was impossible,
the text clearly referred to all existing forms of such sys-
tems, not just those proposed by the United States. In
49. G. Gerasimov, "About the ABM System," Pravda Ukrainy
,





addition, to its implied refutation of those in the Soviet
Union who advocated antimissile defense, its tenor indicated
that the author considered that President Nixon's announce-
ment of the Safeguard system deployment decision had little
effect on the overall strategic balance. Such an inference
could have been a challenge to those who were presumably
arguing that a different perception of United States force
posture intentions was required at that time.
Having discredited the effectiveness of all antimissile
defense systems, the article noted the "irrationality" of
protecting offensive missives "which are hidden in under-
52ground shelters anyway." ' Taken in conjunction with the
assumed ineffectiveness of defenses, this attempt to imply
the adequacy of silo emplacom.ent for strategic offensive
forces makes it likely to assume that the author was speak-
ing for those who favored offensive strength, notably the
Strategic Rocket Forces.
This contention that antimissile defense systems were
ineffective was repeated two days later in an article which
stated that "in the opinion of specialists, it does not
53insure defense against missiles." The nationality of these
"specialists" was omitted. The Gerasimov assertion that the
52. Gerasimov, "About the ABM System," Pravda Ukrainy , 2 3
March 19G9, p. 4.
53. V. Rogov, "Appeal for Peace; V^ho Needs the 'Safeguard'
System; Melvin Laird's Recommendations," Trud (Trade),
25 March 19 6 9, p. 1.
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Safeguard decision v;as not a departure from previous United
States policy was also repeated. Citing American press
analyses that pictured the decision as a concession to the
"rail itary- industrial comple.^" for v/ithdrawl from Vietnam,
the author, V, Rogov , argued that recent statements by Secre-
tary Laird regarding United States disengagement from Vietnam
indicated that the withdrawl would be lengthy and gradual.
Therefore, he concluded, the costs of deploying an antimis-
sile defense system v;ould be added to the Vietnam War costs
54
and would not serve as a substitute for them. In the final
analysis, Rogov stated that the Safeguard decision was an
"American domestic problem" which had international conse-
quences. Opposition to the deployment was typically pic-
tured as focusing on system costs. Rogov concluded by not-
ing that the ultimate fate of Safeguard would be decided by
the Congress. The outcome was seen to be uncertain, partic-
ularly in the Senate.
On 25 March, President Nixon substantially repeated his
13 March arguments for Safeguard at a news conference. In an
attempt to quiet some of the domestic furor surrounding Secre-
tary Laird's remarks concerning the growing Soviet threat, he
55described Soviet force trends as "no cause for fright." In
54. A similar analysis was made by Valentin Zorin, "On
What Are the Billions Being Spent?," Pravda , 20 March
1369, p. 5.
55. "President Nixon Discusses the Vietnam Peace Talks and
the ABM Safeguard System," Department of State Bulletin
,
14 April 1969, p. 314.
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a statement that was quickly interpreted by t\v?. Soviet press
as a policy "based on positions of strength/' ^ the President
stated that he did not "want the President of the United
States, when he sits down at the conference table, to be in
a second-rate position as far as the strength of the United
57States is concerned." He quickly added that this statement
did not suggest that he advocated an arms race since the for-
mer numerical superiority held by the United States in stra-
tegic weapons could not be regained.
Several articles criticizing President Nixon's antimis-
sile defense deployment decision as being symptomatic of
powerful pressures from the "military-industrial complex"
appeared in the Soviet press in late March. These articles
did not state that defensive systems would generate arms race
pressures by requiring the deployment of more offensive sys-
tems, a persistent United States conviction. Conversely, one
article argued that the bulk of budgetary support v;as already
going to offensive systems:
So far, the largest amounts of capital have
been and are being used to amass offensive
types of v/eapons. The situation will hardly
improve if vast sums of money are spenr on
some other kinds of v;eapons,-'S
56. Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, 0500 GMT, 2 8 March
1969. '
57. "Safeguard System," Department of State Bulleti n, 14
April 19G9.




According to the author, V. Matveyev, the explanation for
the Safeguard system deployment decision could be found in
the fact that United States offensive forces had ceased to
require "quantitative buildup" and that another system was
needed to use the potentially available funds. Tv;o other
articles outlined the opposing forces in the United States
domestic debate. Particular emphasis v/as given to the pro-
spective role of the professional military and the "military-
industrial complex" in determining the future course of the
59foreign policy of the United States. The tenor of these
articles revealed a degree of uncertainty concerning the
probable outcome of this debate.
In the first response to the Nixon Administration's
portrayal of the increased Soviet threat to appear in the
Soviet domLCstic press, Pravda attacked Secretary Laird's
"absurd assertions that the Soviet Union's 'military prepar-
ations' are allegedly responsible as the main 'argument' for
60this propaganda for the new armiament programs." The goal
of these statements was seen to be an attempt to "whip up in
the public an arms race psychosis" in support of the interests
of the arms industry.
On 28 March, the first reaction to the Safeguard decision
59. V. Paramonov, "Missiles and Business," Sovetskaya
Roosiya (Soviet Russia) , 26 March 1959, p. 3 and
V. Soidatov, "Billions for VJar," Selskaya Zhizn'
(Rural Life) , 26 March 1969, p. 3.
60, Geoigiy Ratiani , ''Mistakes Have Already Been Made,"




appeared in the Soviet military press. Typically, the role
of the "military-industrial complex" and the arms race impli-
cations of the decision v;ere cited. No commentary on pos-
sible Soviet responses or Secretary Laird's use of the Soviet
threat v,'as included. The announced mission of the system to
protect Minuteman sites was accurately reported. In an impli-
cit comparison to the Soviet "Galosh" system, it v/as noted
that only one of the proposed sites was to be built near Wash-
ington. A subsequent article, which appeared on 2 April,
degraded the notion that antimissile defenses were required
to protect the United States from an attack by the Soviet
Union: "We understand that Americans may have differing views
as to whether they need anti-missiles or not. But they
hardly need these fantasies which aim at slandering the Sov-
let Union
.
This period of extensive comrrientary on the Safeguard
deployment decision was capped by a long Pravda article which
appeared on 31 March. Its analysis of the United States dom-
estic debate since the beginning of 1969 was keyed to a dia-
lectical format:
61. Lieutenant Colonel V. Nekrasov and V. Berezin, "To
the Altar of Military Business," Krasnaya Zvezda (Red
Star), 28 March 1969, p. 3.
62. Colonel A. Leontyev, "Antimissiles and Fabrications,"
Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), 2 April 1969, p. 3. See




,..it is a question of a dramatic clash
between tv/o irreconcilable forces: On
the one hand there are those v/ho demand
an increase in the military budget, the
arms race, and a stepping up of the 'cold
war,* and on the other, there are those
who demand switching national wealth and
human energy over to solving the complex
social problems v;ithin the country. ^-^
The 6 February suspension of United States antimissile defense
system construction was seen to have been a response by the
Uixon Administration to public outcry. Alarmed by the impli-
cations of this suspension, the "military-industrial complex"
had allegedly stepped up its pressure on President Nixon,
producing the announcement of the decision to proceed v;ith
the Safeguard system. Despite this decision, its opponents
were pictured as favoring "talks v;ith the Soviet Union on
limiting strategic offensive and defensive nuclear weapons."
The Soviet leadership had apparently concluded that the Safe-
guard deployment decision did not foreclose the possibility
of such negotiations. President Nixon was not personally
identified with the "military-industrial complex." Secretary
Laird fulfilled that role. The created image of a rapidly
grov/ing body of opposition to the deployment of Safeguard which
favored negotiations with the Soviet Union provided a suitable
"ally" for future appeals.
In addition to statements by President Nixon on 14 and
63. B, Strelnikov, "A Dangerous 'Safety Device,'" Pravda
,
31 March 19 G9, p. 4.
64. Ibid.

25 March, the image of the willingness of the United States
to enter into strategic arms limitation talks with the Sov-
iet Union was supported by statements by Secretary of State
V^iliiam Rogers on 27 March. In testimony before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, he pointed out that there had
been no indication that the President's decision had adverse-
ly affected Soviet wijlingness to begin strategic arms limi-
tation negotiations:
In none of my discussions nor any of the
discussions we've had in the Department
with any representatives of the Soviet
Union has there been any suggestion that
this decision would affect either the ini-
tiation of talks or their successful out-
come . ^^
In response, Senator William Fulbright stated that he felt
that the Soviets were not concerned about the decision
because they had concluded that such systems were ineffec-
tive. His statement overlooked Soviet research and develop-
ment prograjns on anrimissile defense systems other than the
"Galosh." Secretary Rogers cited the facts that the proposed
system would not be operational until 1973, that the progress
and necessity of the system would be reviewed annually, and
that the Nixon Administration was aware of the broad public
opposition to deployment as being conducive to possible arms
limitation negotiations. He was particularly critical of the
frequently repeated assertion that once begun the Safeguard
65. The New York Times, 28 March 1969, p. 14.
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system would inevitably spread into a thick area defense of
the entire nation:
...why is there this feeling that it can't
be turned off? I have no doubt in my mind
' that if the arms talks are successf uj ^ v;e
can stop this program just like we stopped
Nike-Zeus. VVhy do we think we are coinmit-
ted forever, irrevocably, if v/e make this
decision?^^
He concluded that the United States would be "glad" to dis-
band its antimissile defenses if a suitable agreement with
the Soviet Union could be reached.
Soviet statements degrading President Nixon's concept
of "linkage" appeared again in mid-April. It was reported
that high officials in the State Department opposed his pro-
fessed desire to achieve settlement of "other international
problems" before "beginning Soviet-American talks on questions
ft 7
concerning the nuclear missile race." High State Department
officials, notably Secretary Rogers and former Ambassador to
the Soviet Union Llewelyn Thompson, were reported to be advo-
cating the immediate establishment of a date in the summer
for the commencement of negotiations. A later article by
.Yuri Arbatov, Director of the United States Institute of the
Soviet Academy of Sciences, was more critical. He credited
the concept to a "theory" in the United States that the Soviet
66. The New York Time s, 28 March 1969, p. 14.
67. "Arguments in Washington," Izvestia, 10 April 19 69, p.
2. See also Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, 0630
GMT, 23 April 1969.
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Union vas more intsresced than the United States in limiting
strategic arms and that "there are certain concessions to be
obtained in other areas for thin." Interestingly, he did
69
not identify the source ' of this "theory" and, while he
attempted to outline its intent, he neither confirmed nor
denied its validity. A particularly critical article which
had appeared in The Nev; Yor): Time s describing President
Nixon's "brinksraanship" was cited by Arbatov and may have con-
tribited to his analysis. However, denial of the applicabil-
ity of the "linkage" concept in the strategic arms limitation
context had been a persistent theme of Soviet analyses of
United States policy and this article was probably a continu-
ation of that theme.
Arbatov • s article, which took the form of a review of a
booklet entitled "The Future of the Strategic Arms Race in
the 1970 's" by Professor George W. Rathjens of the Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology, approvingly quoted Rathjens*
statement that recent technological innovations had made it
necessary to resolve certain fundamental questions:
68. Yuri Arbatov, "U.S.A.: The Great Missile Debate,"
Izves tia, 15 April 19 69, p. 5.
69. This concept was put forth in various forins by Presi-
dent Nixon during this period. It is generally con-
sidered to have reflected the thinking of Professor
Henry Kissinger, Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs.
70. The Nev; Yoric Times , news analysis entitled "Nixon's
Highly Risky Game in the Sphere of Soviet-American
Relations" by Robert Kieiman, 7 April 1969, p. 42.
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Conditions are nov; favorable - more so than
they will be at any other moment in the
foreseeable future - for the U.S. and the
U.S.S.R, to adopt resolutions that will
allow both countries to avoid a new upturn
in the arms race, or at the,, very least, to
make the upturn less steep.
The key technological innovations v\'Gre antimissile defenses
and multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicles (MIKV)
,
Arbatov pointed out that the antimissile defense debate in
the United States had entered a "decisive phase'' v;hich would
be resolved in tiie "imn^.ediate future." His analysis of this
debate followed the familiar lines of arraying the forces of
the "military-industrial complcix" against those who favored
social development. In a slight break with the Talensky-
Kosygin contention that minimizing losses in a possible nuc-
lear war through the use of antimissile defenses v/as purely
defensive and therefore "innocent," he argued that attempts
to fulfill this mission v^ould accelerate the arms race. Al-
though Soviet articles had frequently cited specific United
States antimissile defense deployment decisions as contribut-
ing to arms race pressures, Arbatov 's statement was the first
to include all such systems in the analysis. Similar analy-
ses were common in United States writings at that time and
fit neatly into the prevalent action-reaction model which
71. Arbatov, "The Great Missile Debate," Izvestia , 15 x^pIil
19 69, p. 5. The quotation cited by Arbatov is from
George W. Rathjens, The Future of the Strategi c Arms
Race in the 1970 's ," (New York: Carnegie Endov/raent for
International Peace, 1969), p. 12,
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dominated the thinking of those who opposed the deployment
72
of the Safeguard system on arms race grounds.
President Nixon's 18 April news conference again avoided
reference to "positions of strength" in evaluating United
States response to his assessment of the increased Soviet
strategic threat, stating that he sought to "avoid falling
73into a second-class or inferior position" with respect to
the Soviet Union. The President pointed out that the United
States did not seek to reattain a position of strategic super-
iority over the Soviet Union. His previously announced adher-
ence to the concept of "sufficiency" was held to be adequate.
In response to a question regarding his evaluation of growing
opposition v;ithin the Senate to his deployment decision, he
indicated that his conviction that the decision was correct
was undiminished and that it v;ould be narrowly upheld by the
Senate.
On 26 April, it was announced that the traditional May
Day military parade in Moscow's Red Square had been cancelled
and that in future years the only Moscow military parade would
be held on 7 November, the Anniversary of the Bolshevik Revo-
lution. Ho reason was given for this policy decision. Inter-
estingly, preparations and rehearsals for the parade had
72. For example, see Senator George S. McGovern in a book
by the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions,
Anti-Ba l listic Missi le: Yes or No?
,
(New York: Hill and
Wang, 1969), pp. 15-23.
73. "President Nixon's News Conference of April 18," Depart -
ment of State Bulletin, 5 May 1969, p. 379.
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begun, but were halted in mid-April. * Some Western specu-
lation as to the cause of this decision at the time of the
cancelli.tion predicted imminent major changes in the compo-
sition of the Poliburo. Subsequent events have shown this
hypothesis to have been incorrect. Another theory which
received wide interest among Western analysts of Soviet
affairs involved the linking of the unsuccessful Red Square
assassination attempt by a member of an elite Red Army unit,
an abnormally large number of unexplained deaths of senior
Soviet military men in early 1969, and the disappearance of
several other high military leaders as indicative of a pos-
sible abortive coup attempt. A minority theory, largely
circulated in newspapers, saw the cancellation as an cittempt
to soften the Soviet image abroad in the aftermath of the
invasion of Czechoslovakia. Some element of doubt as to the
utility of this particular form of military capability demon-
stration was seen to be a factor. The efficient conduct of
the invasion of Czechoslovakia, increased worldv/ide exposure
to units of the Soviet Navy, and the perceived growing pov/er
of its ocrategic power by other nations fulfilled the same
goals as did the military parade in a more subtle and convinc-
ing manner
.
A group of articles by Soviet military leaders appeared
in the May Oay period. Formulations concerning air defense
capabilities failed to refer specifically to antimissile
74. The New York Times , news article by Max Frankel, 30
April 1969, p. 13.
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defenses and maintained the vague reliability theme which had
persisted since early 1968, The statement of First Deputy
Defense Minister Mnrshal Ivan Yakubovskiy v/as typical:
The country's Air Defense Forces, v/hich
include antiaircraft missile forces, fighter
aircraft, radiotechnicai and special forces
capable of reliably hitting ail modern means
of the enemy's air attack at great distances
from the objectives being defended, at all
ranvges of aJ.titude and speeds of flight. ^^
Marshal Zakharov of the General Staff referred to the abil-
ity of the Strategic Rocket Forces to penetrate antimissile
defenses: "Their global type rockets have an unlimited range
of action; they are not only capable of carrying v^'arhcads of
colossal potency, but also of traversing enemy antimissile
netv/orks. "
As the spring of 1963 progressed, the opposition iii Uie
Senate tended to focus on two possible responses to Presideni
Nixon's Safeguard deployment decision. Those v;ho opposed
deployment outright sought to deny the necessary funds. A
second group attempted to establish a deployment moratorium
with continued research and development pending the outcome
of intial negotiations with the Soviet Union on a possible
limitation of ail strategic weapons.
75. Marshal I. Yakubovskiy, "At Battle Posts," Sovetskaya
Roos iya (Soviet Rassia) , 9 May 196S, p. 1. See also
General S. L. Sokolov, "A Great and Natural Victory,"
Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), 9 May 1969, p. 2 and Tags
International s'ervice in English, 1350 GMT, 7 May' 1969
76. Marshal M. Zakharov, "On Guard Over Socialism and
Peace y " Partinaya Z hizn' (Party Life), no. 9, p. 13.

- 259 -
The Ni.xon Administration held firmly to its stand that
the increased Soviet strategic capability required the immed-
iate comKtenceraent of antimissile defense deployment. On 25
April, Secretary Laird argvied that Safeguard v/ac a minimal
step that should be taken to cover the contingency that arms
limitation negotiations might not be successful. He con-
cluded that if the Soviet Union's strategic buildup had been
intended to establish a situation of strategic parity it
should have been halted or slowed. Noting that it continued
77
unabated, he asserted that the Soviet goal was superiority.
This conclusion was supported by the report of a Department
of Defense study group headed by Deputy Defense Secretary
David Packard which submitted its review of United States
7 8
strategic force posture to President Nixon en 1 May. The
fact that this review had been delivered to the National
Security Council two months ahead of its previously announced
com.pletion date of 1 July v;as seen to reflect an Administra-
tion desire to begin negotiations with the Soviet Union on
strategic arms limitation at an early date.
Open Soviet response to Secretary Packard's report was
notably polemical and confined to one article which appeared
on 5 May. The tone of the report was seen to be hostile to
the Soviet Union, reflecting a desire to return to the "un-
forgettable days" of 1949 when "the United States still
77. The Washington Post , 2 5 April 19 69, p. Al




enjoyed £ nuclear monopoly." Pointing o-jt that such a
situation had "not existed since then and will never exist
again f" the article implied Soviet supremacy and stated that
the United ^States sought a first strike capability:
. , .of greatest interest is undoubtedly
the policy which stresses the broad in-
crease in offensive forces in order to
overtake the Soviet Union and preserve
the possibility of making a surprise
attack at any moment. ^^
Forces to achieve this goal were seen to be an inreased
inventory of intercontinental ballistic missiles, including
8
1
some v.'hich were to bo carried by submarines. Pointedly,
these developments were contrasted with the statements of
United States officials "who never tire of assuring the U.S.
public of their readiness to finally begin negotiations on
the liiaiatioA of nuclear arms 'at the end of spring or at the
82beginning of summer.'"
The 8 May publication of the study "The ABM: An Evaluation
79. Yuriy Zhukov, "The Nuclear Tail and the Non-nuclear
Dog," Pravda, 5 May 19 69, p. 5.
80. Ibid.
81. This reference v/as to the Underwater Long-Range Missile
System (ULMS) then being studied by the United States
Navy and Department of Defense officials. This new
system, sim.ilar to Polaris/Poseidon in operational con-
cept, would employ larger submarines v;ith interconti-
nenta.l range ballistic missiles to enlarge its potential
operating areas in an attempt to reduce its vulnerability
to the ontisubraarine v/arfare (ASW) efforts of potential
adversaries
,




of trie Dc;cii>icii to lycploy Sxi Anti-Ballistic Missile System"
cominissioned by SeniHtor Edward M. Kennedy was pictured as
evidence of the sharpening of th" United States domes tic-
debate by the Soviets. Major emphasis was given to its
conclusion that antimissile defense deployment would seri-
ously handicap efforts to achieve arms limitation agreements.
Additional analysis was devoted to the report's statements
that Secretary Laird's assertion of the increased Soviet
threat was "unconvincing" and that the Safeguard deployment
would promote a renev/ed arms race.
Internal United States debate during the month of May
centered on the Nixon Administiration' s evaluation of the
threat posed by the existing Soviet inventory of large SS-9
missiles, its rate of increase, and the potential Soviet
capability to install multiple warheads on this weapon. The
SS-9 was held to be capable of delivering a single 20 to 25
megaton warhead, a triplet of 5 megaton or a sextet of 1 mega-
85ton multiple warheads. Tlie Nixon Administration argument.
83. Jerome Wiesner and Abram Chsiyes, eds., The_ ADM; An
^Xf'AyiL^- L^Tl of the Decision to Dep loy an Ant i -Bal li sti c
M i s s i 1o Sy s ten. , (New York: Signet Broadside, 1969), pp,
330-144.
84. N. Kurdyumov, "CCinmotion in the Pentagon," Pravda , 8
May 1969, p. 5. See also "Position Sent to Congress,"
I zves tia , 7 May 1969, p. 1 and Tass International Ser-
vice ln~Russian, 1348 GMT, 7 Hay T969.
85. U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on International
Organization and Disarmament Affairs of the Committee
on Foreign Relations, Strategi c and Foreign Policy
Implicat ions of ABM Systems, Part 1, 91st Congress,
First bession,~~TWashington, 19G9), p. 286.
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made by Director of Defense Research and Engineering John
Foster, was that the three warhead configuratioi^ constituted
the primary threat to the Minuteman sites. Tests of this
weapon on 13 April had employed three reentry vehicles which
had impacted in a line along the flight path of the missile.
Dr. Foster declined to confirm positively v/hether these re-
entry vehicles had been simply multiple reentry vehicles (MRV)
or multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicles (M3:rv) ,
Projecting present forces and deployment rates ahead to 1975,
he argued that the Soviet Union would have 500 SS-9 boosters
with three warheads each at that time. VJith the estimated
accuracy (0.25 nautical m.ile or 1500 feet) of this weapon,
he concluded that fewer than 100 Minutemen vsrould survive a
coantcrforce attack if the missile sites were not defended
8 7by Safeguard. Based upon these assumptions, he further
argued that an immediate start on the Safeguard deployment
was required to have defenses in place at that time. Finally,
he seconded Secretary Laird's doubt that the Soviet goal was
parity. The validity of these calculations, which were typi-
cal of those employed by Department of Defense strategic
analysts and planners, was disputed by non-governmental
experts who basically disagreed v;ith the assumptions used in
86. The New York Times , 22 April 1969, p. 1.
87. U.S., Congress, House of Representatives, Subcommittee
on the Department of Defense of the Committee on Appro-
priations, Safeguard Antiball is tic Missile System
,
91st Congress, First Session, "Tvjashington, 1969), p. 9,
For a surronary of the testimony, see The Now York Times ,
22 April 1969, p. 1.
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88the Department of Defense analysis. ^ Their vaiied assump-
tions generally led to conclusions vv'hich degraded the gravity
of the Soviet threat or disputed the Nixon Administration's
proclainied optimism about the feasibility of defending the
offensive missile sites with the Safeguard system. Other
non-governmental analysts, notably Albert Wohlstetter,
attacked the assumptions made by the opponents of antimis-
sile deployment arguing that defense of Minuteman sites v;as
the least destabilizing action v;hich the United States could
take in response to the increasing vulnerability of its
S3land-based offensive missile systems.
Addressing graduation exercises at the United States
Air Force Academy on 4 June, President Nixon delivered a
strong attack on those "nev; isolationists" v/hom he asserted
were undermining United States security interests. He firmly
90
opposed any form of "unilateral disarmament," but stated
88. The most vehement of these experts were Ralph Lapp
and George W. Rath j ens, A surom.ary of Lapp's testi-
mony may be found in The New York Time s, 9 April
1969, p. 1. Rathjens' later testimony v;as summa-
rized in The New York Times , 25 April 1969, p. 1. A
further analytical challenge was included in Jerome
V/iesner and Abram Chayes, eds.. The ADM: An Evaluation
of the Dec ision to Deploy an Anti-Ballistic Miss ile
SysTein ^"" (New Yorkl sTgn"it~Broadside , 197)9) . A superb
summary of the disagreement of the Wiesner and Chayes
book v/ith Dr. Foster's assumptions may be found in
Strategic and Foreign Poli cy Impli cations of ABM Sys -
tc^ms, Part II, pp. "sTcPsTS. ~
8S. The Mew Yor k Times , news article by VJilliami Beecher,
26 May 19 69, p." 13.
^^* The New York Times, 5 June 1969, p. 1. The full text
of the address was printed on p. 30.
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that he was prepared for "new initiatives in the control of
arms." V?iLh regard to military spending, he repeated his
earlier stateinent that he preferred to err on the side of
too much rather than too little. Although the address was
primarily intended for the domestic audience, President
Nixon was apparently attempting to counter any unexpressed
Soviet hopes that domestic opposition to hi£ foreign and
military policies would cause him to moderate those policies
substantively. Soviet reaction to the address was critical,
but confined itself to summarizing adverse response in the
91United States.
Washington "leaks" in early June indicated that the
intelligence services were split on their interpretation of
the implications of the Soviet strategic buildup. The Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency reportedly disagreed with the Defense
Intelligence Agency's conclusion that the Soviet Union sought
92
a counter force first strike capability. This controversy,
which attacked the roots of the Kixon Administration's case
for the deployment of the Safeguard system, v/as apparently
resolved by 18 June when the United States Intelligence Board
reportedly concluded that the Soviet Union sought a strategic
93posture slightly greater than parity and was not m.ovmg
91. B. Orekhov, "U.S. Public Alarmed," Pravda, 7 June 1S)G9
p. 5.
92. The New York Times, 1 June 19 69, p. 2.
93. The New York Times, 13 June 1969, p. 1.
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toward the- attainment of a first strike capability. Reflect-
ing this conclusion. Secretary Laird modified his previous
statement that "there is no question that the Soviets are
going for a first strike" to the effect that "the SG-9 is a
94first strike weapon.' His emphasis indicated that this
evaluation was based upon this v;eapon's capabilities rather
than its apparent intent.
President Nixon's news conference of 19 June revealed
that the United States had specifically proposed to begin
strategic arms limitation negotiations with the Soviet Union
95
on 31 July. The President indicated that the proposal had
been made to Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin by Secretary Rogers
on 12 June, He noted that no reply from the Soviet Union
had been received. In response to a question concerning con-
tinued United States testing of multiple warhead offensive
missiles as a possible obstacle to reaching an arms limitation
agreement. President Nixon repeated his conviction that any
uinlateral actions by the United States "v/ould not be in our
interest." Assessing the strength of Senate opposition to
the deployment of Safeguard, he concluded that it would be
narrowly approved. His estimate was that 51 Senators sup-
ported deployment, 46 opposed it, and 3 were undecided. Fi-
nally, he pointed out that recent Soviet multiple warhead
94. The Washington Pos t, 24 June 1969, p. Al
.
95. "President Nixon's News Conference of June 19," Depart-
ment of State Bulletin, 7 July 19 69, p. 2.
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tests; imp.?.ctiDg in tihe Pacific Ocean had further convinced
him of the necessity or irrirrediately initiating antimissile
defense deployment
.
Oveit Soviet, response to this nev;s conference was con-
fined to radio coiTir.ientary on the President's announcement
that he would not halt the testing ot "missiles with multi-
96pie v;arheads." The proposed date for the commencement of
negotiations was not mentioned. A domestic broadcast cited
testing of multiple warhead missiles by the United States as
97
an action that would lead to "a new round m the arms race,"
Whether such tests had been conducted or not v;as not addres-
sed. Whereas the earlier broadcast to international audi-
ences briefly discussed "considerable" Senate opposition,
the domestic broadcast v;as confined to polemical commentary
on arms race pressures.
Soviet press commentary on issues related to antimissile
defenses increased in June. At the core of most of the arti-
cles was the concern that the United States was committed to
the attainment of a "position of strength" prior to entering
strategic arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union.
One analyst expressed concern that the dual development of
antimissile defenses and multiple independently-targeted
reentry vehicJes v/ould "further aggravate international
96. Ta ss_In te rnatJ_OT23 l_ Service in Eng 1 i sh , 0952 GMT , 20
Juiie 19 69.




tensions, particularly between the two major v/orid powers."'^
Cf the tv/o developments, antimissile defense was seen as the
least harmful. A second article briefly referred to the ""n-
cibility cf antimissile defenses to provide complete protec-
tion of defended are^is. Significantly, this article placed
President Nixon among those who opposed the "military-indus-
trial complex-inspired" goal of positions of strength: "For
his part, the President believes that 'sufficiency' and not
'superiority' is the v/ord that should be applied to nuclear
99
weapons." Guch a statement im.plied that therefore Presi-
dent Nixon was a suitable "ally" for strategic arms limita-
tion negotiations, since he also opposed the real enemy in
the dialectical struggle, the "military-industrial complex."
Invoking the opinion of "specialists," the author firmly
discredited attempts to attain military superiority: "Super-
iority no longer holds out military advantages and has become
an irreJ.evant concept," Such a statement is clearly at
odds with assertions of Soviet military writers, who have
consistently assumed military superiority to be the goal of
the Soviet Union in post-1968 articles. It is interesting
98. V. Shestov, "Nuclear Rubicon," Mezhdunarodnaia Zhizn'
(International Affairs), June 1969, p. 62.
99. G. Gerasiracv, "Pentagonia, 1969," Mezhdunarodna ia Zhizn'
(International Affairs), June 1969, p. 48.
100. Ibid.
101. For example, see Major General K. S. Bochkarev , "V. I.
Lenin and the Building of the Armed Forces of the USSR,"
Morskoi Sbornik (Naval Digest), February 1969, pp. 4-5;
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to note that the author, G. Gerasimov, had also v/ritten an
earlier article which was the most critical assessment of
the effectiveness of antimissile defenses to have appeared
102in the open Soviet press to that date. ' A subsequent art-
icle by L. Strelnikov, Pravda Vsfashington correspondent, crit-
icized the Nixon Administration's argument that Congres-
sional approval of the Safeguard program would improve the
prospects for negotiations with the Soviet Union as being
part of a "positions of strength" policy:
It has lately been more and more openly
hinted that in VJashington Congressional
approval v;ill be needed as a 'trump* in
forthcoming AiTierican-Soviet negotiations
on curtailm.ent of the strategic arras race.
In other v^'ords, certain people in the
U.S.A. V70uld like to conduct the conver-
sations from a position of strength. Many
A. Galitsan, "For a Leftist Line," Voenno-i storiche-
skii Zhurnal (Military-historical Journal), March
1969, pp. 12-13; Colonel I. Seleznev, "V. I. Lenin -
The Founder of Soviet Military Science," Krasnaya
Zve?.da (Red Star), March 1970, pp. 9-16; LTeutenant
Colonel V. Ivanov , "Scientific Leadership Principles
for Defending the Socialist Fatherland," Kommunist
Vooruzhennyki* Sil (Co^jnunist of the Armed Forces),
August 1969, pp. 9-16; General S. L, Sokolov, "Our
Revolution Knows How to Defend Itself," Sovctskaya
Roosiya (Soviet Russia), 23 February 1971, p. 2; Major
General S. Ilin, "A Powerful Factor for Victory,"
Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), 12 March 1971, p. 5; Major
General Y. Sulimov, "A Policy of Active Counteraction
to Aggression," Krasnaya Zve zda (Red Star), 1 June
1971, pp. 2-3; Colonel Y. Vlas'yevich, "Dynamics of
Military Economic Expenditures," Kommunist Vooruzhen-
nykh Sil (Comraunist of the Armed Forces), August 1970,
pp. 16-22; and Lieutenant General I. Zavylov, "New
Weapons and the Art of V-^ar , " Krasnaya Zve zda (Red Star),
30 October 1970, pp. 2-3.
102. See above, pp. 244-246.
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are saying that approval of this Pentagon
thesis, which is incompatible v;ith the
tasks of iraprovinq American-Soviet rela-
tions, would be a treraendous mistake for
the United States. Practice has long
since shown that attempts to hold talks
with the Soviet Union from a position of ,^-.
strength are doomed to failure in advance.
While it appeared that tlie dominant faction v;ithin the
Soviet leadership at this time continued to partially sub-
scribe to the "go-slow" tactics which had preceded President
Nixon's Safeguard deployment decision, the internal Soviet
tactical debate on hov; to proceed v;ith regard to strategic
arms limitation negotiations with the United States probably
sharpened during the summer months. The above cited arti-
cles were generally representative of the viewpoint of those
who favored such negotiations. The arguments put forth in
these articles concerning the "principle of equal security"
and denouncing United States attempts to negotiate from a
"position OJ^; strength" have remained persistent themes dur-
ing th.e subsequent conduct of the Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks (SALT) in Helsinki and Vienna. Gerasimov's statement
that military superiority had become an "irrelevant concept"
V7as significant. The utility of military superiority has
been a cornerstone of Soviet military doctrine. Open advo-
cacy of this principle ivas absent during the period from
April to July 1969, probably reflecting a concern for its
103. B. Strelnikov, "Nuclear Pig in a Poke/' Pravda , 10
June 1969, p. 5.

~ 2"/0 --
possible effect on the United States domestic debate on anti-
missile defense systeia deployment. If this hypothesis is
correct, the policy of relative silence v;as a tactical deci-
sion and Gerc^isiniov ' s statement was an element v/hich sup-
ported that policy. The complete absence of military state-
ments challenging tl'C princij^le of attaining military super-
iority since 1969 seems to minimize the possibility that
its utility was being debated in the late spring of 1969
and that Gerasimov's statement had factional implications.
An ongoing internal debate on the strategic implications of
superiority probably continued throughout this period, but
it was submerged to a] low the Soviet Union to present a some-
what less bellicose image to non-domestic audiences, notably
those in the United States.
The previous Soviet assertions that the Safeguard system
differed only slightly from the Sentinel deployment initiated
by the Johnson Administration was challenged in July, The
Sentinel was described as a "light" system, v;hi]e Safeguard
was termed "heavy." After pointing out that neither system
was capable of guaranteeing that all incoming v/arheads would
be intercepted, the article described the provocative nature
of the Safeguard deployment decision:
B'rom the military and political point of
view, the decision to deploy the ADM system
cannot be uiterpreted as anything but a
pro\'Ocation against the socialist countries,
notably the Soviet Union. It is not exclud-
ed that the American hawks may at some par-
ticular moment decide that this system of
antimissile defense is sufficiently effective
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and launch a nuclear and missile v/ar.
while such a scenario has been widely employed in Western
arguments by those concerned with Soviet antimissile defense
efforts, it had not appeared previously in open Soviet anal-
yses. It refuted the Talensky-Kosygin thesis that antimis-
sile defenses v;ere nonprovocative in nature. V7hether this
contention reflected "mirror image" thinking, merely at-
tempted to make a propaganda point, or represented a real-
istic Soviet concern is highly speculative, but such an
interpretation would fit conveniently into an image that
United States force posture trends required additional Sov-
iet strategic force deployments.
In a statement that was generally interpreted as signi-
fying Soviet willingness to open negotiations on limitation
of strategic arms. Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko favorably
commented on such discussions in an address to the Supreme
Soviet on 11 July:
The Soviet Government has already reported
on its readiness to enter into an exchange
of opinions with the USA on so-called stra-
tegic weapons. The U.S. Government has
stated that it is preparing for an exchange
of opinions. The Soviet Government is also
ready for this. One would like to express
the hope that both sides will approach this
question with recognition of its great im-
portance. ^^^
104. Y. Yuriev, "United States' 'New' /vBM System," Me zhduna -
rodnaia Zhizn' (International Affairs), July 1969, p.
129.
105. Pravda, 11 July 1969, p. 4.
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Although Gromyko failed to respond f^pecif ically to Presi-
dent Nixon's proposal to begin tiie negotiations in the first
half of the month of August, tlie tone of the address v;as con-
ciliatory v/ith respect to the United States and "welcomed"
the "Age of Negotiation'' concept formerly advanced by the
President.
On 27 June, the Senate Armed Services Committee reported
out the bill authorizing expenditures for the deployment of
the Safeguard system. The Committee approved deployment by
106
a vote of JU to 7. The release of the majority and minor-
ity opinions on 8 July revealed that neither side showed any
tendency tov/ard compromise. These views and the hardening
of positions typified the evolution of the internal United
States debate which had followed President Nixon's 14 March
announcement cf his deployment decision. A collateral
development had been to downgrade the importance of signal-
ling to the Soviet Union, Both sides concentrated on influ-
encing the domestic debate. Statements which concerned
themselves with possible Soviet responses were employed to
strengthen more pressing domestic arguments. The general
perception of either side in this respect was that those who
favored deployment and were basically concerned with the main-
tenance cf United States strategic force viability saw Safe-
guard as a response to aii increased Soviet threat to a por-
tion of those forces in the form of its strategic posture
106. The Washington Post, 20 June 1968, p. Al
.
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and demonstrated capabilities, as a symbol of United States
resolve to maintain minor strategic superiority or parity
with So""iet forces, and as a valuable negotiating tool if
arms limitation discussions began. The opposition, which
primarily opposed antimissile defense system, deployment on
absolute cost and national priority considerations, argued
that deployment would be interpreted as an indication that
the United States sought to regain substantial strategic
superiority and therefore would adversely affect the pos-
sibilities for future negotiations v;ith the Soviet Union.
This concern of the opposition for possible Soviet reaction
was cited as a miajor consideration in the presentation of
the Cooper-Hart amendment to the bill on 2 3 July. This
amendment advocated cont-inued research and development of
antimissile defense systems pending the outcome of initial
arms limitation discussions. As the month of July progres-
sed, political analysts predicted a narrow victory for the
Nixon Adminiscraticn, with the largest margin seen to be
107SIX votes.
As the crucial Senate vote on Safeguard deployment drew
10 8
closer, Soviet press coverage increased slightly. The
assessment of the United States domestic debate had changed
107. The New York Times , news article by V7illiam Beecher,
18 July 1969, p. 1.
108. N. Kurdyumov, "V^ho Is Advocating Safeguard?," Pravda,
5 August 196 9, p. 5 and "VJhich Way Will the Scales
Tip?,'" Izvestia, 7 August 19 69, p. 3.
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little since the initial anal^^3es of the preceding March.
All extremely close vote v:as predicted. The familiar dialec-
tical image of the opponents in the debate was put forth:
There is a struggle going on in the United
States. On one side is the mighty 'mili-
tary-industrial complex,' striving to plunge
the country into the abyss of an accelerated
arms race and possible nev/ military adven-
tures. On the other is the increasing resis-
tance of sober-minded 7\mericans v;ho understand
the catastrophic consequences of the proposed
course
.
The favorable reference to "sober-minded /unericans" indicated
that tliere were substantive forces within the United States
with whom it would be possible to negotiate on strategic
arms limitation v^ithout regard to tl^e outcome of the Safe-
guard vote. The assertion that those forces were "growing"
implied that their influence v/ould continue to increase.
An alternative explanation was that the Soviet Union v^as
simply interested in making propaganda points through their
interpretation of the United States internal debate.
On 6 August, the Senate voted in favor of allocating
the necessary funds for the initial deployraent of the Safe-
guard system. The margin was 51 to 50, with all Senators
voting and Vice President Spiro Agnev; casting the deciding
vote. Had this measure been defeated, research and develop-
ment of more advanced antimissile defense systems than Safe-
guard would have been continued. The amendment sponsored by
109. B. Orekhov, "Struggle," Pravda, 28 July 1969, p. 5.
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Senators Cooper and Hart limiting funds to further research
and d<i velopment of Safeguard was similiarly defeated, 51 to
Predictably, tbo narrov; Nixon Administration victory
in the Senate vote on the deployment of the Safeguard sys-
tem v/as picturrd as a victory for the "military-industrial
complex"' ]vy tlie Soviet press. Quotations supporting the
argument that the decision portended an accelerated arms
race to satisfy its needs were exclusively obtained from
sources in the United States. ' Holding to the former gen-
eral lino, antimissile defense deployments as such \\'ere not
viewed as promoting the arms race. The role of the "military-
industrial complex" was seen to be critical. The image of
the Safeguard system as the "tip of the iceberg" of future
111
demands of this group was frequently employed. ^ Perhaps
most important were repeated statements that the results of
this vote did not indicate the final defeat of the "sober-
minded" forces in the United States debate:
The Senate vote still does not mean the
end of the struggle in the Congress on
110. The New York Times , news article by William Beecher,
7 August 19 69, p. 1,
111. N, Kurdymov, "The United States: To Please the Military-
Industrial Com.plex, " ££^yj3a, 6 August 19 69, p. 5. Among
those quoted were The _New Yor k Times, Senators Cooper,
Kennedy, and Mclntyre and Tormer~vTce President Humph-
rey.
112. I^i4* ^-^ also Hoscow Domestic Service in Russian,
162 G GMT, 3 August" 19 69
.

the antimissile defense program, the more
so since outside the capitol millions of
Araericans are making increasingly resolute
demands for active steps to curtail the
arms race.-^-^
Several analysts pointed out that the debate represented
the first great challenge to the influence of the "mili-
tary-industrial complex:
"
Yesterday's voting in the Senate thus
reflects the growing antiwar sentiments
in the United States. For the first time
in many years was the government's deci-
sion on deployment of another system of
armaments seriously questioned in the
rank and fileCongress witl} the support of
i'imericans . -^-^ *
A more pessimistic analysis stressed that "it cannot be
ruled out that the mi] itary- industrial complex may throv;
everything into an active offensive which will threaten
115the world with extremely dangerous consequences." Tne
Senate vote was seen to have revealed several key develop-
ments in the United States; the fact that the Senate was
"no longer representative," the instability of the position
within the Congress of those v;ho supported the Nixon Admin-
istration, and the first clear indication that a bipartisan
113. Kurdymov, "To Please the Military-Industrial CcmplGx,"
Pravda, 6 /august 1969, p. 5.
114. Tass International Service in English, 1044 GMT, 7
August T9 6 9.




coalition opposed to escalating the arras race was forming.
By iiTiplication ,- the Nixon Administration v/as pictured as
favoring such an escalation. Hov;ever, the Soviet press
stopped short of directly accusing the Administration of
such an intention. This reaction kept Soviet options open.
While not foreclosing the possibility of opening negotia-
tions with the Nixon Administration, propaganda points
could be scored by asserting that United States actions
were responsible for the continuation of the arras race.
Nevertheless, the influence of the opponents of increiised
armaments was still seen to be ascendant. Given these cir-
cumstances, most Soviet stateraents on the future of the
arms race stressed that its escalation was a probability,
not a certainty. The assertion that "Vvashington' s far-
reaching plans for creating a so-called ABM defense system
could be another dangerous step along the slippery path of
military preparations" was typical.
In the weeks which followed the Senate vote, Soviet
press commentary on antimissile defense subsided. Although
this relative silence could be explained by the fact that
the United States decision was no longer "news," it prob-
ably also reflected an internal Soviet debate on how to
proceed. Despite press statements during the spring and
summer expressing doubt that the wishes of the United States
116. A. Griqoryants and G. Tikhanov, news article in Trud
(Trade), 12 August 1969, p, 1.
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"military-industries 1 ccfiplex" could be overridden, it seenis
likely that some elements v/ithin the Soviet bureaucracy had
hoped th.-^t the Senate vote v:ould have at least postponed
the S£ifeguard deployment. Two possible interpretations of
arguments presum.ably put forth by these e3ements seem like-
ly. First, those who favored negotiations could have used
a vote against Safeguard to attempt to convince opposing
factions that such negotiations were in the interest of the
Soviet Union and likely to yield United States concessions
that even hard-line elements could view as positive. An
image of a United States v;illing to m.ake concessions on
strategic arms could have been inferred from a defeat of
the Safeguard deployment. To avoid being attacked as "ca-
pitulationists" responding to the challenge of the United
States deployment decision, it is possible that this ele-
ment sought to rationalize its interest in moving ahead
with negotiations through adherence to Article VI of the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. " ' Such a stance could
also be expected to yield som.e propaganda advantages with
other states. An unsigned Izvestia article which appeared
on 21 August stressed this viewpoint:
The parties to the treaty have pledged to
conduct negotiations on effective steps
for ending the nuclear arms race. The
Soviet Government takes a very serious
attitude tov/ard this provision of the
117. Previous stateixionts which seem to have established
r,uch a ratiouo.ie are outlined above, pp. 232-233.
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treaty. For its part, cur GoverniTient has
repeatedly expressod its readiness to con-
duct such negotiations for the purpose of
finding mutually acceptable solutions to
this highly important problem. ^-^^
Such an interpretation is typical of that outlined by those
in the United States who have adv-ocated a "soft" approach
to the Soviets. In their view. United States restraint was
seen to strengthen the case of Soviet advocates of negotia-
tion. Inasmuch as Soviet willingness to enter negotiations
has apparently followed "hard" United States actions, the
validity of this interpretation is highly questionr.ble
.
Ai< alternative hypothesis could be that the Soviets
v;ho fv^vored negotiations argued that the Safeguard vote was
indicative of United States wi3,li.ngness to respond to the
Soviet strategic buildup and that the commencement of nego-
tiations v/ould inhibit further United States force posture
developments. The fact that Soviet overtures regarding stra-
tegic arms limitation negotiations have followed "hard" Uni-
ted States actions strengthens the validity of this hypothe-
sis .
The interests of the probable opponents of this faction
were evident in statements which had been appearing during
the suimmer challenging the assertion that antimissile systems
119
were purely defensive. This viev/ v;as again questioned on
118. Unsigned article, "An Obstacle on the Path of Miliai
ism and Aggression," Izvestia , 21 August 1969, p. 1.
119. See above, pp. 270-271.
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23 August in an article which rhetorically challenged the
Safeguard deployment decision:
You say that your only concern is defense,
but hov; does the other side interpret your
' intentions? Will it not see preparations
for an aggressive nuclear first strike in
your concern for defense? Indeed, the temp-
tation for such a strike could increase
since in strengthening your defense, you
are insuring greater invulnerability from
a countorstrike. And will the other side's
suspicion, which has already been aroused
because of your excessive nuclear arsenal,
not be increased?
In short, v/ill the Safeguard system not Jead
to a new spiraling of the arms race, since
new weapons, including the MIRV cluster -
multJciiarge independently targeted nuclear
warheads - are already waiting their turn in
the design offices and testing ground s?-*-^^
The underlying suspicion of the United States' intentions
as reflected by its armaments programs was strikingly simi-
lar to Secretary Laird's analysis of Soviet strategic force
posture trends of the preceding spring. Whether this anal-
ysis indicated Soviet adherence to the popular United States
action-reaction model or v^as an attempt to blame an acceler-
ated arms race on the United States is open to speculation.
Elements of both possible explanations probably were factors
in the internal Soviet debate at that time, but in light of
other articles which questioned United States intent during
August and September it seems more likely that this article
was attempting to demonstrate that the Safeguard system was
120, S. Kondrashov, "After the Capital's Stormy Days,"
Izvestia , 2 3 August 19 69, p. 4.
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indicative cf accelerating strategic weapons programs. By
irapiication; conditions v;ere not favorable for profitable
negotiations on strategic arms limitation.
Breakiiig the silence of the Soviet military, Marshal
Krylov of the Strategic Rocket Forces authored a far more
strident article which appeared on 30 August in commemora-
tion of the 30th anniversary of the beginning of World V\^ar
II. Noting that Germany had begun that war v;ith a surprise
attack on Poland, he asserted that the United States was
preparing to initiate a similar attack on the Soviet Union.
The United States was clearly singled out as the main enemy
of the Soviet Union. China was not m.entioned. It is pos-
sible that Marshal Krylov was arguing £igainst those in the
Soviet bureaucracy who may have been supporting strategic
arms limitation negotiations with the United States to free
resources for military procurement to counter Chinese cap-
abilities. He attacked the argument that the goal of vic-
tory in war had become obsolete with ,the advent of nuclear
v.'eapons . He did not challenge Soviet statements on that
subject and concentrated his attack on VJestern attempts to
mislead world opinion:
The imperialist ideologists are trying to
lull the vigilance of the world's people
by having recourse to propaganda that there
will be no victors in a future nuclear war.
121. Marshal Krylov neatly omitted the Soviet activity
on Poland's eastern frontier and did not refer to




These false af f irriaations contradict the
objective laws of history.
Victory in war, if the imporjalits suc-
ceed in starting it, will be on the side
of world socialism. ^22
While his arguments could be interpreted as an attempt to
justify continued or increased appropriations for the Stra-
tegic Rocket Forces (strong strategic forces v;ere seen to
be mandatory) , the overall tenor of the article and the
gravity of its assertions suggested that Marshal Krylov was
attempting to influence larger issues.
The apparent conviction t))at United States intentions
v/ith regard to strategic arms limitation negotiations were
being used to cover an extensive buildup of its strategic
forces was expressed in an early September article. Wliile
the author failed to carry the argument to Marshal Krylov 's
conclusion that surprise attack preparations were being
made, he criticized "linkage" and asserted that the Nixon
Administration's unexplained delay in initiating talks had
made reaching an agreement more difficult:
The talks on missile systems projected at
the beginning of 19 6 8 were intended as a
further step toward containing the nuclear
arms race. The Johnson Administration put
off these talks, using the excuse of the
events in Czechoslovakia. The Nixon Admin-
istration put them off another seven months
122. Marshal N. I. Krylov, "The Rocket Might of the Home-




so far v^ithout giving any particular rea-
son.
But the actual reason has been clear enough.
The new administration wanted to get started
a major program of ABM installations, and
production of nuitiple warhead missiles.
This was designed to present the Soviet Union
with a fait accompli, change the balance of
forces in negotiations and make it extremely
difficult to achieve agreement on any reduc-
tion of the arms race. ^^^
The reference to the "linkage" concept v;as interesting.
Previous Svoviet articles had not hesitated to criticize the
Nixon contention that strategic arms limitation negotiations
would have to follow the resolution of other international
problems as being indicative of his following such a policy.
In this article, "linkage" was only ascribed to the Johnson
Administration and was directly connected with the Soviet
invasion of Czechoslovakia. failure to imply that President
Nixon also adhered to such a policy was probably intended to
strengthen the arguraent that his delay in beginning arms
limitation talks was solely an attempt on his part to add to
existing United States strcttegic forces. This article failed
to conclude that negotiations were contrary to Soviet inter-
ests
, but carefully pointed out that they were not likely to
produce any significant changes in existing force levels,
particularly antimissile defenses:
123. Victor Perio, ".Miiance of Militarists and Arras Manu-
facturers," Mozhdunarodnaia Zhi zn' (International
Affairs) t September 19C9, p. 22^
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Realistically, a real defeat for the ABxM is
difficult to envisage. Researcli on the ABM
is already underway. Various 'Senators'
propos;-ed 'compromises' that would authorize
the program to go forward to a lesser extent
than the /vdrni nistration demands. Much of
the Congressional opposition is not on the
principle of opposing a further step in the
arms race but strictly on technical and eco-
nomic grounds. This segment of the opposi-
tion is ready to 'compromise.'
Hence the likelihood remains that this pro-
gram vvith its potential mushrooming into a
$100 billion bonanza for the armament kings,
v/ill move forward this year, although the
pace of its advance may be slowed somewhat. ^^'^
The stress on other than arms race considerations by the
opposition also supported the basic conviction that the
United States' intenLions at this tim.c were hostile. While
previous analyses had faiied to refer to this opposition as
"progressive," its motivation and goals had been viewed as
positive
.
The assertion that the United States v/as uniformly hos-
tile to the Soviet Union was mildly refuted in a Pravda arti-
cle which appeared en 24 September. Analyzing American devel-
opments, the article favorably reported that a growing number
of "far-sighted" Senators and Congressmen were concluding
that the "best way to security is in developing peaceful
1 25
relations with the Soviet Union. "" Referring to United
124. Perlo, "Alliance.." Me zhdunarodnaia Zhizn' (International
Affairs), September 1969, p. 22.
125. B. Strelnikov, "Underground Rumble and Capital Echo,"
Pravda, 24 September 1969, p. 4.
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States strategic weapons programs, antimissile defenses were
viewed as d.i awing resources from needed domestic social pro-
grams. Previous allegations of their sinister purpose were
not repeated. 7\ particularly interesting reference was m.ade
to the development of multiple independently-targeted reentry
vehicles (MIRV)
:
It is common knowledge that the Pentagon
has aliready started working on this 'next'
weapon which cannot be called defensive
under any circumstances. The Joint Chiefs
of Staff and Defense Secretary Laird demand
that they be allov;ed to start testing MIRV
as soon as possible. It is said, that these
tests have already started surreptitiously.^^"
Ai'inounced tests of Minuteman III and Poseidon missiles which
were equipped with such warheads had been conducted periodi-
12 7
cally since 16 August 1968.' The attempt to depict these
tests as imminent could have been used to intimate a sense
of ui'gency in initiating negotiations. To have emphasized
this point more strongly would have made the author vulner-
able to charges of capitulationism. A more likely, but highly
speculative, explanation of this "oversight" would have been
an attempt to avoid any implications of United States techni-
cal superiority prior to the commencement of negotiations.
Although informed members of the Soviet bureaucracy were uo
126. Strelnikov, "Underground Rumble," Pravda , 24 Septeiriber
1969, p. 4.
127. By this time, a total of 15 tests of Minuteman III and




doubt av:are of United Slates testing progress, an admis-
sion of the apparent success of these programs would have
exposed claims of the equality or superiority of existing
and planned Soviet strategic forces to some doubt. The
best way to have countered such doubt would have been to
make statements regarding the Soviet multiple warhead test-
ing program then in its early phases. Since up to the time
of the vjriting of this paper in early 1972 the Soviet lead-
ership has not commented on its multiple warhead progriua,
it seems reasonable to speculate that they considered the
expressed United States uncertainty on this issue more pro-
ductive. Denial that United States development of advanced
weapons was proceeding rapidly was consistent with the per-
ception that the Soviet Union v/as ready to enter talks from
a position of strategic parity. In retrospect, this arti-
cle probably reflected the temporary resolution of the m.ore
intense internal debate within the Soviet bureaucracy which
had been evident from the notably more bellicose statements
which had emerged during the latter half of the summer. The
absence of published challenges to the statements put forth
by those who were emphasizing the "United States threat"
seemed to indicate that the margin for this decision was
narrow. If this hypothesis is correct, the decision to
begin strategic arms limitation negotiations with the United
States was m.ade in the latter half of September.
Continuing the less polemical analysis of the United
States antimissile defense deployment, an extensive article
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describing the •'ilemants of the proposed Safeguard system
appeared on i October. Employing descriptions from open
Westerr.' sources, penetration aids, rsidar bi^ickout, atmos-
pheric sorting, computer programming difficulties, and nuc-
lear effects were discussed in a sophisticated, straight-
forward mc'^.nner. Although no attempt v;as made to degrade
the effectiveness of tiie system, it was not held to be im.-
penetrable: "The breaching of the ABM system by a part of
12 8
tJie attacking raissiJes cannot be excluded." Brief crit-
ical x'eferences were m.ade to the role of the "mijitarv-
industrial complex" in forcing the deployment decision and
to Secretary Laird's use oi the "Soviet threat." No mention
was made of possible future negotiations on thci limitation
of strategic arms.
On 18 September, President Nixon addressed the General
Assembly of the United. Nations. While he referred to other
international problems, such as the Middle East, no refer-
ence v/as made to "linkage." Tlie limitation of strategic
arms Wcis seen to be the "most important task" facing the
United States. He reiterated the readiness of the United
129States to begin sucii negotiations,"
On the following day, Soviet Foreign Minister /^ndrei
Gromyko spoke to the same body, Ke did not respond to the
12 8, Colonel-Kngineer M. Belousov, "The Offspring of the
Monopolies and the Militarists," 2a Rubezhoni (Life
/iDroad) , October 1969, p. 22.
129. The New York Tivries, 19 September 196S, p. IC
.

President' o remarks. Assorting that the "Soviet Union has
130
made its position citar"—'' v/ith rc^i^pect to l.)ilaVera'l talks
with the United States, the bulk of hx-^ " '.ocr, cov.ccr -.<?.€{
itself with a multiiaterdl aoproach to the solution of out--
s banding international problcn:. .
Congressional approval of the Milit^iry 7\pproijriations
BH.II on 5 October provided the spark for several Soviet
analyses wh-'.ch concluaed that the Lnitea States had begun
1^1
"another iound in the arms race." "^ Predictably, Lhe role
of the Pentdgcn and the "military-industrial complex" v;ere
1 ^ . .
viev;ed as or itic-' !» " In aad.i tion ic -he e.rrcis race jnipli-
cations,- the passage of the bill v.'cvS seen as contributing
to actions which wculd "inevitt.bly lead to new i;ources of
133
nu. ] ."!. t a r y con:rl.\ct.s .
'"^" The larger issue of the balance of
forceib within tnt United States v;ts stressed:
"It is clear that the implcmentaticn of the
Safeguard plan will result in a sharp growth
of the U.S, military-indusLrial complex's
power and tlie expanded influence on all life
in the country by i;;ilitarists and reaction-
aries. "-' *
130. The Now York Tinies , 20 September 19 69, p. 10.
131. Moscow Dome s t i c Service .in l^ussian, l;j30 G.MT, 5
Octooef"] y^.9»
132.
'^''i^^-'^j;^ i^i Czech to Ci':echoslovakia , 1630 GMT, 8 Octo-
ber "i"0o 9 .
133. b. Strain iKov, "'io Please the I'eiil.igon , '" Pravdg , G
October 19b 9, p. 5.
1.1 4 . Ibid ,
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KOv.'Gver, these trends v;Gre picLurea in gancia] terms. No
reference was jaade ro the former image of United States
adherence to a first strike straceyy.
Statements reminiscen-c of those made in iT\id-'19f«P by
135Soviet sca.entist. Andrei. D. Sakharov ' were put forth iii an
8 October nev.'s conference in Washington by Soviet physicist
Pyotr L. Kapitsa. ' Professor Kapitsa, v;ho was travelling
in K'orth /^"nerica i-nder the sponsorship of the Soviet Cover vi-
ment and had lectured on physics earlier in Canada, termed
antijr'issile defense systems "a v^aste of urgently needed
funds." LilvC Sakharov, rie cited the March 19 6 8 Scientific
Ameri can article by Richard Garv;in and Hans Bethe ' as
being a "magnificent" analysis of the dim px^ospects for an
effective antimissile defense system. Endc'ring the preva-
lent United States action-reaction model of strategic force
posture; developments, Kapil.sa stated that doployiuent of
United States antimissile defenses "will only incre-:.se the
number of missiles in the Soviet Union." Although it is not
knov;n what Kapitsa 's actual stand on these issues was, his
statements while in the United States under the "sponsor-
ship" of the Soviet Government raised the likeli>iOod that
they v;ere intended to strengthen the aiguments of those in
135. See above, pp. iP.G-183,
136. The Iv'ev; York Times, news article by V«a]. tM Sullivan.
'J October 19 69, p. i.
1 37. See aj .»ove
, pp , 1 G 9 - 1 7 ,
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the United States v/ho opposed antimissile defense system
deployment. Put bluntlVf they may have been a "plant,"
Considering the announcement of the ccrrimeiicement of
preliminary talks on strategic arms lim.itation on 25 Octo-
ber, a radio comjuentary made on 21 October was significant.
Citing concern within the United States over future Soviet-
American relations, the comrrientator was quick to point out
that "if these opportunities have not been taken it is not
the Soviet Union's fault." ^^ Obstacles to improved rela-
tions included United States commitment to holding talks
only from "positions of strength," the imposition of "link-
age" (referred to by the Soviets as "package deals") to ' "^
obtain concessions from the Soviet Union on other issues '""Tif
return for movement on arms limitation, and the desire to
"weaken the unity of the socialist community." Pointedly
arguing that the Soviet Union was not going to alter its
course, it was stated that the United States "needs these
139
agreements no less than our country." Finally,- having
repeated that United States "intransigence" was scleJy
responsible for the delay in initiating strategic arms lim-
itation negotiations, the willingness of the Soviet Union
to begin talks was restated. The timing of this broadcast
indicated that its purpose v;as to prepare the Soviet people






for the negot..iat,."i.on ann.o"ai'>cerf;or!t
,
Trie stress on tlie asset"'
tion that it did not signJ-.ty any change in Scviet policy was
particularly relc'vant and x-eflccled the nature of the stance
which had probably evolved in late Septerrtber „
On 2b October, a joint coordinated announcement of "pre-
iiiTiinary difjcnssion;:*' on strategic amns lir-.it.ation was made.
in rioscow and Washington;
Con finning the agreerrient reached earlier
to enter into negotiations on curbing the
?tr".tegic armaments race, the governrrient?:.
of the United States and the U-S.S.R. have
agreed that specifically designated repre-
sentatives will meet in HelsJnki on Noveui--
ber 17, 1959, for preliminary discussion
of the questions i nvolved. ^'^^
United Stales domestic reaction was favorable, but not overly
uptiiaistic about early progress iij these negotiations. Tlie
need for jjoth the United States and the Soviet Union to dis-
play "more urgent det:er-.Tiination to reverse t.herr arrcis race
140. A news article by Max Frankel which appeared in
The Ijew York Times on 2G October discus;?ing the
announcement of the coiiuricncement of negotiations
cited White I'ouse Press Secretary Ronald Zieglcr
as stating that the place and time for the talks
had been proposed to Presiacnt Nixon by Soviet
Ambassador Dobrynin on the morning of 7.1 Octcber
and that the Presivient had iinired lately accepted.
The ra'lio broadcast cited above wa«= nade at 12:20
Washington time (EDT) which indicated that it may
haue been prepared in advance and released after
President Niy.ori's acceptance \v'as I:nov;n in Moscov;.
141. V/hite House press release dated 25 October .1969,
Departmen t o f_ S t a te Bu lietin , 10 November 1 9 G S , p
390. The same text v/as printed in Izvestia and
Pravda on 2G October 1969. The text v/:as no~t ccm-




than either has exhibited thus far" " ' v;as a typical reac-
tion.
Secretary of State Rogers held a news conference on 25
October after the announcement of the Helsinki preliminary
discussions. He eiriphasized that the United States approach
to these talks v.'as serious, flexible/ and without false
hopes. The goal was an agreement which would be "mutually
advantageous" for each side. Although lie stated that the
United States was "not going to exclude any subject," he
characterized the talks as being primarily concerned with
"hardv/are " matters :
We are not talking about detente, or any-
thing else. We are talking about v;hcther
it makes sense for the two of us to con-
tinue to spend immense amounts of money
for the next 5, or 10, or 15 years on stra-
tegic weapons and end up at the end of that
time in the same relative position - or
whether it would be wiser to use the money
for other purposes . ^^-^
Finally, although he did not directly refer to "linkage,"
he insisted that the "talks are not conditional in any way."
Early Soviet analysis stressed favorable world reaction
144to the announcement. Maintaining the dialectical image
142. The Nev/ York Times , 27 October 1969, p. 44.
143. "Secretary Rogers Discusses Forthcoming U.S . -U.S .S .R.
Talks on Curbing Strategic Arms," Department of State
BuJ^U-c^in, 10 WovcRiber 196 9, p. 393.
144. "A Useful Start," Izvestia , 28 October 1969, p. 5.
S^ie also Moscow Domesti c Service in Russian, 1900
GMT, 2 8 October 1969.

of Unitod States mocivatloiiG ^ an edi.toria.1 coruuenl.- in The
L'ev/ York Tl/nes that "the political pressures aaainst the
talks may well turn out to b:^ impressivn" was poir.t,?d]y in-
cluded, A similar viev/ was put iorth by Pravda VJashington
correspondent li. Orekhov on 4 November. The potential role
of the "r.iilitary-industrial complex" and the financiaJ. out-
puts of a j:eiiewed arTus race were enipliasizcd:
This is why the military-industrial coniplex
of the UeSciN. cannot be indifferent to the
idea of slowing the strategic arms race and
why it is so evi<ient that it will spare
nothing to inculcate Araericans with pessim-
isiri about the forthcoming negotiations,
which it an^ithemizes . 1^^
Tiie "anti-linkage" theme was repeated by Yuri Barsukov on
31 October v;hen he cited conflicting statements by Secre-
tary Rogers, ilouse Minority Leader Gerald Ford after a White
House meeting, and Presidential Press Secretary Ronald Zieg-
ler. Given these statements, he expressed uncertainty as
to tlie InIxoxi /vdiainisnation ' s approach to the meetings in
Ilelsinkj.
.
Soviet President Nikolai V, Podgorny delivered the
trad.i.tJ.onal addres" in ceremonies celebrating the 52nd Anni-
versary of the Bolshevik Revolution. Although his address
indicated approval of tiie agreement to negotiate on ariiis
145. B. Orekhc-, "y\ Rc^l Chance," Pravda, 4 November 1969,
p , 5 , . "
3.46. Jzvestia, 31 October 196 9 (. p, 5.
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1 iini tations . he offeired several qi.ialifi cations . Presif3ent
Pcdgorny firinly asserted that the; '-situation of things in
the world'' rriade it necessary for the Soviet Union to main-
tciin its military strength. United States actions vvith
regard to its v:eapons programs v:ere vi-a'vcd as "unconstruc-
tivG.'^ lie specifically attacked ciny possible United States
intentions to ef^iploy "positions of streiigth" tactics in the
forthcoming negotiations: "We have never allov;ed and will
not allov; anybody to talk to the Soviet Union fror?. a pooi-
tion of strength.""
The iTiilitaiy parade on 7 Noverrber was devoid of nev;
weapons. There v.ere fev/er ballistic missiles displayed
than in previous parades. The addresses by senior military
men were notably less bellicose than statements vihich were
made during the preceamg summer.
Sevier, press commentary immediately prior to the com-
mencemcnt of vh.:- preliminary discussions in lielsinki stres-
sed three broad themes: favorable worldwide response, tiie
ser.iousness of the Soviet Union in its approach to the talks,
aiid the existciicc of forces in the United States opposed to
the prospect, of negotiations. World opinion was seen to
have concluded that a favorable outcome of the talks v/ould
enhance international security:
147.
^£S'''i;f;-^j '^ November 1969 , p. 2.
14 8. Tne Mew York Tiraes ^ nev/s article by Bernard Gwertzman,
7 iJovembor 196 9, p. 1.
-I ''r
xhti international public attaches aroat
significance to rhe^e talks. For if they
succeed in curbing the strategic armr. race,
not only wou].d these powers Vv'ho possess
them benefit, from it, bu-»- also all states,
inasmuch as international security would
be considerably strengthened. A positive
outcome of the talks v/ould undoubtedly
help improve Soviet-Araerican relations and
preserve and strengthen peace throughout
the world. On the other hand, a further
buildup of strategic arms can only inten-
sify the threi^t of thermonuclear war, with
its catastropliic and ruinous consequences
for all mankind, and can increase even more
tlie already great international tension. ^'^^
After quoting fiom President Podgorny's 6 November address,
it was asserted that the "Soviet Union is filled with deter-
mination to achieve positive results to restrain the race
to create ever more destructive means of attack and counter-
ISO
attack."' Vv'hile the motivations and seriousness of the
United States Government were not openly questioned, the
existence of ox:>position to conducting strategic arms limi-
tation negotiations with the Soviet Union was noted. A
campaign by "militarist circles" was seen to be the driving
force behind this oppcsicion. Particular emphasis was
given to an address delivered by Secretary Rogers on 13
November. his statements that both the Unitea States and
the Soviet Union had "enough strategic weapons to destroy
each other" and that the negotiations would be "long and
difficult'" V7ere endorsed. Hovjever, his apparent reversal
14SJ. N. N.ikolayeVf "Before the Mt^ctings in Helsinki," New
Tjmc^s, No. 16, .14 Novcumber 19 69, p. IJ.
IbO. Ibid.
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on the importance of the ccr.copt of "link^.ge" war; noted
with concern;
Brit the c!iiaf thing in Roger,.,
.^^^
<i single short sentence. In speaking oi:
the fcrthco'^aing di discussions in Helsinki,
Mr. T.oqos:'^. f.o-.^nd it necessary to stress
that these v.iil inevitably be influenced
'by events in otlver sreas.'
Many journalists wlio had come to Helsinki
v.'ere puzzled by this formulation of the
question, for daring a press conference
only 20 days ago the same Mr, Rogers had
underlined exactly the opposite: the dis-
cussions in Helsinki v;ould by no means be
connected with other problems in the rela-
tions between East and West.-^-'-*-
This shift was cited as providing "additional testimony ro
the furious struggle of opinion" in VJashingtcn. The appar-
ent concern of the Soviet Union vcith tlie iir.pli. cations of
"linkage" seems to have reflected scrae degree of uncertainty
over the prospect of bilateral negotiations in this area of
national security which is perceived to be so vital for all
states, particularly those which aspire to major svorld
roles. In ti)is context,, "linkage" provided a focal point
for those concerns. It was probabJy not the crucial issue.
From tlie bureaucratic -psrspective , the Soviet gT'oups
which could iiave been assumed to have had direct interests
151, M. Sagate.lyan, "On trie Eve of the Helsinki Meetings,"
Izvestia, IG November 1969, p, 2. For the full text
of Secretary Rogers' speech, see "Strategic Arms Lim-
itation Talks f" Department of State Bulletin, 1 Decem-
ber 1969, pp. 465-'468. The passage stressed" by Mr.




involved in a decision to enter iiito arms lijailation dis-
cuss j.ons wiiih the United States at this time V7ere the eco-
nomic p^^nners, the vnilitary, the foreign policy inteili-
gentsia.;, and the Ecientific elite. Although .it is net pos-
sible to deterraine tiie irifluence of these bureaucratic pQj:~
ceptions on the Soviet decision, it is possib].e to outline
briefly probnbie concerns of tliese groups.
The ecojioip.ic planners norraally associated with light
industry and consumer goods uroducLion could have been
expected to favor negotiations if they felt the resources
devoted to the production of strategic weapons systems would
be substantially diverted from military production to civil-
ian prirposes . If they considered that these resources v/ould
be siirply reallocated to other military programs, t)ieir sup-
port fc-r negoclations would presumably have declined. If a
technological spin-off effect from strategic weapons devel-
opment and production similar to that experienced by the
United States had been evident in Soviet programs, there
would have, been grounds for them to oppose negotiations if
resources were to be diverted to conventional weapons pro-
grams with a diminished technological pay-off. On marginal
utility grou'ido, they may have favored continued spenditjg on
offensive systems rather than antimissile defense, since- the
perceived military and political advantages of such a policy
v/ere apparently assumed to be greater. In viewing short-
term considerations, the reported slowdov/n in Soviet econ-
omic growth during the period of 1968-69 may have influenced
i. :..
- 29 8 -
their position.^*"" However, rince the conduct of the nego-
tiations was generally expecced to be lengthy, short-term
coiisidGrations wer<^=. probcfoj.y not crucial. A second grouf of
economic planners ^ those associated with heavy industry, have
strong long-establisaed link£; with the luilitary and probably
opposed negotiations. To tJ^a extent that their larger inter-
ests were tied to the perception that advanced weaponry was
the area v^here the Soviet Union had competed most success-
fully v.'ith the United States, their stake in maintaining
existing programs would have been enhanced, Hov/ever , if
resources devoted to the production of strategic v;aapons
were anticipated to be shifted to other programs v/hich were
largely dependent on heavy industry, sucli as shipbuilding or
tank production, for example, this opposition would probably
have diminished somewhat. Additionally, if repeated Soviet
policy statements stressing tlie need for increased output of
consumer goods represented more than "window dressiiig,"' the
planners in both areas may h.ave anticipated a significant
realJocation of resources if arras limitation talks led to
reduction in overall rates of defense spending.
1S3
The overall position of "the military" ~ was to oppose
152. This trend was reversed in 1970 due in part to drasti-
cally increased agricultural output. However, key
economic indicators revealed that this economic recov-
ery v/as broadly based.
153. Although it appears that a consensus opposing the Sov-
iet Union's negotiating with the United States on the
limitation of strategic arms existed at this time,
Soviet military experience has not been without intra
service rivalry and disputes over doctinal and policy

L. :) J
cntexiiyg negotiations as har. been argued ^tbcve. 'i\\<'. concern
th^-t the talks might ieod to iigreements which wculo adversely
inf3.uonce existing prograras and overall ^;;o^^iet force pcsture
vvciF probably most influential. Since the mili!:.ary v:.?r- then
m the process of making gie-j^t across-the-board progress in
altering the st-rategic b-ilance v.'ith the United States ^ any
move which could restrict that progress was likaly to be
considerations. T.n his book Sov i c t Strategy at the
Crossroads, (Cambridge: harvard University Press", 19G4)^
Thomas W, Wolfe outlined the struggle betv/fcen the "mod-
ernists" and the ''traditionalists" during the latter
phase of Khrushchev's leadership. l'Y.Q:'~:\t debates were
not purely intraservice , but cut across ins tit\itional
lines to include such subjects as the 3i:je of the armed
forces, the nature of the inirial p'?riod of a war, the
length of a v.'ar, the best rr'iiiT^ary stracogy for dealing
v;ith tlie United Staces, the possibility of the escala-
tion of siaall v/i\rs, and the proper role of the niilitary
in the formulation of defense policy and strategy. In
arguing these subjects, the vario\is services attempted
to enhance their future roles or to solidify existing
functions \;hich they may have perceived as being dim-
inished in the future. In general, the temporary res-
olution of these debates durj.iig the Khrushchev period
enhanced the position of the Strategic Rocl:et Forces,
prin-iarily at the expense of the Theater Forces. As
brilliantly pointed out by John Erickscn in his recent
book G ov ie
t
M i 1 i t a ry Powe r , (London: Tne Koyai United
Services Institute, 1971), the period following the
ouster of Khrushchev has been characterised by an evo-
lution of this debate. The major changes have involved
the magnitude of the military effort required to imple-
ment Soviet gcjals, Intraservice aspects \\.Q'^je. developed
over the general movement away from Khrushcliev ' s "nuc-
lear fetishism'' to more balanced forces. Coincident
v;ich the ongoing emphasis on strategic forces, addi-
tional improvements havf..- hziQn made to conventional or
general purpose forces. The period of general across-
the-board improvements has tended to dull intraservice
rivalries. Erickscn has divided the 1965-71 n\ilitary
deloate into discussions of preferences and alternatives
before the attainment of rough parity with the United
States and the subsequent exploration of the strategic
implications of such parity.
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opposed. It is nol.ev/orthy that nu Soviet raiiitdry writer
han endcrsod r.he condiict of strategic arms limitation nego-
tiationL-, e^vca by inference. Coincident with arguments
that Soviet military policy should aim at the attainment o.i:
superiority and that Lenin's assertion that imperialism
would continue to seek the military destruction of the Sov-
iet Union until the worldwide triumph of coirLmunism \-icr(i
still valid, military writers had questioned the utility of
arms limitation agreements to insure peace during 1968 and
.1969. /Although no evidence of an intr amilitary split v.'as
present, it seams likely to assume that those elements most
directly associated vrith strategic weapons, the Strategic
Rocket Forces and the Air Defense Forces, were most opposed
to th3 prospective talks. Tlicse elements not directly
linked to such weapons j, the Theater Forces and the Navy
(v/ith the exception of the Submarine Force) , could have
been expected to profit from, a potential reallocation of
defense funds subsequent to the limitation of strategic
weapons. However, at least overtly, these elements did not
articulate this inuorest. With respect to antimissile sys-
1 54
terns ^ the internal perspectives of 196 7" seemed to have
continued into this period.
Those Party and Govornnicnt officials who ato profes-
sionally connected with the conduct of foreign policy could
have been expected to ta^'or negotiations as an opportunity




to probe for dipiomatic gains. The infjuence of this group
155
on policy format j.oii as not clear, but it is cortainiy of:
minor inviortarice v/hen compared v/ith the:- military, for cxar,.-
ple. It is more involved v/ith policy execution than its
formation. V?hile there were no doubt merabers of this elite
who opposed the iniLiatior. of arms limitation talks, the
conduct of B.n extended hiah-ievel dialogue v;ith the United
States on these vital issues could be assumed to raise its
short-term prestige sornev;hat. The nuraerous statements made
by Foreign Minister Gromyko m favor of initiating discus-
sions somewhat tied the prestige of this elite to the com-
mencement of negotiations. However, to the e>:t:ent that-
growing Soviet strategic forces v;ere perceived to add to
155. A recent addition to this elite has been a group of
academic specialists, most notably those associated
with the Institute of the U.S.A. of the Soviet x^cad-
emy of Science under the direction of G. A. Arbatov.
Again, the role of the academicians in policy form.a-
tion is probably minimal, but they have been active
and fiurly sophisticated analysts of the issues asso-
ciated with the Strategic Arm.s Limitation Talks, par-
ticularly since early 1070. In addition to Arbatov's
15 April 19GS article cited above (see pp. 253-255) ,
discussions of SALT in the Institute's journal have
included an unsigned article entitled "Between Hel-
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ary 197 0, pp" 55-5^7; V. V, Larionov, '"^TJie Strategic
Debates," USA; Economics, Po litics, Ideology, March
1970, pp. 20"3r; G. A. Trcfiraenko, "Some Aspects of
U.S. Military and Political Strategy," USA; Econom-
ics, Politics f Ideo logy, October 1970, pp, 14-27;




Ideology , May 1971, pp. 3^12; anH
K. M.'GeorgTy'ev, "A Step Forward," USA: Economics,
Politics, Ideology, July 1971, pp. '54-55.

the- diplomatic bargaininq pov-'er of ths Soviet Union, it
should have bean assumed that those involved in the conduct
of foreign policy viewed limiting tJ.is growth vitl'i seme
degir^e of concern.
Althouqh Soviet scientists, notably Sakharov and Kap-
itsa, had spoken oixt in opposition to antimissile system
deployment and in favor of strategic arms limitation nego-
tiations it did not necessarily follow that the scientific
elite as a v;hvTle shared these convictions. They may have
repre-sented ci vocal minority. Othei scientists, especially
those eiijcying the use of better research fecilities and
working conditions than their counterparts in the civilian
sector of the economy, raay hav^ opposed divertirig resources
from the technological area where tlie Soviet Union h.ad seen
lb*'its greatest success in corapeting with t.he Unired States.
Of particular concern to such a group would have been any
agreements which would limit Soviet progress in areas where
the United States held a technological lead, sucn as i-.n^Iti-
pie warheads, computer technology, and miniaturization of
electronics components. If this hypothesis is correct.
156, See above, pp. ISO -183 and p. 289, respectively.
157. Thomas W. Wolfe, "Soviet Interests in S7VLT: Politi-
cal, Economic, Bureaucratic and Strategic Contribu-
tions and Impediments to Arms Control," presented
before the Fifth International Anas Control Gympq-
sium_, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 15 October 1971,
p. 21. V/oife's aneilysis of the Soviet bureaucratic




limitfition of £intir:ii8sile defenses might be viev/ed as pre-
serving a perceived Sovi.cit advantage, particularly with
regard to operational experit^nce v;ith a deployed system.
The riuxuerical strategic balance in late 19 69 shov;ed
the Soviet li:i:ioij to possess about 1175 intercontinental
1 S Rballistic roiss.'.lep to ICS'l for the United States. The
former United States numerical superiority in this field
had enC'3d in raid-196'3. Of tliese, 975 Soviet missiles were
the moie modern SS-9, SS-11, and SS-13. The remaining 200
were the older SS-7 and SS-8 models deployed in the period
from 1958 to 1964. The United States inventory V7as com-
posed of 1000 solid- fueled Minutcaian I and II. with the
remainder being the liquid- fueled Titan II. by both quan-
titative and quiilitative standards, the Soviet Union had
attained a general parity in this field v.'ith deployment
continuing, Tlie United States had retained its advantage
in submarine-Jaunched ba].listic missiles with 656 launchers
to about 190 for the Soviet Union, However, the deployment
of the Soviet "Yankee"' class nuclear-powered ballistic mis-
sile submarine had begun in 1969 and construction of addi-
tional units of this class was continuing. Although the
construction of additional "Galosh" antimissile defense
158. Figures cited were extrapolated from The Military Bal -
ance 19 71- 72 y (London: The International Institute
foe Strategic Studies, 1971), p. 55. See Appendix B
for ci graphical presentation of offensive missile
force levels from 1960-71. Annual rate of change in
tiiese force levels is shewn on p. 109 above.
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sites around Moscov>? Jsa^l appaientiy been suspended in mid-
3.968, improvements in the supporting radars and research
and development efforts at Sary Mi=igan had continued. Thf>
projected initial deployment date for Phase I of the Safe-
guard system remained 197 3 v.'hile developmental testing of
system coiaponents v;ai- being conducted at Kv;ajelein. While
both sides v;ere testing multiple warhead systems, the United
States was seen to be several years ahead in this field.
No initial deployment date had been established.
As the United States and the Soviet Union prepared to
begiii the discussions, their mutual perceptions of the
strategic balance and its trends beyond simple num.erical
comparisons viere of major importance. From the Soviet per-
spective, the fact that United States antimissile defenses
would not be operational until 1973 provided some margin
for response if desired. Options available to the Soviet
Union included increased nunibers of offensive missile
launchers, development of multiple warheads for existing
launchers , the adoption of a targeting plan which avoided
attacking \.he defended Winutemaii sites and concentrated on
more vulnerable targets, expansion of the Moscov; antimis-
sile defense system, to include other areas of the Soviet
Union, or a combinaticn of these actions. Although it is
not possible to discern changes in targeting plans, the
first tv'o options have apparently been employed. It is
also not possible to determine what effect the Safeguard
deployment decision had or; these actions. Deployment
'" *•
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rates do not appear to huVQ be.en altered » Previously deter-
mined force level goals ^ bureau r'-'-atic inertia, th-2 apparent
imperati''>'e to employ advanced technology as soon as it is
feasible, and the drsire to maintain established progr?Trs
in the event ot the f a: 3.ure of negotiation^, cculcl have
been larger factors. As will b«'j argued in the following
chapter^ a decision to seek strategic: superiority could
have overridden all of these considerations. The effect of
Soviet antimissile defenses on United States perceptions
and v;eapons acquisition policies declined. The grov/th of
Soviet offensive forces v/cis the primary cause of concern.
Although antimissile testing was being evaluated as closely
as v/as possible and tJie Moscovj system deployment iTiOnitored,
these developments v;ere seen to have less impoytance than
they had in earlier periods. To a large extent, this atti-
tude resulted from United States confidence in the ability
of its offensive missiles to per'etrc;te Soviet defenses
^
particularly when fitted with multiple independently-tar-
geted reentry vehicles (M3KV) then in an advanced phase of
testing.
Broader trends discernable in United States policy and
developip.ents during this period v;hich ijifluonced the anti-
missile defense dialogue vrith the Soviet Union reflected
the fact that the domestic debate on tliis issue had become
increasirigly divorced from missile defense i^-.sues and con-
verted into a confrontation on overall anus policy and pro-
graius. The conviction of the validity of tlie phenomenon of
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action-reaction in asiiessing force interactions, which had
prevailed particularly during the tenure of Robert McNamara
as Secretary of Defense, was subjected to increased tenta-
tive skepticism. The strength and pervasiveness of this
conviction lay at: the root of iv.nch of the opposition to
antimissile defense deployment. While the Nixon Adminis-
tration avoided a direct challenge to this contention, its
advocacy of the Safeguard system represented a growing
reluctance not to respond positively to the growth of Sov-
iet strategic forces. Implicit in its actions was a suspi-
cion that United States restraint in its weapons programs




United States strategic thought, force postures, and
armaraenti. dialogue d'aring the decade of the 3.9GO's were dom-
inated by Robert S. McNamara, v;ho served as Secretary of
Defense from January 19G1 to February 1968, His analysis
of these factors was heavily influenced by the developinent
of deterrence theory v/hich had evolved late in the previous
decade and was seen to have pro^^en itself during the Cuban
Missile Crisis of October 1SG2, The wide acceptance of
this theory in the United States during the decade of the
19G0's was a result of the Jogic inherent in its premises,
covipled \v?ith Secretary McNanara's skillful implementation,
persistent advocacy, and strong conviction that it repre-
sented the best, approacli to avoiding a nuclear* v;ar between
the United States and the Soviet Union. A conviction that
nothing short of a nearly perfect, defensive system could
provide adequate protection for the nation's population and
industriaJ c^^nters against ix determined, massive attack by
a JTu'ijor ivjclear pcv/er was the basis for deterrence theory.
Given this conviction, the best- way to avoid the destruc-
tion of the nation was seen to be procurement and deploy-
irient of offensive forces adequate to deter a potential
opponent rro.a initiating em attack by creating a perception
on his part thar an attack on the United Stares v/ould result
in his society being dest.roycd in retaliation.
- 30 7 -
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Tv:o birsic force postures vr^re seen to be able to dis-
suade a potential opponer.t irom c-^ttacking the United States:
the posTi-ssion of offensive forces vhich could be launcliod
on receipt of v/arning that an attack v;as imTninent or ?..n
progress or the possession of forces which could survive a
massive attack cind then be launched in retaliation for that
attack. The first force posture v;as re;jected on r.he grounds
that it coaid result in a strategic exchange through miscal-
culation or ambiguous indications of irnjjending attack. The
second optioii required iriorc expensive, relatively invulner-
able forces in the form of constantly airborne boirdDers armed
v/ith* nuclear weapons; protected, quick reaction land-based
iitissiles; and missile-arn^ed, nuclear-powered, ballistic rnis-
sile-launching submarines at sea in conditions of readiness
to launch retaliatory strikes after evidence of attack v;as
inmtistakable . Such forces v;ere terined to provide "ass\).red
destruction" and v/ere sc named. The attainment of mutually
perceived "assured destruction'' force postures Ly both super-
powers was seen to provide the highest probability that a
nuclear war would not take place by the deterrence theoreti-
cians. They denied the utility and the possibility of at.tain-
ment of a credible first strike capability by ttie Uiiited
States against the Soviet Union. The denial of first strike
intentions has always been a feature of United States state-
ments concerning its niiclt-ar policy, but its force postures
have included considerable first strike culpability in the
loriTi of a large nuiaericai superiority in delivery vehicles
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or highly accurate weapons systems. Thiz unasserted first
strike capability v^as perniitted to evapornte during the
latter lialf of the decade of the 1960 *s.
Missions traditionally assigned to defensive forces,
those of protecting against an actual attack afrer its incep-
tion, were termed "damage limitation," Forces to acconiolis'i
this mission included antiaircraft and antimisr^ile defense
systems. Additionally, weapons systems desigried to destroy
the offensive v/eapons of a potential enemy before they could
be launched were termed "damage limiting." Apparently con-
vinced that a "damage limiting" counterforce capability was
not attainable against the Soviet Union., United States force
developments in the 1960 's stressed "assuj:ed destruction"
capabilities. Accordingly, forces with "damage liiniting"
capability were pejorativeJy termed "destabilizing." Simi-
larly pejorative wore the images of "rationality" and "irra-
tionality" ascribed to those who did or did not accept this
analysis. For example, implicit in Secretary McWamara '
s
restrained advocacy of the Sentinel antimissile defense
Trends in force developments toward more numerous low
yield warheads for offensive v/eapons systems (from about
1-2 raegaton warheads for Minuteman I and II interconti-
nental ballistic missiles to about: 200 kilotons for
Minuteman III multiple warheads and from about 800 kilo-
ton warheads for Polaris A2 to 200 kilotons for Polaris
A3 to 50 kiic-tons for each "oseidon multiple warhead)
and the apparciit reluctance of tne United States to
deploy antimissile defense systems v/ero sym.ptomatic of
this apparent conviction. Capab.i i ities cited above are
tabulated in The Military P>alance 1971-72, (London: The
International In'-iticut,^ for Strateqic Stud j.es , 1971),
p. 57.

system in Septcinber 3 9 67 was the contention that the Chi-
nese were "irrational." Au subsequent events have shov;n,
Chinese actions v/ith respect to nuclear weapons have proven
to b'3 highly "rational," Although they have persistently
invoked the iMXigc of nucJear weapons as a "paper tigej:/'
they have carefully avoided conf ront,utions v;here their nuc-
lear inferiority could v/ork against them. Additionally,
they liave avoided nakina claims based on their developing
nuclear capability, presumably to avoid stimulating arms
race pressures in those nations which viev; the Chinese as
pctencial opponents. Evidence to this effect was avail-
able in 19 G7, but Secretary McNamara and others who based
their arguraents for United States antiraissile defense sys-
tem deployiitent on anti-Chinese grounds generally employed
this rationale as a pretext rather than a cause for their
advocacy.
Also iraplicit in the argument that force postures
vv'hiich reflected "irrationality" by introducing elements of
instability into the perceived strategic balance between
the United States and the Soviet Union vjas the contention
that iTtanlpulation of uncertainties on the part of potential
opponents lacked political utility. Since K\u'c.ual force
estimates and perceptions are largely determined by prob-
aiiilities, the widening of the range of those probabilities
raay result in differing estimates of existing or projected
"fitrategic reality." An increased range of uncertainty
provides a somewhat greater opportunity for political and
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rrdlitary octivily at lovv^cr .levels of confrent e.t.ion v;.itiM the
strategic balance of forces in tlie b^ickground. Although
the United States generally denied the utility of -chis
principle during the decade in question, it did not auto-
matically follow that the Soviet UJiion shared tliis convic-
tion or vie'wed it as "irrational.'" Seen fi'ora the Soviet
Union's perspective, the possession of antimissiie defenses
cind weapon? systems with some degree of first strike cap-
ability might seem to be highly "rational" when coupled
with the v/ill to manipulate the created uncertainties. If
combined with local conventional superiority and/or geo-
graphical proximity to the location of £• confrontc'ition,
such uncertainties rr.igyit be expected to enhance the attain-
ment of political objectives without the .Soviet Union hav-
2mg Lc resort to armed conflict v However, with respect to
antimissile defense systems, the apparent niutual perceptiori
that existing offensive forces in the possession of either
side can penetrate existing or projected defenses made the
utility of such systems i<i this context suspect..
An important adjunct to United States adherence to an
"assured destruction" strategy during this period was the
belief that an "action-reaction" model or strategic force
2. Uri Ra'anan, "Soviet Global Politics and the Middle East,"
E-^-^i-L-^^™ SiPJ -L^S^- t^evicv; , September 1971, p . 21, See
also the forthcoming pamphlet Th_e Dcterioraxion of the
V 1^ 'Z^-P"^!.^^ £^t:rategic Balance . Seme Political Implica-
tions
, by the sarae author to be presented to the Senate
Corfimittee en Governmental Operations, Subcoirunittee on
National Security, in Febru^^ry 1972.
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dGveiopments v;£s valid. In addit.iori to the traditionally
accepted concept that on-? ' s own force developments and
deployments could prompt reciprocal actions by potential
adversaries either in the form of offensive or defensive
weapons systems, sell-restraint v;as seen to influence the
behavior of potential adversaries importantly. Gro^«i'Jng
United States coiamit?pant to the perceived wisdoin of deter-
rence theory and the development of "assured destruction"
rather than '"damage limiting" forces led to the belief that
the Soviet Union would also adhere to these concepts if
properly "educated." This "education program" was reflected
in United States force posture developments, the published
rationales for those developioent.s , and direct comjr^unicatien
with the Soviet leadership. Secretary McNamara's impas-
sioned discussion v;it!i Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin £it the
Glassboro meetings in June 19G7 was an example of the lat-
ter approach. While it laay be argued that this program had
some influence on Soviet antimissile defense system deploy-
ment decisions, particularly in the latter half of the dec-
ade of the 196C's, the notion chat self-restraint would be
reciprocated is subject to question. The apparent failure
of the Soviet Union to suspend or reduce the rate of con-
struction of offensive missile sites lifter it had attained
numerical parity with the United States in mid-i9e9 indi-
cated this program had not been completely successful. A
similar lack of restraint in the construction of ballistic
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validi c.y of this belief to que::tiori. ' Given the conviction
anO pervcisivenesi- of Secretary HcNaiaara's anaJy:-i.s during
the docjilf^i of the i9 60's, it seems reasonable to assume
that the Soviet leadership took Uniteci States self-restraint
for granted. While the expressed concern for the Soviet
straLegic bv.ildup on tte part of the Nixon Aduiinistration
may have dueled chiE perception somewhat, tiie difficulty
experienced by Prosiden'^ Nixon and Secretary Laird in secur-
ing Zunds for the deployraent of the Safegucird antimissile
defense systerr. and the devclopnient of other advanced stra-
tegic weapons systems is indicative of the political
strength of Sc'cretary McNamara's analysis and policies.
The perceived political utility of antimissile defense
systems decii:ied d'lring the decade of tnc 19C0's. iniring
the early period from 1960 to 19G4, such systenis were coa-
sidered to be the next important technological step in
strr-tegic force posture developrrents. Both the United
States and the Soviet Union wore conducting extensive pro-
grams of rc-isearch and development in this field. An early
Soviet deployiT.ent around Leningrad was accompaned by a pro-
gram of capability cia.i.V';5 apparently intended to enhance
its political utility. U'hile this program reflected tha
style of Niki ta Khrushchev to some extent, it represented
At the time of the completion of this paper, Ja.nuary
l'J"/2; tiie nusiiber of "Yankee" class submarines in an
operational stacus or under constrvictioii was nearing





a continuation of the politics '.vhich were par ticuXariy evi-
dent in the Soviet inari'pii lotion of international percep-
tion.-:; v/hich had been somewhat successful followi;ig the
launching or the Sputniks in 19 G7. The relatively more
restrained cla.iias for antimissile defense systems v:hich
characterized the remainder of the decade reflected both
the style of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime and a perception
that the creation of ari "Antimissile Gap" vxouid possess
diminished political utility. Several factors contributed
to ti>is perception. First was an apparent realization that
previous Soviet att:empts to exploit real or alleged strate-
gic capability advantages had only produced short- tei"m
results which were then transformed into greater strategic
inferiority than had existed previously. Three Soviet
actions related to strategic forces during the period fol-
lowing World War li had produced such results: the detona-
tion of an atomic device in 1949, the long-range bomber
demonstration at the 1955 Tushino Air Show, and the launch-
irjg of Sputrtik in 1957. The atomic test, which had taken
place much earlier than had been predicted by V7estern ana-
lysts, v/as a major factor in the United States decision to
proceed with the development of thermonuclear weapons. The
"Bomber Gap," which grew out of the demonstration at Tush-
ino, resulted in an increase in the numerical strength of
the Strategic Air Coirjr.and during the latter half of the
1950 's. Finally., the United States missile deployments,
which wt^re stimulated by the launching of Sputnik, resulted
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in the marked Soviet. Ktrategic inferiority which influenced
the outcorae of the Cuban Missile Crisis. A second lactor
v;as the drastic improvement in strategic intclLi g«:5nce col-
lection capability which had resulted froiu technological
developments such as reconnaissance satellites. Since
antiruissile defense systems require large supporting radar
installations in addition to extensive ir.issile launch ccio-
plexes, detection in the early phases of their construction
can be assumed. Additionally, satellites can r;.cnitor the
numerical strength of the launch complexes. Tl^e key remain-
ing uncertainty in intelligence estimates of antimissile
defense capabilities is the quality of the defenses. These
uncertainties can be kept within reasonable limits by con-
ducting research and development activities on a nation's
own defensive systems. It should be noted tiiat qualitative
claims by either side are influenced by enlisting bodies of
opinion in each society v;ho contend that antimissile sys-
tems are ineffective in the major power confrontation con-
text a Although articulation of this belief in tiic case of
the .Soviet Union has been lim.ited to expressions^ by the tv/o
scientists Sakharov and Kapitsa, a trend toward increased
"antimissile realism" was also apparent in statements by
military leaders during the period after 19G7. In the United
States, this opinion is widespread as evidenced by state-
ments of both those who opposed and supported deployment of
Se)-,tinel and Safeguard. h final factor is the difficulty of
staging a convincing demonstration of antimissile capability
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short of ail actual nuclear exchange. vvhile it is a rela-
tively .siu.plG t<i3k for either the United States or the Sov-
iet Union to intercept an incon'iirg reentry vehicle under
test conditions, system performance under conditions of
Gi^turatioi)
,
penetration aids deception, and in an atmos-
phere of previous nucJ^-iar detonations remains a major un-
verif iiible uncertainty .
Tv\'o factors wliic)i have ciiaractorized Soviet force pos-
ture and its development have somewhat diminished in their
applicability under the Brezhnev-JCosygi n regime: defensive
emphasis aiid attempts to technological j.y "leap frog" the
United States. Most Vvestv-^rn analysts assessing the Soviet
antimissile defense deploym.ent have depicted it as a logi-
cal continuation of a traditional predilection for strate-
gic defense. While this emphasis has deep roots in the
Russian experience predating the Soviet period, it was par-
ticularly eviderit during the twenty years follov;ing V^'orld
VJar II. It has been estimated that Soviet expenditures on
antiaircraft defenses during this period were two and one-
4halt times those of the United States. Hov/cver , despite
these expenditures on interceptor aircraft and antiaircraft
guns and missiles, these weapons generally lagged behind
United States offensive capabilities and tactics. For
4, U.S., Congress, House of Representatives, Subcommittee
on the Department of Defense of the Comjiiittee on Appro-
priations , Jiilitary P rocu remen t Authorization s for Fi s-
cai_Y_ear_19S8
, 9 6 1li "Conqre s s , F
i
rst~Se s sTorTT" (Washing-
ton, 1367) p". 30 2.
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examplf:-, early Soviet interceptor aircraft were unabJ.a to
operate at nicht or in adverse v;eather conditions ivhen
5Uniteu States bombers haa that capability. Later, v;hen
tiic SA-2 surface-to-air missile systom v;as deployed to pro-
vide defenso against high altitude attack in al} weather
conditions. United States boiabei tactics had already beer?
changed to stress low lev.^1 penetratiorj and cil-tar:k. In
both cases, the Soviet defensive efforts had been tardy and
qualitatively infex'ior to United States offensive measures.
While the doploynents of the "Galosh" antimissiJ.e defense
system around Moscov; and the "Tallinn Line'' (v/hich ic now
considered to be primarily intended to counter high per-
formance aircraft and tne cruise missiles launched by such
aircic'ft) are indicative of a continuation of this defen-
sive emphasifi, the failure of the Soviets to substantially
expand the Moscow <intimissile defense systerf' during the late
1960 's may represent a reduction in its perceived impor-
tance. As will be outlined belov?, such an interpretation
would fit into a strategy v;hic}i other force posture devel-
opments seenis to indicate. ' It is possible to argue that
recent Soviet strategic force developruonts , notably in the
form of the large SS-9 missile with its potential counter-
force capability, represent a growing penchant fcr offensive
5. Supersonic all-weather iatci-iceptors did not enter the
Air Defense Forces inventory until 1959 with the intro-
duction of the Su~9 (Fishpct)
.
6 . See be 3.0W
, pp , 3 2 1-- - 2 3 .
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forcren raitlier thfiii defense ^ dospite the pressure of tradi-
tions, Ilov.'ever , since the SS-5 is generally regarded as at
least a potential counter force v;capon, it raay be viewed r,r.
a continuation of the traditional defensive emphasis in that
it reduces the strength of an opponent's overall offensive
capability through counterforce strikes. Interestingly, an
August 1970 article by P. G. Cudarin, Chief of the Amur Dis-
trict Civil Defense IJeadquaters , referred to the ernpioyment
of co\inter force strikes as a defensive measure:
The most effective means of defending the
country's population are effective actions
aimed at destroying the enemy's offensive
v/eapons botli in the air and on the ground
at th.eir bases. Rocket troops ~ the nev;
typo of armed forces - play a major role
in the destruction of tliC enemy's offen-
sivc v;eapons . '
Soviet attem.pts to technologically "leap frog" the
United States also characterized the tv;enty year period after
World \\'ar II. These attempts exploited the secrecy inherent
in a closed society and the dbility of a comjnand economy to
allocate resources directly to the solution of a particular
technical problem. There is some indirect evidence that the
first sucji attempt v.'as the rapid Soviet transition frcm the
atomic to the hydrogen bonib in t}ie period from 1949 to 1953.
The most notable success v^/as the virtual bypass ina of the
7. P. G. Gudarin, ''Modern Offensive Means of the Imper-
ialist Ar n.i i e s , " B^agoreshchensk Domes tic Service i
n
Russian, 104 5 GMT7~5~?^gust"iy'7 .
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intercontinental bomber to concentrcrce researcl/ on micsj.lcs.
aided by the p^ircicul^jrly e'Cfc.ctive '•.ieinonstrction at the
1953 Tvishino Air Show v/hich contributed to tho 'JioribGr Gap"
of the io.ic;~1950 ' s . This performance was repeated through
the manipulation of. Sputnik, and the ''Mis"^>ile Gv.p' of the
late 1950 ';•. Again in this case, tlic Soviet Union did not
translate a short'- term technological adva?'itag»:- into military
hardware on a large scale. It now appears that large scale
military procurement was postponed until second- generation
intercontinental ballistic missiles v;ere develcpcd and proof
tested in late 1961. The antimissile defense deploymerits
during tlie period fro:o 1962 to 196S seemed to repeat this
pattern, initial deployment; of wliai: probably weie teclmo-
logically primitive systems was made in 19C2 and 1963,
accompanied by a moderate program of public statements to
probe Vv^estern reaction while research and development con-
tinued on m.ore sophisticated systems and components. V/est-
ern reports indicated that the Moscow dspioym.ents (v;hich
were essentially completed in 1568) v/ere begun, lialted, and
Sthen resuiiied in early 1956. Breaking with Lhe former pat-
tern, reversion to continued rt'.search and development rather
than eyteniiive doploymert followed m.id-~196S and has appar-
ently v~cnt.ii-iued to the present time, January 1972. This
decision, which probably reflected Soviet domestic poiiti-
ca.l goals,, priorities, and perceptions of international
8. T^\e iJew York Times, 8 December 15 66, p. 1.
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factors,, was apparently raaae in early 19 6 7 as has been out-
9lined above. Viewed j.n conjunction vi th the apparant
reduced eiophasis on stratenic dt.fanse- attempts at techno-
logical leaps have a reduced role in a.w overall Soviet
strategy which seems to favor raore solidly based force
dev€.-.lopments , Additionally, improvements in strategic
intelligence collection capabilities have degraded tJf.e prob-
ability that a techno-locjical J.eap can take place wxthout its
being detected in its early phases.
numerous political analysts have described the politi-
cal conf rcntaticri which has evolved between the United
States and the Soviet Union as o. ''limited ad\'erc:ary " rela-
tionship c In the context of the 1960 's, both superpowers
v/ere seen to have mucual interests in avoiding nuclear war,
sustaining their client states when threatened by clients of
the opposing superpower, and mainr.aining cheir political and
military interests where they v/ere already established.
While tiiis anc^lysis recognized the relatively greater dyna-
mism of Soviet aspirations, it tended to assume that this
dynamism v/as a transitory phenomenon v^hich would subside
with tliG passage of tinte as domestic demands for resources
and the attention of the Soviet leadership became more acute
To date, this dynamism has not. subsided. In general terms,
the trend during the decade in question has been for the
United States to see "limited" as the operative word in
9. See above, pp, 106-113.
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describing this relationslJ p while the Soviet Union has
focused on the ' iicivcrsa.ry" portion. A3.thonoh. the Uniteci
Stati'S has acted oji the premise that its restraint v.'ouid
ultiinateiy induce the Soviet Union to reciprocate by impos-
ing parallel restraint on its policies and actions . the Sov-
iet Union appears to have taken United States restraint for
granted and viewed it as an indication of diminished Ameri-
can will to act as an adversary. it is even possible to
argue that United States perceptions of restraint have been
interpreted as duplicity by the Soviet leadership. Fox
example. United States deployment of antimissile defense
systems and multiple v/arhead offensive missiles would seem
to fulfill an adversary perspective, but v/nen coupled ',/ith
professed eagerness to negotiate on strategic arms 3 imita-
tion could have been seen as an attempt to diminish the vig-
ilance of the Soviet Union while the United States attempted
to reattain strategic superiority. On the other hand, in
reviewing SO'/iet moves toward arms control of antim.issile
defense systems, they have seemed to follow United States
actions which could be described as "hard" bargaining moves.
The professed willingness on the part of the Soviets to
begin negotiations in ooth ]9fi8 and 1969 follov/ed key Senate
votes sustaining the Administration's deployment decisions.
On a highly speculative basis, it can be argued that the
Soviet leadership is miore willing to deal with the United
States when its behavior cc'iifcrma to the imago of an adver-
sary than when it takes a "softer" line. The failure of an
..>.>-- i ,-•>, :
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adversary to act in keeping vith this in.age rae;y be expected
to be viev/ed with suspicion rather thai; gratitude by the
Soviet ITnion.
Viewing Soviet force posture developnients vh.ich have
evolved during the tenure cf the Brczhnev-Kosygin reginve;.
it is possible to outline a possible Soviet grand, strategy.
Broadly speaking, t.hese developjTtents have in-::luded ir.creased
land-ba.sed strategic offensive forces whose nuiabers exceed
those of the United Stages end v;h:.ch are per.ceived to pos-
sess a significant counterforce capability; near numerical
parity in second strike, relatively invulnerable submarine-
launched missiles; major impi'over^Konts in the luobility of
Theater Forces, including naval infantry (presumably simi-
lar in its mission to the United States Marine Corps) ; naval
forces capable of operating for extended periods in areas of
potential intei-national conflict such as the Mediterranean
Sea and the Indian Ov-rean; an expanded ruerchant marine; and
improved air superiority (fighuer) aircraft and antiaircraft
surf ace-tO'-air rriissiles apparently available to selected cli-
ent states faced witli threatening air forces. h hypothetical
grand strategy indicated by these force posture developments
would invoiv-e the stalemate of United .States stratevgic forces
allowing for l-.h3 ij.creased utility of the mcie mobile con-
ventional forces in areas of conflict more remote from the
Soviet Union than contiguous states '.vijcsrei Soviet fox"ccs have
traditionally been influential. Thomas Wolfe nas pointed
out that a persistent the?,)e cf Soviet statements on arms

^ £. ^
control and disarmament questions has invoivcd pledges of
"no fj.rst use'" of. nuclear weapons. Such a pledge by the
United States would essentially reduce the credibility of
potential political threats banod upon its foriaeriy super-
ior strategic forces. Having failed to secure such a
pledge through, negctiacioiis
^ the Soviet strategic force
buildup represents the virtual attainment of such an agree-
raent. througli force posture deveJ.opments and their effects
on mutually held perceptions by both sides. In the absen.ce
of the possession of credible first strike capabilities for
United States strategic offensive forces, any threat of the
employment of its strateg.ic forces by t')e United States
would imply a wj.llingness to risk destruction of its cities
in return tor siiailar destruction of Soviet cities. Some
analysts, notably Donald C. Hrcnnan. have terr.ed such a
sitiHitioji as "mutual assured destruction (MAD)'" and have
stresc-ed the lack of credibility of such threats. Per-
ceived United States reluctance to employ its strategic
forces wouJd be enhanced by the counter force capabilities
10. ThcT'ias Yi, V?olfe, "Soviet Ir- teres ts in SALT: Political,
Economic, Bureaucratic ar.d Strategic Contributions and
In.pediments to Arms Control," unpublished monograph
preser.ted to the Fifth Internation al Arms Control Sym-
pos.ium, Philadeipi i a, Pennsylvania, 13 Octc>ber I97j.
,
pp7~~Tr-40. For the text of a 1S68 Soviet Government
m.emora.nduia concerning urgent disarmament steps v;hich
listed a "no first use" pledge first, see Tass Inter -
nationa j Service in English, 1810 GMT, 1 July 19 68.
Jl. Donald G,. Brennan, "The Case for Missile Defense,"
Foreign Affairs, April 19 69, p. 4 43,
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of the Strategic Rocket Forces. Possession of such forces
v;oulca be expected to raise the political threshold of escal-
ation to qeneral nuclear v;ar. The rojc of antimissile
defense systems in such ri ground strategy would be similar
to that of a counterforce capability at greater cost. Put
bli;ntiy, the marginal utility of antirpisBiJe. defense sys-
tems in such a stre.tegy dictates expenditures or<. other
types of forces. Extensive research and development activ-
ity in areas related to antiraissile defense systems would
reduce the risk of such a force postLure, particularly in
the short-term when the potential adversary does not pos-
sess such defenses. The generally perceived lack of v;ill-
ingness on the part of t:he United States to erg^ige in con-
ventional conflict in reivote areas in the aftermath of its
experience in Vietnajii enhances the credibility of such a
strategy and the potential political influence of Soviet
conventional forces in those areas,
'Passive" defense measures, known generally as civil
defense, nave received additional Soviet emphasis since
19o5 v;hen the program v;as recentralized under the leader-
ship of Marshal Chuikov. This recentralization has been
accompanied by an extensive and ongoing publicity prograra,
abetted by compulsory and universal training beginning with
classroorf\ training of school children and continuing through
further education at niost places of emplovinent- The train-
ing includes integrated dis^istex- programs in ixuclear a.ttack,
post-attack radiation hazards, bacterial and chemical attack,
i .
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and r.atureil disa5;tfii"5i , such as floods, Includod are fairly
realistic exerciser, in rescue and repair of the deva^Jtated
areris, Coliective farm exerciser, for exam.pj.e, have encom-
passed protection of livestock. Additional elt..'raent:3 in the
civil defense program include apparent plans for the evacu-
ation of urban populations, to r^^ral areas, vn.th cadre work-
ers remaining in the cities to use ezifsting shelters; plans
for rail and road e^'acuaticn with established timetables
for assembly at collect) or? points; and lists of items which
families are to brii'.o with thcra in the event of mass evacu-
ation, Oiie author has further hypothesized that an alter-
nate command structure has; been established in the Volga
Military District in the event of a nuclear disaster tc
Moscov;."^" United States civil defense po.-epsrations have
been Jaroely confined to paper studies and the dasiqnatiori
of urban structures to serve as slieltern. With the cxcop-
tion of a surge of public interest in hcTiC civil defense
procedures v/hicii included a boom in t.he construction and
iiiai-keuing of home shelters in the early 19G0's, United
State;? public interest in civil defense has reinained pas-
sive. hiO training prograri-. comparable to that of the Soviet
Union has been instituted,
As the decade of the 1960*3 progressed, antijidssile
defense systeris generally acquired functions which, v.-ere
12- John Erickson, Soviet J^ilitary Pov.'er
,
(London: The
Royal United v'>eF\'l^cV-:^Tiis"trt^ut","i'&71) .. p. 4S.

- 326 ~
raore. syinbolic thau nnlitary. Initially, the belief that
they represented tlivi iaost Lc^ jhnicfil ly sophisticated wea-
pons system in cxiEtence mcide their potential psychologi-
cal influence on tlie perceptions of technological superior-
ity held by third powers seem valuable. While this factor
vas not normf».lly discussed, it nevertheless v/as a subtlety
which influenced decisions by both the United States and
the Soviet Union.. IIov;ever,. as the decade ended, the devel-
opment of multiple vvarhead offeiisive systems somewhat usurped
this tuncT:.ion, In. the context of the strategic dialogue
between the United States and the Soviet Union, antimissile
defense systcia de^jloyments also fulfilled symbolic functions.
The location of the Soviet defenses had such function,
although, other factors were probably more important. The
Nixon Administration's emphasis on defense of strategic
retaliatory forces before providing a thin area defeni^e of
population and industrial centers '/.-as symbolic in that it
v/as seen to enhance r.he credibility of the United States'
proclaimed "assured destruction'' strcitecy.
Jn the tv'o years of negotiations at the Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks (SALIM which have followed the period of
this paper, a wide)y held perception that some limitcAtion
of aiitimi sr.ile defeiise systems v.-ou Id be an element of a
first stage of r?greement has developed. This perception
received official sanction in a statem.ent made jointly by
the United Stales and the Soviet Union on 20 Il^v 1371-,
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The Governments of the United States and
tlie Soviet Union, after reviewing the
course of their talks on the limitation
of strategic armaments, have agreed to
concentrate this year on working out an
agreement for the limitation of the deploy-
ment of antiballistic missile systems -
ABM ' s
.
They have also agreed that together with
concluding an agreement to limit ABIl ' s
,
they will agree on certain measures v;ith
respect to tne limitation of offensive
strategic weapons.
The two sides are taking this course in
the conviction that it will create more
favorable conditions for future negotia-
tions tc limit all strategic arms.
These negotiations v/i 11 be actively pur-
sued. ^-^
The mutual perception of the diminished political util-
ity of antimissile defense systems v;ith regard to the grand
strategies apparently adopted by the United States and the
Soviet Union has led to tx situation where the limitation of
such systems is possible. In a sense, this possibility
reflects the symLtolic function of antimissile defense sys-
tems. Perceived to possess marginal political und military
advantages at groat financial cost, they represent an area
where some agreement can be reached with relatively minimal
political cost.
13. Tas s International Service in English^ 185 3 GMT, 2
May 1571 and Thc""New Yo"rk ""Timer. , ^21 May 1971, p. 2.
The full text of the announcement is quoted above.
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Soviet antimissile defense forraulaticns published during the
poriod ' froir. January 19G0 to November 1969 ha^'^e included those
listed belcvv. They are arranged in chrcnclogical order » The
author and his military position, when available and if appli-
cable, follow the quotation. Pages listed arc crossreferences
to the text of the preceding paper.
October 1960 - "So far, there is no practical way of repuls-
ing a nuclear rocket attack." Major Genera] Talensky,
military theoretician on the Soviet General Staff, p.
27.
Noveniber 1960 - We have rockets that can destroy "offensive
piiotless devices at great altitudes." Marshal Kaza-
kov, CoHLTiander of Artillery and Missile Forces, p. 2o.
Septerfiber 19 61 - "We remain very satisfied with the w'ork of
those who produced the irieans of combatting rockets*"
Preraier Khrushchev, p. 32.
October 19 Gi ~ "I must report to you that the proble:ri of
destroying missiles in flight ha.3 been successfuJly
solved." iMarshal Malinovsky, Defense Minister, p. 33.
May 3.962 - 'We have successfully solvei the probleiu of des-
troying enemy missiles in flight. " Colonel Sidelnikov,
p. 33 .
July 19 62 - "The Soviet Union was forced to develop . , .anti-
missile rockets." Premier Khrushchev, p. 35,






August 196 2 -' In reg<-;rd to antimissile def onsei^ , "in prin-
cipj.ep a tocJinical solution to this piobler.i han been
found." Marshal Sokolovsky, fcjrroer Cnicf of the Sov-
iec Goneral Staff, p. 35.
October 19 6 2 - "We have successfully solved the problcra of
destroying enemy missiles in flight." MarsJu'ii Malin-
ovs3:y , Defense MinistGr, p. 35.
Decemijcr 19 62 - "The Soviet Union has proved her superior-
ity over the United States in the field of antimissile
defenses." Marshal Biryuzov, Conimander of the Strate-
gic Rocket Forces, p, 37.
February 1963 ~ "The problem of destroying enemy rockets in
flight has been successfully solved." Marshal Biryu-
zov, Comniajider of the Strategic Rocket Forces, p. 38.
Nove.Tiber 19G3 - The rocket displayed in the 7 Koveinber par-
ade is capable of destroying "the enemy's rockets in
the air.'" Marshal Biryuzov, Coirjaander of the Strate-
gic Rockec Forces, p. 42.
"The c.xiijtiag systems of antiaircraft and antimissile
defei'irjO cannot v/ith.stand nuclear rocket strikes. And
.no iTiatter how strong this defense may be, cur strategic
rockets v;ill inevitably reach their selected targets-"
Marshal Krylov, Commander of the Strategic Rocket
Forces (Marshal Krylov replaced Karshal Biryuzov after




January 1964 - "The covabat possibilities of the PVO forces
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permit the destruction of practically all modern means
of strategic attack." I-iarshal Sudets , Commander of
the Air Defense Forces (PVO)
, p. 44.
March 1964 - "VJe have successfully solved the problem of
creating a reliable defense, not only against aircraft
,
but also against mis^iJes." Marshal Sudets, Commander
of the Air Defense Forces, p. 44.
August 1964 - "The constantly growing possibilities of anti-
missJle defense roust be taken into account." Marshal
Sokolovsky, forraer Chief of the General Staff, p. 46.
October 19G4 " "Antimissile systems are defensive weapons in
the f u] 1 sense of the word." Major General Talensky,
military theoretican on the General Staff, p. 47.
November 1964 ~ "It should be added that in cur country the
problem of combatting enemy rockets in flight has been
successfully solved and effective methods have been
found for destroying any weapons of air and space
attack by an aggressor." Marshal Krylov, Commander of
the Strategic Rocket Forces, p. 51.
February 19 6 5 - "The Soviet Union has solved the complex
and extremely important problem of destroying any enemy
rocket in flight." Marshal Malinovsky, Defense Minis-
ter, p . 53.
May 1965 - Rocket displayed in the military parade is an
"antimissile missile." Pravda< p. 54.
October 1965 - /antimissile defenses "have become a reliable
shield against nuclear attack." Marshal Malinovsky,

Defense Ki'iister^ p, 56,
February 19ff) - "I'e have eveiythi.-^g necessary for succesc-
faXiy corabatti' p.g enemy missiles at distune approaches
to protectcu objectives." Marshal Malinovsky, Defense
Kin.\ster, p. 60. This statement vas repeated by Gen-
eral BatitsKy. First Deputy Chief of the General Staff
and subsequently Correnander of th^e Air Defense Forces,
p. GO
.
April 1966 - "Soviet air defense means reliably ensure the
destruction of any aircraft and many rockets of the
enemy." Marshal Malinovsky, Defense Minister, p-*. 61.
"Models of our rockets ...are capable of destroy iny
enemy means of air and space attack at a^iy a I titudo
and at great distances from protected areas and objec-
tives." Marshal Sudcts, Coranander of the x^ii Defense
Forces, p. G2.
May 1956 - "Our antiaircraft troops are developed to the
point v/here they can guarantee the destruction of any
type of aircraft, and many missiles, of an eneiay. "
General Ivanov, Co:mviandanc of the Higlier Military Acad-
emy of the General Staff, p. 66.
"At the present time, the air defense weapons insure
the reliable destx'uction of any aircraft and many mis-
siles of the en'^my - " Marshal Sudcts, Comraander of the
Ail* Defense Forces, p. 68.
January 1967 - "Tiie A3.r Defense Forces are capable of reli-
ably protecting the countiy's lerritor.y against an ^lerial

- 332 ~
attack of tiie enemy. " Marshal Maiinovsky, Defense
Minister, p. 89.
February .19 67 - The Air Defense Forces "can reliably pro-
tect the country's territory from an enemy air attack."
Generui Eatitsky, Commander of the iAir Defense Forces,
p . 1 4 .
"Detecting enemy ruissiles in time and destroying them
in flight i.s no problem." General Kurochkin, CoiuB^and-
ant of tfie Frunze Military /^cademy
,
p-, 104.
"Modern means of cintiaircraft defense assure the des-
truction of any aircraft and many kinds of rockets,"
Marshal Grecliko, First Deputy Defense Minister, p.
10 4
.
"Unfortunately there are liO means yet that would guar-
antee the complete security cf our cities and rr.ost
important objectives from the blov;s of the enemy's
weapons of mass destruction." Marshal Cliuikov, Com-
mander cf the Civil Defense Forces, p. lOS.
'*In recent years a realistic possibility has arisen
for u:. effectively carrying cat antirocket defense."
Harsl)al Bagramyan, Deputy Defense Minister, p. 10 5.
"The Soviet. Union has solved the complicated and highly
important problem of destroying enemy missiles in
flight." Marshal Kazakov, Commander of artillery and
Missile Forces, p. 106
«
"Our antiaircraft defenses have efficient raissile
intercepting syi-tem.s." Marshal Sokoicvsky, former
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Chief of tiie General Staff, p. 105.
Jane 1967 - "..»the best means for defending our state from
nuclecir attack are our powerful rocket troops and our
antimissile missiles and interceptors, which are
designGid to prevent enemy nuclear missiles from pene-
trating cur air space. They v;ill be destroyed even
before they approach our borders." Marshal Chuikov,
Conimander of the Civil Defense Forces, p. 126.
July and September 19G7 - ''The enormous speed, especially
v/hen approaching a target, and the various forms of
trajectories make the [strategic] rockets invulnerable
in flight, especially when used on a mass scale." Mar-
sha] Krylov , Commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces,
p . 13 5.
August 1967 - The Air Defense Forces "are equipped with
modern antiaircraft missiles and fighter planes. The
high standard of technical equipment of the air defense
units ensures their ability to cope with the task of
protecting the country from nuclear attacks." Colonel
General Lomov, p. 167.
November 1967 - Soviet "antirockets permit the creation of
a reliable defense of separate targets and broad
regions of tiie country." I zvestia and Krasnaya Zvezda
,
p . 1 5 5 .
"Our antiaircraft troops are capable of destroying
enemy mass air and space attack at any altitude and at




"Among their ^rms, our country 'r> ant?i.air defense; 3 have
accural. e interceptor -r.-lssiles of enerny nuclear carriers
and missi.les . '' Marshal Krylov, Coinraander cf tlie Stra-
tegic Rocket Forces f p. j5B,
January 19 68 - "The arnuirriant of the air defense forces con-
tains complexes of antj a.i rcraf v nuided missiles cap-
a.ble of de^3troyin9 practically all uiodern nieans of air
and opacc attacks at significant distances from
defended targets, at high and lov altitudes, and at
supersonic r light speeds." ileMeral Batitsky, Conmiander
of the Air Defense Forces, p. 16?
<
February 1968 - "The Air Defense Forces arc capable of des-
troying an.y aircraft and many missiles of the enemy."
Marshal Krylov, Commander of the Strategic Rocket
Forces, p. 16 5.
"Wg are closely watching the development: of rccket
technology in the armies of other major countries and
we knc/v their present state. V/e also know the solu-
tions to the problems of antrrocket defence." Marshal
Krylov, Corrj-nander of the Strategic Rocket Forcer., p.
166.
"The Air Defense. Forces are capaijle of destroying any
aircraft and ir^any missiles cf the enemy." Marshal
Zakharov, Chief of the Genera] Staff, p. 166.
"The Air Deferise Forces have charged beyond recogni-
tion. They comprise antiaircraft rocket troops, air
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defense avifihion, e.nd radiotechnical troops capable of
waging a. sbccessful sLrugqie against canned and unman-
neri means of air iittack undnr any conditions and at a
considerable distance, from defended objectives." Mar-
shal Grech3;.o^ Defense Minister, p. 166.
July 19 6 8 - The Air Defense Forces ''have learned to make
use of the most modern fighting means and are destroy-
ing tne eneray at all altitudes and in all maneuvering
conditions." Marshal Eatitsky, Comjnander of the Air
Defense Forces, p. 133,
November 19 6 8 - "The great speed, wir.h complete automatic
control over the flight of the missiles, and some
other properties of the v;eapons make them practically
invulnerable to existing systems of enemy missile
defense." Marshal Krylov, Coivuuander of the Strategic
Rocket Forces, p. 190.
"A main component of our PVO Forces is liow the anti-
rocket troops, which in cooperation with other branches
of the anti-aircraft defense force, reliably defend the
Soviet skies from all methods of air attack by an
aggressor." Sove tsk iy Patriot, p- 190.
February 1969 ~ "The Party and Government have entrusted
the Air Defense Forces v;itVi the defense of the father-
land's air frontiers, having created all necessary con-
ditions for fulfilling iihis responsibl3 task.' Marshal
Batitsky^ Coiumandor of the Air Defense Forces, p. 207.
May 1969 - "The country's air defense forces, which include
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antiaircraft inissiTie forces, fighter aircraft, rddio-
technical and special forces capable of reliably ! it-
ting all modern means of the enemy's air attack at
great distances froin the objectives being defended, at
ail ranges of altitudes ar.d speeds of flight." Marshal
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